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My dissertation explores the making of the modern division between the political and 
the economic realm. To modern political reason, the economy appears like a self-
standing reality, internally related in terms of functions and understood to follow 
regulating laws of its own. The dissertation counters this account of the relation 
between the economic and the political realm. It analyzes the epistemological claims 
to objectivity, on which this division rests and shows how the allegedly neutral 
depictions of economic necessity remain inextricably linked to political imaginations 
of order. The main thesis of the work posits that the modern rendering of economic 
reality in terms of a self-contained and functional realm stems from the desire to 
establish secure foundations for a viable body politic. 
The works of Malthus and Keynes are the exemplary cases for this study of the 
intimate relations between political reason and accounts of economic objectivity. The 
writings of Malthus crystallize in important respects the emergence of the specific 
modern objectivity at the beginning of the nineteenth century. With him, the notion of 
scarcity gained its important role for defining economy. It is shown that the definition 
of economy in terms of scarcity is tied to Malthus’ attempts to envision a regulatory 
epistemology for the social body, which ensures a silent and visceral order against the 
uncertainties of the political world. The economic realm is thus conceived as the 
foundation of the body politic. The writings of Keynes witness the crisis of this  
   
economic foundation at the beginning of the twentieth century. The dissertation 
explicates Keynes’ critique of the epistemology of scarcity, which underwrites modern 
accounts of economy. He opens a perspective on economy in terms of temporality, 
conventions and power, which traverses the closed boundaries of the economy. But 
this different view on economy is overlaid by Keynes’ political desires to procure new 
foundations for the body politic: the envisioning of a national economy under the 
guidance of the economic expert, for which Keynesian economics is known, fulfills 
this desire. The thinking of economy is thus shown to be inextricably tied to the 
question of the political.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 1991 the world famous economist Jeffrey Sachs traveled to Russia, 
invited by president Yeltsin to give his advice about how to set the failing remnants of 
the inherited Soviet economy onto a new track. The “dead-end” of socialist economic 
wisdom, the political change and the rampant inflation was to be healed by new 
recipes of the “clinical economist,” to use the term Jeffrey Sachs prefers for himself. 
He had collected credentials as an advisor to Bolivia, Poland and Chile earlier, being 
very much in demand by politicians the world over. Having applied his wisdoms to 
other economies before, equipped with historical precedence about decisive changes 
and with the expertise of an economist, he designed a “shock therapy” for the Russian 
economy. This time it almost killed the patient. Disappointed by the failing outcome 
of the therapy due – according to his own opinion – to other governments not carrying 
through with aid and the incomplete implementation of his suggestions, Sachs has 
since then focused his attention upon the fate of Africa to rescue it from poverty. As a 
special advisor to U.N. general secretary Kofi Annan and the spokesman for the U.N. 
Millinium Project, befriended with pop-star Bono, and director of the Earth Institute at 
Columbia University he travels the world to achieve the eradication of poverty.
1  
Modern common sense rarely wonders about these traveling experts, who are 
asked to mend the economic diseases of the modern body politic.
2 International bodies 
                                                 
1 “An economy,” he says in an interview“can be reoriented from a dead end, a dead end of socialism or 
a dead end of mass corruption or a dead end of central planning, to a normal market economy.” See the 
webpage pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_jeffreysachs.html for his own 
account of his experiences. At Harvard he gave a speech at the degree ceremony for medical doctors 
with the title: “Clinical Skills, Global Solutions,” which is symptomatic for his belief in the valid 
analogy between the doctors for social and individual bodies. See 
(focus.hms.harvard.edu/2006/062306/classday_sachs.shtml).  
2 Traveling experts in economic matters are not such a recent phenomenon. For an example of a long 
history of “money doctors” (see Drake 1994).  
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of governance, such as the International Monetary Fund employ many  “superb 
professionals, who regularly work 80-hour weeks,” and who are “bright, energetic, 
and imaginative,” with a commitment to reduce poverty, set economies on the right 
track and produce accounts of particular national economies.
3 Based on scientific 
accounts of ‘the economy’ and the political neutrality of their expertise, they assume 
universal applicability and common benefit to their work. These descendents of the 
“worldly philosophers”, as Heilbronner once called the towering figures in the history 
of economic thought, are not content with exclamations of high morality and 
normative visions, but turn towards material desires and every-day needs, trying to 
figure the demands for progressive development in view of the inclinations, limits to 
and necessities of human existence.
4 While the experts change and their recipes with 
them, the claims to the technical neutrality of their doing and the overbearing weight 
of economic matters surrounds the position they fill in different ways. This 
commonality of technical advice and importance seems to travel even across very 
different political regimes in Western modernity; it surrounds the scientific plan about 
economic production as much as the scientific merits granted to markets.
5 
                                                 
3 These descriptions are taken from an open letter of Kenneth Rogoff from the IMF to Jospeh Stiglitz, 
chief economists at the World Bank, who had written a scathing critique of the economic policies of this 
institution in his book Globalization and its Discontents. It is a very instructive piece of writing in 
respect to the self-understanding of the economic experts at work, their assumption about the universal 
validity of their recipes, the medical analogies and the modes of ‘truth discourse’ employed. The letter 
is published in the official IMFSurvey (see imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2002/070802.pdf). 
4 See Heilbronner (1999). It should be noted that Heilbronner had no liking for a science of economics 
closed in the certainty of mathematical models and would probably like to see a different professional 
self-understanding that that exhibited by the employees of institutions like the IMF. 
5 One might take Jeffrey Sachs’ own description here - to be found in the same interview cited above - 
as a point in case. While becoming an official advisor to Russia in December 1991, he worked 
informally already under Gorbachev, invited by the Grigorii Yavlinsky, who had been a key economic 
advisor to Gorbachev and to Yeltsin when they were working together in 1991. The former and future 
experts met and Sachs describes it in following words: “I ended up giving a series of, in what for me 
were rather extraordinary circumstances, lectures to senior officials at the state planning agency... And 
there we were, probably 30 senior [officials] across the table all with their books open and I was giving 
them lectures about market economy from A to Z. And they were taking notes on everything, trying to 
figure out how to save themselves.”  
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The privileged position of neutrality, which economists assume in order to 
enlighten political reason about the economic reality it has to reckon with, hinges upon 
its clear division from the political sphere. The latter fares in this framework as a 
realm of power, cumbersome deliberations, populist demands, impending corruption, 
and the limitation of legal instruments of intervention. The boundary staked out 
between these two spheres should not be understood to imply indifference on the side 
of the economists towards the other half. Economic regimes are supposed to support 
and further a desired political order, and arguments about the market as the guarantee 
of liberal rights are often to be heard. But the support comes from a safe distance. The 
economist’s reasoning about order is not initiated by a deliberation about the “art of 
the political,” the various notions of freedom and power, their relation to bodily needs, 
machines, regimes of exchange or the like. It commences instead with the question of 
necessity, functional organization, desire or individual rationality. Those elements are 
assembled in a depiction of a self-enclosed system of economic relations, internally 
related in terms of functions and understood to follow regulating laws of its own. 
Correspondingly, to the political will, the economy appears like a stumbling 
block: it is a self-contained world, often defying normative projections of the common 
good. The laws of economy precede and exceed the means of sovereign law and 
imprint instead their demands on the political will. Lack and plenty, decay and 
progress, indeed nothing less than the life and death of the social body, all seem to be 
at stake in it, which no one can afford to circumvent. Even if economics today has 
shunned all substantive definitions of its subject matter in terms of livelihood and has 
only retained the notion of scarcity as its placeholder, the order of economy remains 
inextricably tied to questions of material well-being. To ignore the precepts of 
economy, expounded by its scientists, conjures up the threats of inviting social 
calamities of a higher order. Where political hopes might easily be led astray and are  
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too quickly at hand with high normative aspirations and popular proclamations, sober 
accounts of economic reality are more cautious. They teach a realism of facts, 
historical feasibility and the proper order of means and ends. Beyond the sentimental 
wishes of the beautiful soul and the superficial drama on the political stage, the viable 
order of social life is announced in the abode of economy. “We turn to the economist 
to supply prescriptions for society’s ills”, writes Sheldon Wolin, summarizing this 
modern temper; such knowledge, as the sociologist Herbert Spencer put it, “can 
scarcely fail to affect our judgments as to…what is desirable, what is practicable, what 
is utopian” (cit. in Wolin 2004, 262). 
An immense political and cultural privilege accrues thereby to accounts of 
economic reality. In regard to questions of life, political reason develops an 
understanding of its limits, envisions appropriate forms of governance and separates 
the realm of the viable from utopia in reference to the definition of economic reality. 
My current project started with a sense of astonishment about this privilege and the 
powers it grants to the laws of economic reality. This privilege appears to be 
accompanied by a certain depletion of the political imagination, which oscillates 
between succumbing to the economic realities of the market and a managerial and 
technocratic stance to ‘the economy’ as an object of intervention. Faced with this 
diminished state of the political imagination, the most naïve and general questions 
appear to be strangely appropriate: If political reason is so prominently referred back 
to economic reality, what kind of reality pertains to economy? What is the nature of 
the necessity implied? On what grounds is the externality between economy and the 
political realm maintained and what shapes the boundary between these two realms?  
These are questions that engage with the assumptions about the nature of 
economic objectivity itself, necessitating thereby an epistemological and philosophical 
stance. The question of epistemology is here to be understood as a historical one. It is  
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directed towards a historical analysis of the political and social bearings of the ‘telling’ 
of ‘economic truth’, intending to unravel the boundaries erected around the functional 
laws of economy and the political reason that it implies. The present dissertation 
engages therefore with the shaping of economic objectivity in light of a genealogy of 
modern political reason. Its guiding assumption – which remains to be made plausible 
by the argument itself and whose theoretical resources will be given due recognition 
below – is that the rendering of economic reality into a self-contained realm, governed 
by its internal laws, bespeaks a desire of political philosophy for foundation; in the 
strict externality assumed between the political and economic sphere one is 
confronted, so to speak, with an internal division of political reason. Economic 
thought is in this sense also political philosophy, wrought with every hope for 
foundational visions of the common good, and mindful of the inherent contingency 
traversing such hopes. It is argued here that the claims to depict economic reality are 
thus also political imaginations of forms of subjectivity, hierarchies of judgment and 
decision, modes of actualizing the common good and – often – utopian schemes of 
order. 
It is important to note that the peculiar division between the political and the 
economic realm has a specific historical origin: it bespeaks a modern conception of a 
body politic, which emerged in the wake of the French Revolution. With the 
nineteenth century, the conception of social cohesion outside of the political sphere of 
legal representation became more paramount, although it exists already with different 
roots in the eighteenth century. The modern body politic is split and its ‘other’ half 
belongs to a more natural realm, to which social and economic order has to adhere.
6 
                                                 
6 See Poovey (1995) for a cultural history of the birth of the notion of the “social body” in Victorian 
England. Recording the completion of this change by the mid-century, she contends: “Whatever its 
causes, by 1860, the idea that individuals were alike in being responsible (economic and moral) agents 
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The physiological body becomes in this conceptualization both, a material basis to 
which economic thought refers and a figurative source to imagine social order. This 
double status is created in a discourse that simultaneously strives for scientific and 
political foundations.
7  The emphasis on the material and imaginary, individual and 
social body, belonged thereby to a general rise of conceptualizations of order in terms 
of functional cohesion, that pertained not only to the physiological, but also the social 
side of things.
8 Scholars in different disciplines have noted the profound changes in 
the systems of thought at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Sheldon Wolin 
accounts for it as part of the rise of a “non-political model of a society…being a closed 
system of interacting forces” and the “erosion of the distinctively political”, which 
culminated at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
9 Joseph Vogl records in the 
same manner, but more recently, that the rise of the economy as the privileged site of 
society’s self-description and its rendering of a fertile and production social body 
belongs to this time.
10 As Wolin points out, it was also only around this time that 
scarcity constituted “a basic presupposition of liberalism”, adopted through its alliance 
with economics, whose peculiarity as a body of knowledge “was its insistence on the 
                                                                                                                                             
was being advanced as a substitute for the tutelary role that the metaphor of the social body had initially 
assigned to the state.” 
7 See de Mazza (1999), who sets out to trace how and why ‘the organism, as physiological correlate of 
the autonomous bourgeois subject and the biological substrate of the whole human being, advanced to a 
paradigm, which organized public thought about the reorganization of the political body’ [my own 
translation from the German original]. 
8 For the social science Saint-Simon is often presented as a point of crystallization of these new 
conceptualizations. He is recorded to have said “My friend, we are organized bodies”. The science of 
political economy was also linked to the study of organized bodies: “The subject matter of political 
economy was a complex and living totality. As a science of society, economic science ought to study 
the various social organs, their needs and ways to satisfy these needs (Heilbron 1995, pp. 183-4). 
9 See Wolin (2004, pp. 260, 262, 271, 281). He also sees a long line connecting the developments more 
than a century ago with the current situation: “The decline of political categories and the ascendancy of 
social one are the distinguishing marks of our contemporary situation where political philosophy has 
been exclipsed by other forms of knowledge.” (ibid).  
10 See Vogl (2002) for a very careful and sustained discussion of this change in the conceptions of 
economy and “poetics of knowledge” associated with it. The quote is translated from the book, which is 
written in German. About the change between the eighteenth to the nineteenth century (ibid. 247f).  
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primary importance” of this concept (Wolin 2004, 285).
 Foucault has tried to capture 
this change towards the notions of organization, function and limits in the human 
science in the phrase of the “analytics of finitude”, which has guided the analysis of 
the questions of wealth, society and economy in the nineteenth century. It linked the 
anthropology of the naked human being with the elaboration of the social body as the 
most fundamental part of the body politic. 
The “displacement of political by economic theory” (ibid., 272), which is the 
focus here, belongs thus to the rise of these novel conceptualizations, which impart the 
division of the spheres with the sense of closure, self-organization and externality on 
the side of economic reality. The present project focuses on the particular rendering of 
the economic realm stemming from this period, while it should be noted, that 
systematic reflections upon economic matters commenced much earlier. The 
“differentiation of the things economic from their social context” is traced back to the 
seventeenth century (Appleby 1978, 26);
 from there, the next great step towards the 
systematization of economic thought is usually associated with the Physiocrats, who 
envisioned the economy in terms of a closed circular process, and the work of Adam 
Smith (Schabas 2003a).
11 But intellectual historians have cautioned more and more 
against seeing a line of continuity between those centuries, or even between the world 
of Quesnay, Smith and classical political economy.
12 For Adam Smith, the reflections 
on wealth were still a “branch of the science of a statesman or legislator”, developed 
as part of the questions of “police, revenue and arms” (Winch 1996, 21). Similarly, the 
physiocratic system – much hated by Hume and criticized by Smith – was directed to 
                                                 
11 For various historical, economic and theoretical accounts of economic thought, which converge in 
this respect, see Schumpeter (1955), Lowry (1974, 429), Gay (1969, 349), Buck-Morss (1995). 
12 Keith Tribe warns against reading similar economic terms like price, value, production as necessarily 
belonging to the same system of thought and cautions against treating the history of economic thought 
in terms of “anachronistic unities” (Tribe 1978, p. 35).  
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counsel the “rulers or those with influence at court”.
13 Such remarks can only indicate 
the different relation between the economic realm envisioned in the eighteenth century 
and the political reason it shaped and related to. The beginning of the nineteenth 
century saw a different construction of ‘the economy’ and its attendant political 
reason, one that resorted to notions of self-organization, functionality and scarcity. It 
defines a world in which we still live at the beginning of the twenty-first century, as 
the historian Rothschild has put it − and it is this world with which this work is 
concerned (2001, 6).
14  
Objects and Interlocutors in the making of the modern body politic: Malthus and 
Keynes 
In order to render plausible the claim that the construction of political economy as an 
“innocuous, unpolitical subject”
15 belongs to the elaboration of political reason itself, 
this dissertation centers on two thinkers whose work crystallizes in prominent ways 
the articulation of modern political reason in its relation to economy. Thomas Robert 
Malthus, standing at the beginning of the long nineteenth century, and John Maynard 
Keynes, experiencing its end in the first decades of the twentieth century, are the 
objects of my analysis and my interlocutors for tracing the articulation, crisis and re-
articulation of modern economic objectivity. Both have written in times of profound 
                                                 
13 See Tribe (2003, 154-155). The Physiocrats hoped to influence the sovereign to rule according to 
natural precepts. They favored a “legal despotism”, which was intended as “a rebuke to Montesquieu’s 
parliamentary theory of balancing bodies” (Riskin 2002, 108-109). 
14 “We still live, at the outset of the twenty-first century, in a world which is defined, in important 
respects, by the evens of the French Revolution and of the Post-Revolutionary restoration” that is, the 
“coalition of laissez faire economic policy and political conservatism which was established in 
opposition to the revolutionary violence of the 1790’s and which came to dominate nineteenth-century 
political institutions” (ibid.). 
15 See for this phrase Rothschild (2001, 244-245).  
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political and social upheaval, which encompassed or threaten to encompass the 
inherited modes of living, conceptions of man and political hierarchies in a whirlwind 
of change. Both economist have been intensely concerned with the events of their time 
and sought to provide a vision for a new, properly founded body politic. 
Malthus stands at the cusp of the break between the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century. Intimately tied to the Scottish Enlightenment and the debates about the 
French Revolution on the one hand, his work is on the other hand the beginning of the 
modern body politic chronicled above. Scarcity, functional necessity and the 
fundamental status of the economy became accepted idiom with the public debate of 
his work, the analysis of which thus gives clues about the transformation of political 
reason in the making of modern economy. If Malthus testifies to the beginning of the 
modern body politic – and also most prominently to its bodily foundations
16 − John 
Maynard Keynes witnesses a moment of its impending demise. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, the rise of the social question at home and of imperialistic rivalries 
abroad signal most visibly the strain of the “Victorian synthesis” of law, hegemonic 
peace and market exchange.
17 He answered the crisis of the body politic with a 
profound criticism of its economic foundation and set out to devise a new basis for it - 
more lasting than the old, but based on the scientific account of the ‘economic 
machine’ nonetheless. Keynesian policies shaped the post-War international order and 
government policies for developing the ‘national economy’ until the 1970s, since 
which time, as indicated above, the tides have turned back to the market. But 
regardless of the fate of these systems of thought, the foundational work of Malthus 
                                                 
16 Catherine Gallagher has pointed out, how the body became with Malthus “completely 
untranscendable” and thus “absolutely problematic”. As it could not be ignored anymore, it received a 
complete valorization. This is how she characterizes the “nineteenth century discourse on the body” and 
the social organism (Gallagher 1986, pp. 88-89). 
17 For a cultural-historical account of the “anxieties” of this time, see Hynes (1968) and Peppis (2000).  
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and Keynes remains of lasting influence in shaping and exploring the modes of 
rendering intelligible “economic reality.” As Mitchell has pointed out, it was only 
since Keynes that the notion of the macro-economy has gained the statistical 
coherence, it enjoys today throughout, while Malthus’ articulation of scarcity never 
waned in its importance. Both thinkers together offer therefore exemplary and crucial 
insights into the articulation of modern economic objectivity and its role for the body 
politic and are chosen therefore as the focus of the current work.  
From another perspective, the concentration on Malthus and Keynes might also 
appear a quite peculiar choice for an attempt to think about the specific ways in which 
the economy, as a self-enclosed space, was isolated from political reason. If Malthus 
captured certain aspects of the nineteenth century change, he also retained certain 
theoretical sensibilities that set him very much apart from figures like Ricardo, whose 
labor theory of value and mechanistic approach were to have such ascendancy in the 
nineteenth century.  Keynes, understanding himself to belong to the “ranks of the 
heretics”, counted Malthus with him, since for both of them, capital could die from its 
own abundance and mechanisms of regulation did not work smoothly. Indeed, 
Malthus wrote his political economy in order to stake out a science more in line with 
some aspects of the eighteenth-century thinker Adam Smith, who gave desires, 
customary validation and time a role to play for the determination of relations of 
exchange.
18 Yet, regardless of these distinctions, Malthus’ contribution to founding the 
division between the political and economic worlds on the basis of the “laws of 
necessity” remains in place. The quarrels among economists in the nineteenth century 
occur on an already established groundwork, which Malthus laid down.  
                                                 
18 For the role of desires in Adam Smith, see Shapiro (1993) and the differences between Smith, 
Malthus and Ricardo within the shifting systems of thought see also Winch (1996, 410-411).  
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The fact, that Malthus’ work functions as a watershed between the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, between the political debates that greeted the inauguration of 
political economy and the rise of political economy as a science, offers a most 
instructive site for the exploration of the intimate links between political reasoning and 
the rendering of economic facts. The intermeshing of political and economic argument 
in Malthus does not single him out as more backward, religious or pre-scientific in his 
economic thought than those who came after him, but instead render visible the 
inextricable link to those political, philosophical or moral foundations of the belief in 
laws of internal functioning, which is characteristic for this science.
19 Likewise, 
Keynes is a figure of different callings, being an economist, philosopher and statesman 
alike, as his biographer has put it,
 whose explicit political reasoning will help us trace 
the scientific making of the economic objectivity for which his name no less stands 
(Skidelsky 2003). But Keynes assumes also a slightly different role in the argument 
presented. It is especially with him, that the closed space of ‘economic objectivity’ is 
traversed in ways that open possibilities for thinking about economic matters in a very 
different light: economy is presented in terms of temporality, conventions and 
hegemonic measurements. In this sense, Keynes is not only the object of a genealogy 
here, but also an interlocutor to explore other possibilities of thought. 
As it probably has already become apparent, the theoretical and analytical 
                                                 
19 Winch has gone furthest in making the case for Malthus as a “political moralist”, and argued to give a 
decisive role for Malthus’ Christian beliefs and natural theology (Winch 1996, 221-405 and especially 
411-412). Others have -and the reading of Malthus given in this work agrees more with them – have 
stressed the more fundamental role of his utilitarian reasoning. See for this argument also Haevener 
(1996, 409). The fact that Malthus described political economy as a ‘moral science’, not capable of the 
same exactitude than the mathematical science, should be placed in the context of this time and the 
meaning of moral science then. It referred to the “integral science of man and society”, and it took 
physiology as its stronghold in order to take the study of morality of the hands of theology, linking the 
account of ideas, sentiments, senses into one single framework, more akin to “zoology” than theology. 
For this account see (Heilbron 1995, 176-177).  
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ways these figures of economic thought are approached is different from usual 
accounts of their contribution to economics as a science. In line with the guiding 
assumptions and questions posed above, they are read here as political philosophers 
and economists simultaneously. Our concern here is to decipher the political reason 
that is foundational to the their texts within the factual accounts of the economic 
realm. The boundaries they draw and re-draw around these two spheres are analyzed 
in terms of the political vision they mean to sustain. This mode of reading results in an 
often de-familiarizing interpretation of their work. It stands at a distance to the 
histories of economic thought and the narrative about the progress, leaps and faults of 
the science. It places importance where others do not - for example in Malthus’ 
lengthy discussions of indigenous societies – and it has supplemented the material 
published in the thirty-volume Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes with 
archival work on his political-philosophical writings and his lectures on population. 
Somehow deemed not as relevant in the legacy of his work and thus not made 
available, they required my research at the King’s College Archive Centre and they 
shape the argument of this dissertation in important ways.
20 
Discussed in the context of a “history of the present”, which is interested in 
understanding the making of an economic functionality in conjunction with modern 
political reason, Malthus and Keynes are taken out of the space of their discipline.
21 It 
is therefore not surprising that only sparing support can be found in today’s newly 
burgeoning debate on Keynes or Malthus, wedded as it is to the history or further 
                                                 
20 See the list of ‘Archival Sources’ at the end of the bibliography. The archival material about Keynes’ 
very early writings on political philosophy, notably his paper on Burke (UA 20/3, 1-85); about his 
understanding of time (UA 17, 1-21); and about his relation to questions of eugenics have been most 
important for the current argument. 
21 Genealogy, understood as a “history of the present” is, above all, in the words of Dean “a new form 
of criticism, able to induce critical effects and new insights” without invoking teleological unfolding or 
global necessities” (Dean 1999, 35).  
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development of economics as a science. In respect to Keynes, the greatest proximity 
can be seen with scholars within economics who seek to retrieve a different legacy of 
Keynes than the “hydraulic Keynesianism” that became dominant in economic 
policies and orthodox adaptations of his work. These scholars, called “Post-
Keynesians” or “fundamentalist Keynesians” pursue the questions of uncertainty, 
institutions and historical processes within the account of economic dynamics.
22 They 
are met on the other side by some economists who use the methods of discourse 
analysis and science studies, to argue for the constitutive and radically constructivist 
nature of economic theory.
23 But for the genealogy of political reason and the inquiry 
of the boundaries of these fields, they do not offer the theoretical perspectives sought 
in this work and are therefore mentioned only from a distance. Outside of these 
debates in economics, Keynes finds some rare considerations in debates about English 
modernism, but has otherwise – despite of his rhetorical wit and accessible prose – not 
found a wide scholarly audience in social or political theory.
24 The reception of 
Malthus offers an only somewhat different picture. Due to his influential role as a 
thinker at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the intellectual history attending to 
his work is more widespread than the acknowledgement of his contribution to the 
history of economic thought.
25 His influence on the shaping of the Poor Law and his 
                                                 
22 See Arestis (1992, pp. 88-89) for this account and Danby (2004) for going beyond the assumptions of 
internal coherence. Danby argues to go beyond the modernist assumptions of economic thought and 
resorts to economic sociology, social networks and thick descriptions as an alternative approach, which 
is yet again different from what this current seeks to do. For the post-Keynesian scholarship, see Dow 
(1995). Fitzgibbons and Carabelli are good examples of the link these scholars seek to establish 
between the philosophy of Keynes and his economic thought (1988; Fitzgibbons 1988). For the 
philosophical discussion of Keynes’ notion of common sense see also (Coates 1996). 
23 See Ruccio (2003) and Cullenburg (2001) for the discourse-theoretical approaches to economics as a 
science.  
24 See Esty (2000) for an argument, which will be taken up in the discussion of Keynes. 
25 For the most comprehensive reconstruction of the scientific standing of Malthus within this tradition 
see Hollander (1997).  
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connection to the political debates at the time have made him a part of the history of 
political theory as well, not to speak of his lasting influence for population studies
26. 
As will be seen in the following chapter, this scholarly work in intellectual and 
political history helps in important ways to corroborate elements of the theoretical and 
historical narrative constructed here, and is cited extensively.  
But the argument envisioned here cannot find the necessary theoretical and 
analytical support in this diverse and fine scholarship. The potential significance and 
plausibility of this study rests with the intimate relations it can exhibit to exist between 
the visions and temptations of political philosophy and the epistemological molds and 
claims in and with which modern ‘economic objectivity’ is made. For this, one has to 
turn to debates in political theory and social theory, which very rarely even touch upon 
the thinkers chosen here. It is to these debates about the notion of the political, the 
‘analytics of power’ and insights of historical epistemology that this dissertation 
contributes, by considering the question of economy in the writings of Malthus and 
Keynes in a new light. 
‘Modern economic objectivity’: Historical Epistemology and the question of the 
Political  
The seemingly simple question, about the kind of ‘economic objectivity’ to which 
modern political reason so overwhelmingly refers, is not as simple as it might appear. 
It already bespeaks a theoretical and methodological perspective that allows one to 
claim that ‘all questions of epistemology are questions of social and political order,’ as 
                                                 
26 Most of these reference are part of the chapters on Malthus. A good, a most recent entry point into the 
scholarship of Keynes gives the book by James Huzel on the popularization of Malthus (2006).  
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Shapin and Schaffer in the by now canonical work on Hobbes and his relation to 
experimental science have put it (Shapin 1985). Equally canonical for the discipline of 
science studies has been Lorraine Daston’s argument on the historical and moral 
nature of objectivity, asking how it is possible that the very form of objectivity, “that 
seemed to insulate science from the moral – the creed that takes the fact/value 
distinction as its motto – simultaneously lays claim to moral dignity of the highest 
order” (1992a; 1992b, p. 122). We might ask in a same vein, how the science of 
economy, insulating itself from the political and professing this at its very motto, 
simultaneously lays claims to political dignity of the highest order? 
This opening up of epistemological claims to social and political analysis 
refers prominently today more often than not, inside and outside of the discipline of 
science studies, to the writings of Michel Foucault, who has provided tools and 
perspective to posit these questions in fruitful ways. While the uses and abuses of the 
notions of discourse, power and truth are overwhelming, his own explanation of these 
terms is still a source of methodological guidance, in that it forces “philosophical 
disquietude” about epistemological claims within a close historical analysis of the 
practices of knowledge – “being understood here as places where what is said and 
what is done, rules imposed and reasons are given, the planned and the taken for 
granted meet and interconnect.“ (Foucault 1991, 75). In her recent book on the history 
of economic facts, Mary Poovey has applied this perspective to an analysis of 
economic thought in the early nineteenth century, including Malthus, among other 
thinkers, in her material. Her argument about the specific nature of observations and 
empirical reference that can be ‘counted’ within this discourse has been a very well 
received contribution to the field of sciences studies, which has begun to de-naturalize  
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the strategies of economic science, to render its object of study open to reflection, as 
opposed to its acceptance as self-evident, as has been assumed.
27 The economist Philip 
Mirowski has been the most visible figure in this respect, with his books on the neo-
classical tradition of economic theorists, that criticize their reliance on the physical 
notion of energy-conversion to render their category of value constant, as their 
scientific aspiration would require.
28 
But all these works, important as they are to support the questions posed to 
‘economic objectivity’, remain linked to the internal account of this science, and very 
specific in their empirical material and in the focus of the argument - they are, for this 
reason, silent on the relation to political reason. Closer to the theoretical concerns of 
this work have therefore been studies on the discourse of development and the 
understanding of economics on which it relies Escobar already a decade ago suggested 
regarding “economics as culture”: “It is above all a cultural production, a way of 
producing human subjects and social orders of a certain kind” (Escobar 1995, 58f). 
More recently Timothy Mitchell followed up on this claim with his book Rule of 
Experts. Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (2002). He counters the ‘pictures’ of 
economy produced in development agencies with a more grounded and differentiating 
account, posing discordant facts and perspectives in order to demonstrate the 
particularity and limitations of these pictures of economy and the stories of 
modernization of which they are a part. The links these writers establish to relations of 
power and the making of order lead us back to Foucault, on whose theories they 
explicitly rely. We are moving in wide circles, as the current debates offer only partial, 
                                                 
27 See Poovey (1998). Her argument resolves about the double nature of the ‘facts’ - “general facts”, as 
Malthus called them - which belonged already to a coherent system in their very modes of observation.  
28 Aside from Mirowski’s (1989; 1994; 2002) work, also the following have contributed in this way to a 
different history of science: Cullenburg (2001), Yonay (1998).  
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albeit very valuable aspects and inspirations, but have initiated no coherent discussion, 
that would string together epistemology, the political and economy into theoretical 
perspectives and critiques, which would develop further the frameworks Foucault has 
offered. 
Within the last decades the reference of truth-regimes back to relations of 
power have become very ubiquitous and it is refreshing to read Foucault’s own 
warning against being too quick in theoretical conclusions: The “political critique of 
knowledge” Foucault says of his own approach, “does not consist in denouncing the 
power, which resides in any alleged truth, since, believe me, the lie or the error are as 
well part of the misuse of power”. It is not to “denounce the oppressive element in 
reason, as believe me”, he says, “unreason is as oppressive”.
29 The point is therefore 
not, to infer from one pole of the relation between power and knowledge to the other, 
but to analyze under “what conditions and with which kind of effects a “veridiction” 
occurs (Foucault 2004, 61). As well known, Foucault’s theoretical ways to link 
questions of knowledge to those of power turned towards the “materiality” of practices 
and techniques. The making of knowledge and the relations of power met in this 
practical, technical aspect, to which he recurs in all of his theoretical and analytical 
endeavors.  Thus, in his analysis of liberalism in terms of a political rationality – or 
political reason, as it is termed here - he emphasizes accordingly, that liberalism 
should neither be understood as a theory, nor as an ideology, but as a practice: that is, 
it is a rationalization and reflection upon techniques of governing (Foucault 2004, 
436).  
                                                 
29 These quotes are taken from the lecture on the “History of governmentality II: The birth of 
biopolitics”, held in 1978-1979 at the Collège de France. They had not been published until 2004 in 
German and are not yet published in English. The translations stem thus from myself. See for reference 
the German edition of Foucault (Foucault 2004, 61).  
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Foucault turned towards the study of liberalism as a political rationality in the 
context of the lectures on the History of Governmentality. The newly coined notion 
‘governmentality’ - a neologism between ‘governing’ and ‘mentality’ – introduces not 
a new analytical perspective.
30 Instead, it is a frame for Foucault’s attempt to deploy 
the de-essentializing and relational analyses of power and knowledge for processes, 
larger in scale and scope than the individualizing, disciplinary techniques he had 
studied before.
31 Already in the History of Sexuality, Foucault had described modern 
forms of power as both, individualizing and totalizing. The study of governmentality 
picks up this thread and turns towards technologies of governance, which encompass 
strategies to govern a social whole as a whole. 
It is this context of a genealogy of political rationalities that Foucault turns 
towards the themes of population and economy. He seems thereby to address the 
complex of the themes of economy, political reason and population, which are so 
central to this study. Yet, his elaborations remain – despite the proximity of phrases, 
themes and analytical perspectives – in a certain distance to the envisioned project. By 
ascertaining this distance, it will be possible to specify the theoretical focus and to 
account for the structure of the argument. A few paragraphs are therefore dedicated 
towards the elucidation of how Foucault approaches the themes and questions that are 
                                                 
30 He defines governmentality as follows in the context of his concept of power: “The notion of power 
itself has not other function than denoting a realm of relations, which are to be analyzed; what I 
suggested to call governmentality, that is, the modes, in which the conduct of human beings is 
governed, is nothing but the suggestion of the grid of analysis for these relations of power”. (Foucault 
2004, 261). 
31 He says explicitly that he wishes to explore the possibilities of the perspective on technologies and 
strategies of power to the field of the state – which is at the same time, it seems, an exploration of the 
possibility of a non-totalizing perspective on issues grouped in social analysis usually under the heading 
of “macro-level”. The decisive part of the citation in German is as follows: “Wenn, was die Disziplinen 
anbelangt, diese dreifache Bewegung des Übergangs nach Aussen gewagt wurde, dann ist es diese 
Möglichkeit, die ich jetzt hinsichtlich des Staates erforschen möchte” (Foucault 2004a, 177).  
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pertinent to this work. 
Foucault grants population and economy a paramount role for the genealogy of 
political reason: the modern political problématique, he asserts, is inextricably linked 
to the question of population and economy.
32 Both, population and economy are 
understood as the correlatives of a technology of power – more specifically, they are 
understood as the correlative of the liberal technology of power, which seeks to govern 
through indirect means. Liberalism addresses the interests and desires of individuals, 
in order to mold their conduct towards the utility of the whole (Foucault 2004a, 108f). 
It is not the minute attention to the disciplining of each element, but an “aleatory 
space”, which is opened for the different forces to intersect and governed in view of 
statistical means and risks (ibid., 38-43). Needless to say, Foucault neither assumes the 
reference to the self-interested individual, nor to the freedom granted in this ‘aleatory 
space’ of forces as marking the limits to relations of power. On the contrary, they form 
fields for a plethora of interventions, albeit of such indirect kind. Most debated today 
by those working within this framework is the contemporary form of “neo-liberal 
governance”. Foucault had commenced in his lectures the analysis of this form of 
liberal rule, which centers on the extension of a calculative grid to institutions and 
types of human action, where they have assumed no governing role before. Wendy 
Brown lucidly points out that “[n]eo-liberal rationality, while foregrounding the 
market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy”; it rather pertains to 
producing “all human and institutional action as rational entrepreneurial action” 
(Brown 2003).  
                                                 
32 The quote in German is as follows: “[D]as moderne politische Problem ist, denke ich, unbedingt mit 
der Bevölkerung verknüpft” (Foucault 2004a). At another point, he describes the question of population 
as a condition of possibility for the thinking of economy, “that only became possible to the extent that 
the subject of population was introduced” (ibid., 118).  
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Her remark, apt as it is, might thereby alert also to the limits of the view on 
economy and liberal political reason, as developed in the Foucauldian account. The 
focus on the regulatory and constitutive relation, in which the (economic) subject is 
made, is here not meant to be doubted in its validity and importance. On the contrary, 
it has guided an aspect of the analysis of economic thought and political reason. But 
the question of economy – loosely understood to refer to the relations of money, 
exchange, objects, production and needs – elapses curiously from sight. While 
economy and population are granted such paramount role, the question of what 
Foucault’s “analytics of power” could imply for this field of economy, seems to 
remain unanswered. 
This unanswered question might be due, on the one hand, to a simple reason: 
Foucault explicitly located his analysis of liberal political rationality and 
governmentality as an alternative to theories of the state, which assume it to be a 
centralized, overarching power structure. Foucault set out to answer to the counter an 
understanding of the modern liberal state, which would be too quick in asserting an 
undercurrent “fascist” and “totalitarian” core (Sennelhart 2004, 534). It bespeaks the 
historical context of the 1970s and Foucault refers to the “phobia of the state” as the 
foil against which he develops the notion of governmentality and announces: “The 
problem of the formation of the state lies at the core of the questions, I attempt to 
pose” (Foucault 2004, 112). Thus, the economy – unlike here – was not part of the 
‘theoretical disquietude’, which guided his analysis.  
But there might also be a deeper, more systematic reason, for why Foucault did 
not, in the course of his argument, at least open up the question of economy and its 
relation to modern political reason in a different way. This more systematic reason 
might lie in the very approach to questions of power and knowledge solely in terms of 
techniques, which is usually the very source of analytical strength. But applied to the  
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genealogy of liberal reason, and the account of the modes of governance of “the social 
body as a whole”, the attempt to ‘read off’ the analytics of power from the dominant 
discourses about economy and political reason, seem to loosen its strength. While 
always seeking to twist liberal political reason into an “analytics of power”, he seems 
to be dangerously close to mirroring the horizon set up by the system of thought he 
analyzes. The structures of governance he describes in terms of the limits enacted by 
markets, the “aleatory spaces” of forces and the self-interested subject, might be an 
effect of a form of political reason. It might not guide the way to understand the 
relations of power at work, but impede such analysis, as it stems not only from the 
elaboration of governmental techniques but also from the foundationalist temper of the 
political philosopher. Perhaps the strict division between the ‘modern economic 
objectivity’ and political reason belongs as much to the realm of metaphysical desires 
or dreams for order, as to the sober liberal reflections on how to govern beyond the 
law. 
With a different aim than Foucault and in light of the theoretical dissatisfaction 
with his account of political reason and economy, this project thus cannot rely on all 
the work he has done. Instead of drawing the notion of economy too quickly into an 
account of a governmental technique, the project here is more cautious. It attempts to 
contribute to the genealogy of modern political reason and its relation to economy, by 
engaging very closely with both, the political and economic writings of two important 
economists. Its aim is to elucidate in an exemplary fashion the intimate relation 
between the making of modern economic objectivity and the political visions, to 
which it answers.  It thus opens the Foucauldian notion of political reason towards the 
realm of visions of order and foundationalist tempers, which inflect the modes of 
thinking about economy itself. How to open the functionalist space of the modern 
economy to an ‘analytics of power’ and the spaces of contingencies and contestation  
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accompanying it, without eschewing the consideration of the specificity of questions 
of money or other economic matter, is here taken to be an open, rather than an 
answered question within the Foucauldian perspective itself. But the first aim is to 
understand the strict division between the economic and the political sphere, the 
epistemological privilege granted to economy, its proclaimed necessities and realities 
and the role of political reason therein. 
Structure of Dissertation  
The dissertation is divided in two parts, revolving around the works of T.R.Malthus 
and J.M. Keynes respectively. The part on Malthus analyzes the emergence of the 
specific modern economic objectivity at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
argument, which seeks to show that the modern account of economic objectivity 
belongs inextricably to a mode of ‘doing’ political philosophy, proceeds in three steps. 
The first one consists in excavating the political problématique, which Malthus 
presents to his readers. Through a careful reconstruction of the historico-political 
context, Malthus appears as a political philosopher, who was concerned with and 
plagued by the question of political judgment. The French Revolution abroad and 
political radicalism at home had given rise to an unprecedented democratic extension 
of political voice, which was coupled with the impending politicization of the 
questions of life and subsistence. The fears, uncertainties and complexities, which 
seemed to be tied to political judgment in general and the advent of life on the political 
stage in particular, are paramount in Malthus’ text and lead him to search for the 
proper foundations of the body politic afar from the political stage: he turns towards 
the socio-economic body, which is then imagined to be governed by its own laws of 
production and reproduction. The first chapter thus traces how the worries of the  
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political philosopher Malthus bring about the political economist, who sets out to 
establish a distinct economic order, prior and external to political reason. 
The second chapter consists in a close reading of Malthus’ texts aiming to 
explicate the principles of order, which are at work in the accounts of such self-bound 
economic reality. The chapter centers on the notions of limits and scarcity, which 
reside - since Malthus - at the core of economic science. These notions are shown to 
vacillate constantly between the normative and factual register, bespeaking more the 
wish for order than the sober and scientific account of the allegedly constant laws of 
nature and necessity. Against the difficulties and uncertainties of political judgment 
and the complexities and dangers attached to the politicization of life, economy is 
presented as a regulatory epistemology, which guides the social body towards 
happiness and wealth in a silent, visceral manner. The peculiarity of this social 
epistemology, which couples fear and lack with truth on the one hand and suspects 
abundance to result in blindness on the other hand, stands at the core of the second 
chapter.  
The third chapter takes up the general principles developed before and 
demonstrates how the subject-position of economic man and the regulatory capacity of 
capital and value exhibit this epistemology of limits and the proper order it is 
supposed to bring about. As a social epistemology, economy encompasses a much 
wider field than the professed concentration on the creation of wealth. It claims to be 
the condition of possibility of civilization and viable material order in general. The 
figure of economic man and his gendered predicaments belongs to this vision of order, 
which directs its regulatory powers to the molding of sentiments, desires and needs. 
The making of the proper subject of order stands at the center of the epistemology of 
economy – while the notions of capital and value exhibit in turn nothing more than the 
regulatory dreams of this epistemology of scarcity.  
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At the end of the nineteenth century, these foundations of the body politic 
crumbled. The neat boundaries between the economy and the political sphere and the 
promises of scarcity, progress and civilization were contested by the political, cultural 
and social events of the times. Like the first part, the second part commences with an 
elaboration of the specific political problématique, which the political philosopher-
cum-economist contrived. Akin to Malthus, Keynes was concerned with the questions 
of political judgment as the politicization of life returned with a vengeance. But unlike 
to Malthus, the economy did not promise anymore to offer the stable foundation 
against the vagaries of political judgment. On the contrary, economy had become part 
of the problem, as it appeared as a source of contestation and instability. The historical 
chapter on Keynes as a political philosopher traces hence his problematization of the 
inherited notion of the economy; with him, economic man becomes a figure of sorry 
degeneration and the solid grounds of economy turn into an epistemological vertigo.  
The fifth chapter probes into the theoretical grounds, on which Keynes relies 
for his critique of the inherited conceptualization of economy. This chapter engages 
with Keynes as a theoretical interlocutor, who has provided the venues for thinking 
economy beyond the confines of the epistemology of scarcity and beyond the 
foundationalist desire to find order in this realm. The sources of this different mode of 
thinking economy, which centers on the questions of temporality, measurement, 
conventions and power, are carefully retrieved from Keynes’ various writings – 
published and unpublished. Such reading presents an aspect of Keynes’ thought, 
which resides in between the old orthodoxy of economic thought, which he criticized, 
and the new orthodoxy of economic objectivity, which he took part in founding. 
Reading his thought against the grain, this chapter comes closest to outlining a mode 
of thinking about economic matters, which is not embroiled in the foundationalist 
temper and opens these matters to relations of power and contingency.  
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But Keynes did not eschew the foundationalist desires of political philosophy; 
nor did he forego the specific privileges of the scientific authority of the economist. 
The sixth chapter turns towards the more well-known Keynes, who has envisioned a 
new economic foundation for the body politic. The account of a national economy, 
open to be regulated by the scientist in the service of the common good, belongs to the 
Keynesian heritage; it has dominated the post-War era and provides still the template 
for political debates about the possibilities to tinker with the economic fate of modern 
societies. This last chapter explores the making of “hydraulic Keynesianism” in terms 
of a commitment to a political philosophy, which searches proper foundations and thus 
strives for the closure of the field of economy – overlaying the opening of this realm 
Keynes had developed before.  
A brief reflection on the question of the political in respect to economy 
concludes this political genealogy of modern economic objectivity, woven through the 
historical and theoretical analysis of these two exemplary thinkers of economy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SHORELESS SEA OF POLITICAL REASON AND THE QUEST FOR 
FOUNDATION 
 
“I have, during my life, detested many men; but never any one so much as you” – thus 
William Cobbett vented his political anger against Robert Thomas Malthus. Compared 
to others it was a mild allegation against him. The soft-spoken clergyman had been 
alternately called a “mischievous reptile,” a “black vampire” and a “miserable sinner 
against science,” guilty of having produced an “abdominable tenet,” utterly 
“disgraceful to man”.
33 The object of all this hatred was a book, which had appeared 
first anonymously in 1798 under the full title An Essay on the Principle of Population, 
as it affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of 
Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers.
34 It was written, so the story goes, “on 
                                                 
33 William Cobbett wrote this in his Weekly Political Register 34, 33 (May 1819), as in (Tuite 1998, 
152). The disdain about the “abdominal  tenet” stems from Coleridge, cited in (Fulford 2001,360). Marx 
thought that he was such “sinner against science” – this and Proudhon’s and other allegations can be 
found in Dupaquier (1983, 259) and Walzer (1987, 2). Harriet Martineau had described Malthus as 
speaking “slow and gentle” (cit. in Huzel 2006, 55) 
34 Its success led him to undertake much more extended  research,  resulting in a much larger second  
edition which appeared in 1803 (James, 1979, 81) The empirical basis for the new work included 
among other things his own observations during the travels he had undertaken to Norway, France and 
Switzerland and the letters of the missionaries from the colonies (they will be referenced in the second 
chapter). It is taken by many to be like a “new work”, almost double in the number of pages 
(Cambridge) 1983, xv). One of the most commented upon differences lies in the “ever-greater 
emphasis” Malthus placed on the effectiveness of moral restraint while he had removed “those passages 
which had caused the widest offense” (see the introduction in Malthus 1986a, 7). The essay on 
population will be hereafter abbreviated as PO. There are changes throughout the editions. The fifth 
edition, for example, concentrated on the schemes of Robert Owen instead of those of Godwin to 
exemplify the peculiar problem the force of population posed against their ideas of improvement (James 
1979, 376). The reading given in this work relies on the enlarged editions, using the sixth as the 
reference point, but being cognizant of the changes which occurred since the first edition. The work is 
treated as a whole and the quotes travel back and forth between the editions, warranted by the fact that 
the logical structure of the Essay was retained throughout. Malthus himself described the difference 
between the first and second edition in the following words: “To those who still think that any check to 
population whatever would be worse than the evils which it would relieve, the conclusions of the 
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a spur of occasion”, after a debate between Malthus and his father - who was an 
“ardent admirer of Rousseau” and “enthusiastic believer in the optimistic philosophy 
of the Enlightenment”. The book, in which Malthus set out to refute this admirer of the 
political hopes of his time, came to shape the search for the economic foundations of 
the modern body politic.
35 
The Principle of Population was undoubtedly a great success: it went through 
six editions by 1826, was quickly translated and “immediately became the centre of 
heated political debate” (Avery 1997, 77): “No contemporary volume”, commented 
the Edinburgh Review, “produced so powerful an effect upon the age in which it was 
written as the Essay on Population” (Walzer 1987, 2). It is said to have convinced 
William Pitt on the issue of the reform of the Poor Law, which was finally changed in 
1834.
36 The wish of Southey’s that the “farthing candle” of Malthus’ “fame must stink 
and go out” did not come true - on the contrary. Godwin, who had been an important 
theoretical adversary, received ever more “harsh and narrow” critiques and “Malthus 
could have not obtained more credit in the eighth century for laying the devil than in 
                                                                                                                                             
former Essay remain in full force” (PO iii). 
35 Patricia James tells the story and also gives in general a good overview of the reception, Malthus’ 
biography and the content of his books. (James 1979, 69 and 116f). About Malthus’ father and also 
about the reception of Malthus’ book see also (Avery 1997, xv and 56f). The story is also told in Halévy 
(Halevy 1995a, 104) who adds that Malthus’ father was the “exécuteur testamentaire” of Rousseau. 
Keynes’ biographical piece on Malthus also has many biographical details. See (Keynes 1971f). 
36 The Poor Law Amendment Act was passed in 1834. It challenged the right to paternal support 
through the parishes which had been granted since its ratification 1601. “The success for Malthus’ bid 
for scientific authority and his attempt to scientifically legitimate the illegitimation of illegitimate 
origins is attested by Edwin Chadwick’s comments on the Poor law Amendment Act…‘as the fist piece 
of legislation based on scientific or economical principles.’” (Tuite 1998, 150). See also (Dean 1991) 
and (Cody 2000) and about these amendments. Cody especially focuses on the fact that “for the first 
time in English history, single women were made legally and economically responsible for their 
illegitimate children” and that “a growing number of politicians and political economists accepted 
population theory as a science able to reveal the underlying truth of human behaviour and social 
institutions.”(ibid.)  
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the eighteenth century for laying Mr. Godwin”.
37 When Godwin finally published an 
answer to Malthus in 1820 on the issue of population – while Malthus’ Principle of 
Population was appearing in its fifth edition – his words were considered to be “below 
contempt” and Malthus’ himself declared it to be a “poorest and most old-womanish 
performance”.
38 The hope of Godwin, to “restore the old principles of political 
science” against the new language of population and economy was uttered in vain 
(Rosen 1970, 37). 
The Principle of Population and its wide success against its adversaries mark a 
decisive shift in the terms of public debate at that time. The language of right versus 
tradition, the calls for revolution or reform had dominated a vigorous political dispute 
during the 1790s, in which “the country had become divided – more sharply indeed 
that at any time in living memory – between those who clung to an unchanged 
political system and those who sought to reform it”.
39 British radicalism, with its call 
for democracy, its opposition to hierarchy and its promise for the end of man-made 
misery, had been revived and flourished during this decade – mainly due to Paine’s 
The Rights of Man which appeared in 1791 and which shook English radicalism back 
                                                 
37  Robert Southy (cit. in Cope 2002, 59). Godwin himself commented in 1801: “After having for four 
years heard little else than the voice of commendation, I was at length attacked from every side…The 
cry spread like a general infection.” He heard nothing but “dislike and abhorrence” about his new 
philosophy (ibid., 44) 
38 It was James Mill who wrote to Ricardo that Godwin’s book on population should not even be given 
“the honour to take the least notice of it” (Rosen 1970, 33f). About Malthus’ comment see (James 1979, 
382). The British Critic found that “Mr. Godwin is now clearly in his dotage” (ibid., 381). Godwin 
himself commented in 1801: “After having for four years heard little else than the voice of 
commendation, I was at length attacked from every side…The cry spread like a general infection.” He 
heard nothing but “dislike and abhorrence” about his new philosophy (Cope 2002, 44). Malthus himself 
wrote an anonymous review, declaring the book to be the “poorest and old-womanish performance that 
has fallen from the pen of any writer of name, since we first commenced our critical career” (James 
1979, 382).  
39 See (Royle 1982, 63), but also (Cope 2002, 45) for the account of these divisions.  
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into activity.
40 Godwin had joined with his book in 1793 - answering together with 
Paine to Burke’s famous indictment of the clash of the French Revolution and its 
English supporters.
41 It was an intensely polemical debate, fuelled and inflamed by the 
pen and rhetoric of the participating antagonists.
42 But by the end of the decade, the 
conflict had become “increasingly muted”. The role of harshest repressive measures 
instigated by Pitt in 1794 and 1795 – comprising the suspension of habeas corpus, the 
prohibition of political assemblies and the extension of the verdict of high treason to 
any criticism of the constitution or the government – was considerable in bringing this 
“radical surge, floods of lectures, meetings, conventions, book and pamphlets” to an 
end.
43 
                                                 
40 The first part appeared in February 1791, the second part was published in February 1792. Paine is 
credited with having energized and remolded the “face of English politics” after the French Revolution: 
“In 1790 English radicalism was in abeyance; after the publication of the first part of the Rights of Man 
it was shaken back into activity and was not to be checked until the full panoply of state power drove it 
underground” (Royle 1982, 113 and 45). But contentious English politics had started much earlier than 
with the French Revolution. The 1760s had already been “an important decade in the development of 
reform politics in Britain” characterized by the increasing critique of government with a mounting base 
outside of the political machinery. But the political demands for constitutional reform – i.e. improved 
representation through annual suffrage – had their precursors even earlier in the eighteenth century, 
reaching back to the 1720s and the activities of Bolingbroke and Walpole (Royle 1982, 13f) and 
(Kramnick 1968). A continuous strand, weaving earlier and later traditions of English radicalism 
together, was established through the history of religious Dissent, culminating in the writings of 
Priestley, Burgh and Price. In the last years of the 1780s the agitation to remove the political exclusion 
of Dissenters was linked to more general constitutional critique (Royle 1982, 13f and 43). Moments of 
politicization also came through the abolitionist movement. 
41 “Godwin made a greater impact than is sometimes allowed”, alerts Royle (1982, 77). Halevy 
corrobates this estimation, pointing out that, although it was a voluminous work and written in less 
accessible language than Paine’s, it did not fail to exert a profound influence in the literate circles and 
political clubs. “Ainsi se prolonge, d’année en anné, la polemique que Burke avait ouverte, tirant 
prétexte du sermon de Price, et qui fournit, en trois ans, à la literature politique de l”Angleterre, quatre 
ouvrages classiques” (Halevy 1995a, 38). 
42 McNally points out that Burke’s critique was not “intellectually disarming” to the radical critique. It 
rather strengthened it as his allegations of the “hoofs of the swinish multitude”, for example, were just 
used as a rhetorical slight against him in an even more vigorous return of argument and rhetorical armor 
(McNally 2000, 435). About Burke’s “obsession” with Jacobinism see Kramnick (1977, 143ff).  
43 In July of 1795, the suspension of habeas corpus had lapsed but was followed by the “Two Acts”, 
banning all meetings of more than forty people and licensing lecture halls” (Royle 1982, 77). The 
“notorious Two Bills”, were shocking to many (Wells 1986, 23). Raymond Williams reminds his 
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Somewhere in between 1789 and 1803 “the assessment of human nature 
changed” and the high hopes entertained before were repudiated.  Cope chronicles this 
“strident apostasy” which almost “obliterated the British enlightenment” (2002, 43). If 
it was refuted more by repression than by argument is a debated question; but for 
Malthus the matter was unquestionable: “the beautiful fabric of the imagination” of 
Paine, Godwin and their followers certainly vanished “at the sever touch of truth” (PO 
334). While they chose to dwell in a dream and to follow a “phantom of the 
imagination” -“’gorgeous palaces’ of happiness and immortality” - it was necessary to 
“awaken to real life, and [to] contemplate the genuine situation of man on earth” (PO 
329). The “bewildering dreams” and the “unrestrained speculation” of the political 
philosophers needed to be tamed with a firm eye towards the viable possibilities for 
improvement (PO 325; 602); the “old mode of philosophizing”, which “make facts 
bend to systems” were to be replaced by Newtonian discipline, which helps to 
“establish systems upon facts” (ibid, 324). Malthus’ contemporaries styled him as the 
“Newton of political philosophy” and he would certainly have embraced this title, 
honored by the comparison.
44  
The success of the Principle of Population was hence the success of a new 
idiom of political debate: “the scientific analysis of the economic workings of society” 
became more and more a touchstone for the political language of rights and the 
                                                                                                                                             
readers of this “crudest kind of repression: prosecution, imprisonment and transportation” against 
Godwin and his circle, in which their “rational and civilizing proposals” were “quite ruthlessly hunted 
down”. “It [Godwin’s circle] is a remarkable moment in English culture, still insufficiently honoured 
for the bravery for its initial attempt, and this mainly because the repression broke it so thoroughly and 
drove it underground for a generation” Williams in (Crabtree 1980,52). See (Cope 2002, 45) for this 
account of the debate before its demise. 
44 “It is certain that we cannot too highly respect and venerate that admirable rule of Newton, not to 
admit more causes than are necessary to the solution of the phenomena we are considering” (Malthus 
1986b, 8). The Principles of Political Economy will be hereafter abbreviated as PE.  
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political promises of revolution and reform.
45 To Malthus, who abhorred the mob and 
its democratic excesses as much as the despotic measures of repression, the sober and 
scientific recognition of the condition of man on earth was a much-appreciated change 
of scene. Malthus’ contribution to this rising science in his book on population earned 
him the first chair ever to be instituted in the discipline of political economy: in 1805 
he accepted the newly founded post at the East India College (subsequently 
Haileybury College).
46 The institutionalization of this science testifies to its increasing 
popularity in the wake of Malthus’ success: other universities and colleges followed, 
accompanied by a rising number of institutions and debating clubs, novels and 
children’s books, all focused on the profusion of the new wisdom of the age.
47 
Malthus himself, referring to the “increasing attention paid to the science of political 
economy” found it “particularly gratifying, at the end of the year 1825, to see that 
what I stated as so desirable twenty years ago, seems to be now on its eve of 
accomplishment” (PO 526).
48 
                                                 
45 “In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries political economy emerges as the dominant 
mode of English political discourse. The new discipline represents an important departure from the 
forms of discourse available in an earlier tradition of civic humanism” (Barker 1981, 160). 
46 James gives a very thorough and interesting account of the founding of the East India College at 
Hertford. It was set up by the directors of the East India Company in order to ensure a formal training of 
its civil servants. Students “should be imbued with reverence and love for the Religion, the 
Constitution, and Laws of their own Country” and studied classical literature for writing skills, 
arithmetic, ‘general law, politics, finance and commerce’ and ‘oriental learning’. The third subject was 
later transformed into the title of Political Economy, for which Malthus took the post. James gives a 
detailed account of the history of the founding and the connections between the Parliament, the Board 
and the Company at play (James 1979, 168-175) 
47 “Oxford established the Durmmond Chair in 1819 (held by Senior). Both, Cambridge and University 
College, London, created teaching posts in political economy in 1812, followed by King’s College in 
1831…Other forums for informed debate were the Political Economic Club (formed in 1821)”. Malthus 
and Ricardo were among the twenty-one members. The best-known popular accounts of political 
economy were Marcet’s Conversation on Political Economy (1816) and Harriet Martineau’s 
Illustrations of Political Economy; Easy lessons on money matters (1833) was intended for children, but 
reached an estimated two million readers. (Schabas 2003a, 170f) and (Redman 2002,275).  
48 The quote continues: “The increasing attention which in the interval has been paid generally to the 
science of political economy; the lectures which have been given at the projected university in the 
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The “important political truth” furnished by this science was about the 
fundamental “structure of society”, with which Paine “has shown himself totally 
unacquainted” according to Malthus (PO 526; 505). It taught political reason the 
lesson of reality – a reality, which it could not decree or wish away, but which 
imposed limits and demanded attention. Viable order and possible improvements of 
the common human lot only came in accordance with it, but not in ignorance of it. 
“Political economy is perhaps the only science,” Malthus affirms “of which it may be 
said that the ignorance of it is not merely a deprivation of good, but produces great 
positive evil” (PO 526). The knowledge of social structures it professed and the limits 
to political reason it was able to derive, were built upon the revelation of the presumed 
natural predicaments of human existence. The principle of population “dramatized for 
Malthus and his generation the predominance of scarcity in human affairs”, and 
“earned for political economy the title of the dismal science” (Dupaquier 1983, 
196f.).
49 The clear-headed confrontation with the dire facts of necessity had to be 
henceforth the basis from which all ideas about viable and possible modes of social 
order had to proceed; and the anthropological figure of man, incessantly striving to 
evade the “pressures of finitude” made his appearance.
50 
It is not the case that the eighteenth century had ignored the limits of sentient 
                                                                                                                                             
metropolis, and, above all, the Mechanics’ Institution, open the fairest prospect that, within a moderate 
period of time, the fundamental principles of political economy will, to a very useful extent, be known 
to the higher, middle, and a most important portion of the working classes of society in England” (PO 
526). 
49 The allegation of the “dismal science” stems from Thomas Carlyle (Avery 1997, 87). 
50 “Necessity, that imperious, all-pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed 
bounds…and man cannot by any effort of reason escape from it” (PO 8). The time leading towards the 
turn to the nineteenth century marks in Foucault’s account of the Western episteme the great shift from 
the classical towards the modern systems of thought. Man as a finite being forms hence the matrix 
which determines the search for grounds and calls into being the infinite regress between empirical 
sciences and philosophical foundation (Foucault 1970).  
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beings and the demands of corporeal existence and needed to be reminded of needs 
and wants. Quite the converse applies: the sentient being was the starting point, from 
which thinkers like Hume, Smith, Paine or Condorcet developed their respective 
reasoning about sociability.
51 Sensibility and sympathy were taken to form the social 
bond, open to refinement and civilization. At their roots lay wants and needs, which 
governed the human condition. “No man is capable”, said Paine, “without the aid of 
society of supplying his own wants.” Necessities and desires form the very nucleus 
around which society is assumed to emerge. For Paine, it constituted a realm of 
“mutual dependence and reciprocal interest” and “social affection”: “Commerce, civil 
intercourse and exchange of benefits” would form an ever more complex web of 
relations, producing “universal civilization” (Paine 1897, 266 and 309). But the 
“chilling breath of want”, which Malthus introduced to the scene (PO 334), was still 
absent - not only in the revolutionary optimism of Paine, but also in the more skeptical 
                                                 
51 For explicit reference to the “sentient being” as basis of social and political considerations, see, for 
example, Condorcet (1976, 98) and Condorcet (1955, 128 and 134f). To take the “sentient being” as a 
basis for social and political thought characterizes the eighteenth century – it provided utilitarian 
philosophy with its two ‘authorities’ of “pain and pleasure” and it formed the basis “for all knowledge 
of the interrelations of the physical and the moral” which the rise of physiology in the ‘science of man’ 
promised to further. “Human beings were more or less irrevocably molded by the complex and 
interlinked impressions – internal and external  - that acted on sensibility”. The medical accounts of the 
human organism and the social accounts of its order of life meshed in the study of sensibility (Williams 
1994, 104, 55, 87, 130). See also (Heilbron 1995, 180). It was very prominently the Scottish 
Enlightenment which made “sympathy the great cement of human society” (Schabas 2003b, 282f). 
Sympathy was a notion derived from the study of the nervous system, “which first began to make its 
inroads into the Edingburgh medical establishment with the appointment of Robert Whytt” (ibid, 290). 
For a very instructive account of the relevance of the “study of the nervous system” for the Scottish 
Enlightenment, and thus for Adam Smith and later Malthus see (Lawrence 1979). About the political 
and philosophical relevance of these arguments see also Hess, who points out that the questions “of the 
mutual relations, restrictions and connections of body and mind in the individual human being becomes 
indistinguishable from the question of the structure of the collective body politic”. Separation between 
body and mind was seen as a sign of absolutist statecraft which “reduces the individual body to a cog in 
the rational-mechanical political body, while removing the individual mind from the realm of politics 
proper” (Hess 1999, 22f).  
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conservatism of Adam Smith (Halevy 1995c, 177):
52 Nowhere did the Wealth of 
Nations - as contemporary interpretations of Smith remind us - assume such general 
situation of scarcity on which the ensuing tradition of economic thought came to rest.
53 
With Malthus, the recognition of the ‘reality’ of corporeal existence assumed a new 
meaning as the “breath of want” became “chilling”.  
The turn toward the “real state of things” enshrined in necessity and scarcity 
seems thus to be more than the sober awakening from the “imaginary state of things” 
that Malthus’ rhetoric desires to make us believe.
54 It rather appears as a step into to a 
different ‘social epistemology’ – that is, a different account of what constitutes the 
objectivity and ultimate reality of social order. Condorcet and Paine, whose lack of 
knowledge about “social structures” Malthus so bemoaned, were not just expounding a 
political dream when they attended in their way to the “frightening complexity of 
conflicting interests, that link the survival and well-being of one individual to the 
general organization of societies” – to use Condorcet’s own words.
55 The discovery of 
                                                 
52 Rothschild gives a very differentiated account of the various claims on Smith as a representative of 
radical or conservative policies and argues that he belonged to neither side. The caution of her judgment 
is very instructive. But Halevy confirms the estimation that there is an amount of skepticism against the 
broad exercise of political reason is very much different from trust for Paine. A similar argument makes 
Vivienne Brown, finding a “moral fragmentation of humanity ”in the Theory of Moral Sentiments: 
“The sage and the philosopher who are able to enter into the dialogism of moral discourse are 
differentiated from other moral agents, but the rest of humanity, the mob of mankind, can at best hope 
to live a merely decent life according to given rules” (Brown 1994, 196). What marks Smith out against 
Condorcet and Paine and puts him into the lineage of Malthus is his belief that “politics is the ‘folly of 
man’, while economic progress is like Candide’s garden, which can be cultivated with success” 
(Hirschman 1997, 104). 
53 “Thus, in WN [The Wealth of Nations], the later neoclassical concept of scarcity as the defining 
characteristic of the economic problem is absent” (Brown 1994, 151f). Smith’s account of a market 
“associated with [a] social ethic of natural liberty” is “antithetical to the appeal to the great restrictive 
law of nature in Malthus” (Barker 1981, 163). 
54 Malthus comments in the following words on Condorcet: “A few observation will be sufficient to 
show how completely this theory is contradicted, when it is applied to the real, and not to an imaginary, 
state of things” (PO 320). 
55 (Condorcet 1955, 131). It is of course true that a liberal-democratic optimism about social structures 
pertained to Paine’s thought and it could turn into a “trap” and the denial of “sources of coercion” at 
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the “exact nature of human desires and needs” and their “social effects” were part and 
parcel of the hopes put on the social sciences in the eighteenth century.
56 Condorcet no 
less than Malthus cherished Newton and his experimental and empirical ethos in the 
‘making of facts’ in contrast to the ‘systems’ of philosophical or scholastic 
reasoning.
57 
But “facts” and “systems” related differently for them.
58 What Malthus thought 
                                                                                                                                             
work in this realm. For example, in Paine’s defense of the Bank of Pennsylvania on the basis of the 
obligation of contract, he eschews the question of power pertaining to such institutions. About the two 
sides in Paine, see (Kramnick 1987, 26ff). But Malthus was not searching for a more sensible account 
of power relations in the political and economic realm. He thought Paine to be dreaming, because Paine 
assumed a right to subsistence to belong to the realm of the possible and feasible. Condorcet, who was 
much more attuned to the long passage of time before the social realm would indeed exhibit the desired 
structures of equality, had much more than Paine to say about a necessary political judgment and 
institutional attention to this realm (Rothschild 2001, 178ff). But again, Malthus found his science as 
nugatory as Paine’s liberal dream. 
56 In the philosophes’ eyes, Gay describes, scientific detachment and reformist involvement belonged 
together. “The application of reason to society meant that knowledge and welfare, knowledge and 
freedom, knowledge and happiness must be made into inseparable allies” (Gay 1969, 322). See also 
Cohen for the views of the social sciences at this time (Cohen 1994). 
57 Condorcet thought that the social sciences are a peculiar achievement of his age “dont l’objet est 
l’homme meme, dont  le but direct est le bonheur de l’homme, acquerer une langue egalement exacte et 
precises, atteindre au meme degree de certitude” (Baker 1964, 213). 
Condorcet juxtaposed, just like Malthus, the “vague explanations of Descartes and scholastic 
absurdities” to “the art of putting nature to the question by experiment so as then to be able by 
calculation to deduce more general facts”. Much of his theoretical energies were caught with the 
question of how to “determine facts not linked to general laws”. The “calculus of probability” would 
ensure that one dealt properly with the “different degrees of certainty” which pertained to social life – 
life annuities. electoral systems, money, taxation would be the proper fields of application for such 
modes of reasoning. All the time, “reason”, the “laws of nature” and “science” stood against the world 
of the “supernatural; extravagance” and “ignorance” (Condorcet 1955, 158f). Rothschild remarks about 
the caution and circumspection Condorcet showed in respect to proposing any ‘truth of society’: “The 
process of public choice, a sort of political tatonnement, in which every benefit of a project is compared 
to every costs, was dauntingly complex” but it could not be avoided, since there was no “hydraulic 
machine” running by itself (Rothschild 2001, 178f). 
58 See the book of Mary Poovey for a discussion of the specific relation between systematic standing 
and empirical observation in the judgment about what would count as an economic fact (Poovey 1998). 
Malthus indeed exhibited great pains in discarding some observations as valid economic facts in 
contrast to that “general experience” he wanted to admit to his science since only they would be able to 
give rise to “general principles”: “But when from this confined experience, from the management of his 
own little farm, or the details of the workhouse in his neighbourhood, he draws a general inference, as is 
frequently the case, he then at once erects himself into a theorist; and is the more dangerous, because, 
experience being the only just foundation for theory, people are often caught merely by the sound of the 
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to be “absolutely nugatory” (PO 321) was for Condorcet the serious progress in 
“social mathematics”
59. He poured over tax schemes, calculations for annuities, 
theories of probability, designs for electoral systems. Less extensively, but still in a 
similar spirit, Paine carried out such meticulous calculations - trying to ensure that all 
would receive their appropriate share of civilization, without nourishing the despotic 
powers of church parishes and without a complex governmental machine.  
The “art social”, which Condorcet defined as the art to achieve the end of 
“poverty, humiliation or dependence” (Condorcet 1955, 175)
 – while a “true science” 
in his eyes
60 - was fuelled by a political vision; it professed “pious hopes” about the 
“unbreakable chain truth, happiness and virtue” and was caught in unrestrained belief 
in the superiority of reason, the innocence of reciprocal trade and the simplicity of a 
free society (Condorcet 1955, 191f; Rothschild 2001, 156). It did so unabashedly.
61 
Rothschild describes in her book Economic Sentiments how the eighteenth century – 
she takes Adam Smith, Turgot and Condorcet as her main examples – had a much 
                                                                                                                                             
word, and do not stop to make the distinction between that partial experience which, on such subjects, is 
no foundation whatever for a just theory, and that general experience, on which alone a just theory can 
be founded…but these advocates of practice do not seem to be aware that a great part of them may be 
classed among the most mischievous theorists of their time” (PO 558). Poovey quotes the political 
economists McCulloch on the same issue as follows: “It is not required of the economist, that his 
theories should quadrate with the peculiar bias of the mind of a particular person. His conclusions are 
drawn from observing the principles which are found to determine the condition of mankind, as 
presented on the large scale of nations and empires” (Poovey 1998, 20 and 159). 
59 Condorcet introduced the term “social mathematics” in 1793, hoping for an exact social science in the 
service of political reform (Heilbron 1995, 168). “One objective of the social mathematics was to 
protect the truth of society amidst a mass of uncertain and changing opinions” (Rothschild 2001, 178). 
Malthus commented about Condorcet’s efforts at “proper calculation” that “no application of 
knowledge and ingenuity” and “no effort” could help against necessity (PO 554). 
60 “The social art, he wrote, is a true sciences based, like all the others, on experiments, reasoning, and 
calculation” (Gay 1969, 344). 
61 The social sciences – comprising at that time the whole field of philosophy, moral theory, law, 
political economy, history and geography and keen to shed the authority of church and state – were 
born, so to speak, in the very search for political reform and its representatives actively sought to 
contribute to a new constitution (Heilbron 1995, 91 and 140, 168).  
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less-bounded understanding of economy. In their world, “freedom as an end in itself” 
fared beside the civilization of economic sentiments. While Smith favored the gradual 
taming of excesses and had little hopes for political reason, Condorcet strove for the 
progress towards freedom and equality through endless negotiations, calculations and 
reflections, maintained by all individuals alike, pertaining to all eras of life (Rothschild 
2001, 70 and 232). The revolutionary impetus of Paine and the even stronger believer 
in unfailing reason – William Godwin – would complete this picture. But their 
intermeshing of science, politics and economics became, in the lense that Malthus 
carved for the nineteenth century, a realm of mere imagination.
62 
If one is not content follow Malthus’ own narrative about the end of the 
“imaginary state”, how is one to read his rhetorical claims towards reality themselves? 
If the economic reasoning of the eighteenth century was arguably wound up with 
political hopes, which may seem to be pious or problematic today, what are the hopes 
underwriting his assertion of presenting nothing but the truth of the reign of necessity 
juxtaposed to political dreams? To what kind of political vision does the strong 
boundary between the realm of political reason and its concerns on the one side and 
the realm of economy on the other side belong? And finally, what kind of necessity 
                                                 
62 One should add that Adam Smith had a different fate: he was claimed as a part of the economic 
orthodoxy, having elaborated the play of demand and supply as the core of economic reasoning. This 
will then sound like the following assessment by Backhouse: „[B]y the time Adam Smith came to 
publish his celebrated Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), the notion 
that economic affairs should be analysed in terms of an equilibrium based on supply and demand was 
well established“ (Backhouse 1988, 173). The genealogy Rothschild gives of the “invisible hand” – the 
metaphor par excellence for the self-enclosed economic system in the dominant interpretations of Smith 
– is revealing and interesting in this respect. She makes a convincing argument that it was an “ironic” 
notion about systematic beliefs (117), whose use – well known to Smith – in literature and philosophy is 
traced back to Ovid, Voltaire and the ancient accounts of the “hand of Jupiter”. For Smith, she 
maintains, it was a “sort of trinket”: not the “discovery of inherent order”, but used for its beauty as a 
political tool of persuasion (Rothschild 2001,  70, 117, esp. Chapter 4). Within an analysis of the 
Western episteme, inspired by Foucault, Adam Smith is generally taken to be the intermittent figure 
between the classical and the modern discursive order Vogl (2002, 247) and Foucault (1970, 170).   
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and reality is conjured up in this ‘new science’, which claims to be more sober and 
more realistic than any other? 
The boundary, for whose making Malthus was crucial, turned the science of 
economy into a “walled city” – as Stuart Mill put it – with its own territory and its 
more narrow concerns about the production of wealth.
63 Constructed as an “innocuous 
and unpolitical system”, it set out to establish unshakable foundations” from 
“unquestionable facts.”
64 While it claims just one ‘territory’ amongst others for its 
science, this restriction appears at the same time as an extension of its bearing: the 
order it describes - with its inner functional coherence and autonomous in its own laws 
- claims to be more fundamental than others, breached only under the threat of inviting 
worse social calamities. It is this conception of ‘the economy’ as an internally 
regulated field, whose ways of functioning makes and presents its own laws, which 
becomes the foundation of what I would like to call the ‘double constitution’: a split 
body politic, where the political realm and its reasoning about power and freedom 
stands in relation of strict externality to an economic realm, constituted by its laws of 
functioning, prior to any political reason and more ‘real’ than its counterpart. 
The following chapters attempt to show how this division thrives on much 
                                                 
63 Malthus’ instantiations of this boundary read as follows: “Canute, when he commanded the waves not 
to wet his princely foot, did not in reality assume a greater power over the laws of nature” and one 
might as well command that “two ears of wheat should in future grow where only one had grown 
before” (PO 368). In this way he commented on the political interference with wage or the prices of 
provision: “No stretch of human ingenuity and exertion can rescue the people from the most extreme 
poverty and wretchedness” (PO 523). Beyond the power of “any revolution” or “change of 
government”, the social body has to follow its own modes as it is governed somewhere else (PO 385). 
64 Rothschild describes this shift in the above-mentioned terms of an “innocuous” subject and quotes 
Jean-Baptiste Say, who had translated Smith for the French-speaking audience and who was appreciated 
by Malthus for his definition of the subject matter of political economy. He says, “we can succeed in 
discovering all the general facts which together compose this science…It is established on unshakable 
foundations, from the moment when the principles which serves as its basis are rigorous deductions 
from unquestionable facts” (Rothschild 2001, 248). Also see Tribe for this shift and his account of Say 
(Tribe 2003, 162).  
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more than some recognition of the complicated structures in the socio-economic 
realms, which exceed the mechanisms of law and ‘pious hopes’. The account of 
necessity and scarcity as conditions of life, which it furthers, is different from the 
acknowledgment of corporeal needs. Instead – as will be shown – it bespeaks a 
comprehensive political vision, which works through the division between the 
economy and the political sphere so understood. The term ‘double constitution’ means 
to capture this ‘double’ writing of a political constitution. It supplements a liberal 
political half of rights and negative liberty with a vision of order for the social body, 
supposed to promise civilization and support for the liberal freedoms.  
Necessity and scarcity, which the principle of population so prominently 
introduced, belong to this attempt to determine the foundation and regulatory kernel of 
such order. The claims to speak nothing but the reality of the ‘order of things’ and 
bodies reveals itself – this is the thesis to be rendered plausible – as a dream of 
foundation, which cherishes a particular form of ‘visceral reason’
65: molded within the 
passions and desire, it constitutes the proper subjects, determines the terms of their 
relations and conduces them to fit the body politic. The reflections about the 
peculiarity of relations mediated by things, money and machines and needs follow 
hence the overarching political quest for foundation and are molded in this 
perspective. One of its most lasting effects is the frame it furnishes for political reason 
itself: hoping for an order which has its own laws and carries its own foundations – a 
hope tied to the reign of necessity – it delineates a realm towards which the questions 
of power, freedom or hierarchy cease to be posed. Likewise, the science of economy 
                                                 
65 I have adopted this term from an article by Geoffrey Waite (2005). It was so fitting that it kept itself 
attached to the argument, although the use in the original article is different. Here it is intended to refer 
to the making of reason by the shaping of the material and libidinal ‘economy’ of the body.   
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also ceases to analyzes or reflect upon their subject matter with a view to the relations 
of power. It is thus for the sake of founding this order that the sentient being – with its 
manifold desires and needs, among which ‘liberty belonged to the first of the human 
heart’, as the wife of Condorcet put it – turns into a ‘naked body’, subjected to 
necessity and cared for in an order of economy solely able to alleviate the “chilling 
breath of want”.
66  
Today one rarely hears about Malthus, that “chilling breath” or the drama of 
life and death that is given such importance here. Malthus wore the “mantle of fame” 
                                                 
66 This transformation is in some respect a transformation of the utilitarian frame. Utilitarianism was 
ubiquitous at the time, as Halévy recounts: it belonged to British radicalism, to French enlightenment, to 
Bentham’s panopticon and to Ricardo’s systems. In its broadest meaning, utilitarianism questions the 
authority of moral precepts derived from some natural law or given authority. It refers those obligations 
to the consequences and degrees of ‘utility’ or ‘happiness’ they bring and assumes those benefits as the 
only normative measure. Emerging against the authority of church and state, it belonged to the 
fundamental questioning of inherited authorities. But its carrier and meaning shifts with different 
systems of thought.  And it carries its own dangers since whatever is deemed useful can override 
individual rights, especially when linked to an account of a cohesive social body whose collective 
benefits are announced by the few. It was Godwin who went furthest towards a complete utilitarian 
account in the service of political reform, equality and freedom, coming closest to the dangers it 
entailed, although, as Halévy qualifies, he could not pass as a pure utilitarian on account of his 
conception of man as a rational being, i.e., more than a being of pleasure and pain (Halevy 1995a, 61). 
He eschewed right as the foundation of the body politic and declared, just as Malthus did, that there is 
no right to live. The happiness of each and all is the sole reference point and no contracts or promises 
are binding against it. It led Godwin to undo property rights and it also induced him to measure each 
individual’s worth in respect to the utility s/he has for the social body: the chambermaid would thus 
certainly, he ponders, prefer that the bishop be rescued from the fire instead of herself. Godwin opposed 
any coercive power of the state – thus it could only be the chambermaid herself who renounced her life 
(Godwin 1993, 59). Malthus abhorred the reason which Godwin portrayed, but like him he opposed a 
state that coerced the distinctions of ‘worth’ onto a human being. But, Malthus did not reject the 
utilitarian frame of happiness as the horizon of his political philosophy, and, most importantly, he did 
not shun the questions of individual worth – on the contrary. It might be sufficient to hear one quote, 
bringing to the fore the question of individual worth: “[T]he quantity of provisions consumed in 
workhouses, upon a part of the society that cannot in general be considered as the most valuable part, 
diminishes the shares that would otherwise belong to more industrious and more worthy members, and 
thus, in the same manner, forces more to become dependent” (PO 365). In general on can say that 
“economics” elaborates the social philosophy of utilitarianism in a certain way and it presumes a 
“personified society which tries to make the best of the available resources” as Myrdal put it. Jevons 
would confirm that “the general forms of the laws of Economics are the same in the case of individuals 
and nations; and, in reality, it is a law operating in the case of multitudes of individuals which gives rise 
to the aggregate represented in the transactions of a nation” (Jevons 1924,15) and (Myrdal 1954, 17).  
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of being the country’s foremost economist only for a short time; after two decades it 
fell to Ricardo, who codified political economy into that set of laws, which even Marx 
took to be the highest scientific achievement of the age.
67 Against the rigorous 
deductions of Ricardo, Malthus’ observations on the matter lacked the air of unfailing 
logic and precision; is more considerate of the failings and shaky grounds of that 
system of thought still in the making. But in the meanwhile Ricardo also belongs to 
history. Both of their old-fashioned arguments on population, hunger, hours of labor 
and value ring unfamiliar and outdated today; a more and more formal definition of 
economy seems to have replaced these foundations. The urge to resemble the natural 
sciences and to achieve their assumed neutrality made the older definitions of wealth 
and value appear as manifesting an embarrassing commitment to an outworn political 
                                                 
67 McNally comments on this as follows: “It is an interesting irony of the intellectual history of early 
nineteenth-century Britain that, although he was out of step with a number of the main doctrines of 
classical political economy, Malthus becomes a central figure in this tradition”. Being out of step refers 
to Malthus’ opposition against the free trade in corn, on which we will shortly touch in a later chapter. 
McNally continues: “In fact, for perhaps twenty-five years – during the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century when classical political economy assumed the form of an orthodoxy – Malthus’ essay ranked 
second only to Smith as a cornerstone text of classical economics. As one biographer notes, Adam 
Smith’s mantle had fallen upon Malthus, he was regarded as the country’s foremost living political 
economists”. (McNally 2000, 438f). The biography he refers to is the one written by James (James, 168 
and 246). See also (Redman 2002, 270). Eli Halévy points out very clearly the central role of Malthus 
and his rendering of the principle of population for the systematization and unification of ‘the economy’ 
and its science: “One sees the role, which the principle of population and the law of rents, derived from 
it, plays in constituting the new political economy: it is an principle of unification. Henceforth, the 
variations of rent, of wages and profits could not be studied separately anymore…they all stemmed 
from a single and singular law”. This quote in English is the attempted translation from the original, 
which goes and continues as follows: “On voit quel role joue, dans la formation de la nouvelle 
économique politique, le principle de population, complete par la loi de la rente, que en derive: c’est un 
principle d’unification. Désormais, les variations de la rente, du salaire, des profits, ne peuvent plus, 
comme elles le pouvaient du temps d’Adam Smith, être étudiées separément: elles dérivent d’une seuele 
et unique loi. Et l’économique politique, conformément au réve de James Mill, va reprendre, quoique en 
un sens nouveau, le caractère rigoureusement systématique qu’élle avait présenté, en France, au XVIII 
siecle, chez Quesnay et les physiocrats: en 1817 paraissent les Principles de l’économie politique et de 
l’impôt.” (Halevy 1995a,162). The title he mentions at the end refers to Ricardo’s book On the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Once again Halévy on this role and the link Malthus 
forms between Adam Smith and Ricardo: “Le sytème de Ricardo, que est une pièce essentielle de 
l’utilitarisme integral, derive au moins autant de Malthus que d’Adam Smith” (Halevy 1995b, 66)  
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anthropology, to moral precepts and political meanings. Stanley Jevons, one of the 
three fathers of the neoclassical tradition, who is praised for his insights still today, 
declared in 1870 the final overcoming of all ‘metaphysical’ connotations of the notion 
of value when he defined economic as resting on the ‘marginal’ calculation of 
‘pleasure and pain’. But while the marginal calculus eschews the labouring body as an 
objective measure, it does not eschew scarcity. This notion has remained in its central 
position ever since Malthus and proves to be the sine qua non of economic matters, for 
Jevons and his neoclassical colleagues no less than for Marx.  In reference to scarcity 
are the rules, the regulatory powers, the necessity and identity of the realm erected.
68 
“Bref, “ as Halevy put it perspicaciously in such small and unimportant looking 
sentence which nevertheless carries great weight, “l’utilité ne saurait devenir objet de 
science que dans les cas où elle s’achetète au prix d’une paine” (Halevy 1995b, 11). 
Therefore Malthus remains in some sense a contemporary: it was he who furnished the 
tradition with the key to its coherence and regulatory powers, rendered it more self-
enclosed and self-standing after his death. 
But the political economist remains incomprehensible without the political 
philosopher who accompanied and spurred him. The ‘double constitution’ which the 
political philosopher sought – and which the political economists wrote – answered to 
a particular political problématique into which the events of the time coalesced for 
him. It was certainly a time of utter upheaval and stark debate, fuelled by the French 
Revolution abroad. The following and final pages of this chapter turn to the worries of 
the political philosopher and seek to elucidate the political problématique pressing on 
                                                 
68 “The sum total of all things, material or immaterial, on which a price can be set because they are 
scarce (i.e. both useful and limited in quantity) constitute social wealth” [emphasis added, ut] – so 
defines Walras the matter towards the end of the nineteenth century (Walras, 40).  
  43
him. From afar, one can already record how fundamentally the events of the time 
challenged the inherited understandings of order and political reason. The word 
liberty, which the English constitution was proud to claim for the existing order, 
suddenly carried “alarm and sedition in its sounds” – such said Thomas Muir in his 
courtroom in 1793 and predicted that this word was soon to be proscribed from the 
language.
69 The works of Paine and Godwin had imbued the liberal distinction 
between the realm of property, need and liberty on the one hand and sovereign power 
on the other hand with a call for profound reform or revolution, democratic passion 
and critique of poverty.
70 What the liberal political constitution would mean – and 
Malthus was certainly committed to this cause
71– became in indeterminate question: 
all its constituent parts – bodily protection, liberty and individual judgments – shed the 
calmness of a coded legal order and its bounds. Malthus answered to this 
indeterminacy and the wide ranging hopes and fears accompanying it. At the end stood 
a double constitution which linked liberalism to the notion of scarcity and both halves 
were settled on their side, written in one stroke (Wolin 2004, 285). 
                                                 
69 (Rothschild, 59). Tomas Muir was ‘marked out for exemplary punishment because he had openly 
distributed Paine’s work for the ‘lower orders” (Thomis 1977, 15). 
70 The revolution “was to embrace the entire economy of society, change every social relation and find 
its way down to the furthest link of the political chain, even down to those individuals, who, living in 
peace on the private fortune or on the fruits of their labour, had no reason to participate in public 
affairs” witnessed Condorcet, for France, this extension of the political realm (Condorcet 1955,150ff).  
71 As one exemplary case of his view on government, power and freedom, might stand the following: 
“That there is, however, in all power a constant tendency to encroach is an incontrovertible truth, and 
cannot be too strongly inculcated. The checks, which are necessary to secure the liberty of the subject, 
will always in some degree embarrass and delay the operations of the executive government….If we 
once admit the principle, that the government must know better with regard to the quantity of power 
which it wants, than we can possibly do with our limited means of information, and that, therefore, it is 
our duty to surrender up our private judgements, we may just as well at the same time surrender up the 
whole of our constitution. Government is a quarter in which liberty is not, nor cannot be, very faithfully 
reserved” (PO 503).   
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Bread, Masses and Political Reason 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the political stage extended its bounds in 
unprecedented ways.  Not only was it occupied by masses of people new to it and 
directed to a wider audience, but it also had new issues brought to it: questions of 
bread and subsistence raised political passions and achieved a political import which 
they had not before.
72 The French Revolution certainly had its share in anchoring this 
simultaneity of popular exercise of political reason and questions of subsistence firmly 
in the spectator’s mind. The six thousand women marching in October 1789 to 
Versailles to demand bread, bringing the monarch back to the city, was one of its 
instantiations, the ‘Great Fear’ associated with the coalescing peasant insurrections in 
the summer of 1789 another. “Public opinion was on the march” as “thousands of 
starving and unemployed French men and women” would transform a “political crisis 
into a political and social revolution.
73 The sans-culottes were exclaiming “bread or 
death” and “bread and constitution” and the question of subsistence formed the 
backdrop of the involvement of the masses in the political upheavals.
74  
Malthus did not have to look across the channel in order to find the powerful 
manifestations of the broadening of political reason and the new concerns about life it 
encompassed. The English scene had been characterized by the rising “expression of 
public opinion outside of parliament” since the 1750s (Royle 1982, 42). Royle notes 
                                                 
72 “The revolution was the first point in French history at which persuasion of a mass audience was 
crucial and an integral part of the political phenomenon” 
73 The deeds of women received the most pronounced demonization in the critical accounts of the 
French Revolution. See for example the analysis of the German Press at that time, of which….gives a 
lucid account in (Gamper 2002, 572f) 
74 Rude maintains that the “French Revolution served as a watershed, tending to inject a political 
content to such disturbances where it did not exist or hardly existed before” (24-29). The slogans of the 
sans-culottes are described in (Rude 1959, 24-29, 140, 156)   
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“the expansion and quickening” of channels of communication – such as turnpike 
roads, the postal service, newspapers, as well as a multiplying number of coffee 
houses and discussion clubs – which “was fostering a new interest in politics beyond 
the narrow oligarchy at Westminster”. The foundation of societies like the Society for 
Constitutional Reform became instrumental in the widening of the public base for 
political contestation: “Most remarkable of all the SCI’s features was its industry and 
vigour in bombarding the country with free or cheap radical literature” (ibid., 17; 30). 
The fame and influence of Paine’s Rights of Man, which created a “style of radicalism 
and transformed the face of English politics”, was based on this increased readership: 
“Few parts of the country seemed untouched by Paine’s words”; he was ubiquitous as 
he was influential. In the Potteries, “Paineite publications are in the hands of most of 
the people”. “To an unprecedented degree”, judges Wells “politics were popularized” 
(Wells 1986, 21). 
The “undeniable fact of mass readership” coincided with an underlying social 
unrest, which was continuously present throughout the 1790s. The years 1795 and 
1796 saw the “largest outbreak of food disturbances to occur in England at any period” 
(Darvall 1934, 65). In general, those protests still belonged to the familiar pattern of 
eighteenth century popular protests, which were local in dimension and bound in their 
claims for fair price and redress in the distribution of bread and provision.
75 But the 
protagonists of the British radicalism provided the political language to link the 
question of bread to a broader political horizon; perhaps they even agitated to do so.
76 
                                                 
75 Dinwiddy strikes a middle chord, assuming that “at least a great deal of passive dissatisfaction” 
existed and that the time between 1795 and 1802 constitutes an “important phase in a change in the 
“sub-political attitudes of the masses” [quotation marks] (Dinwiddy 1991, 48) Historians are divided 
about how far subsistence issues and “passive dissatisfaction” of the masses became indeed effectively 
politicized and radicalized. See also (Christie 1991, 176) for a more skeptical voice. 
76 Wells describes how the political societies, like the LCS, sought to address the wider public by taking 
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Above all, there was a great fear on the side of British government and its supporters 
that the “radical nature” of the ideas amounted to an “intended revolt” which needed to 
be answered with the harshest measures
77. The string of violent popular protests, 
among them food riots, compounded these fears.
78 Food, rights, universal suffrage and 
constitutional changes presented a dangerous mélange of issues, merging here and 
there, or threatening to merge in ways not foreseen, as even “children’s sweetmeats 
were wrapped up with parts.
79  
Malthus feared these most unfortunate ways that the question of life entered 
                                                                                                                                             
up the issues of food. Thelwall, talking at the meeting at Copenhagen Fields in October 1795 in front of 
more than 100000 people denounced the food riots and instead made a claim about the ‘systematic’ 
causes of the shortages (Wells 1986, 76). 
77 “The British government faced widespread, organized pressure for parliamentary reform, and a public 
which had been so encouraged to flirt with republicanism by Paine’s work that the social and political 
elite had felt it necessary to organise to an unprecedented extent in defense of the status quo and the 
constitution” (Philp 1991, 9). Thomis makes the argument most strongly, maintaining that the “British 
government would react in a less than rational manner when confronted with reform demands” , while 
“never in the 1790s did reform threaten to become a mass movement” (Thomis 1977, 13 and 7). He 
argues that, while the food riots did put law and order in danger, they remained quite apart from the 
political movement, “which made no attempt to exploit social and economic discontent for political 
advantage.” He also contends that by the turn of the century “the cause of political reform had still not 
reached the people in any great numbers”. See Royle and Wells below for a different account of the 
situation. Apart from the highly diverging accounts, there is unity about the unprecedented amount of 
popular participation and about at least the perception of the instability and contestation. Therefore, the 
claim here, that the sense of a political reason ‘out of bounds’ was pervasive, is corroborated by the 
historical record. Rude describes the situation as follows: “Political motivation played a more important 
role in popular disturbances” at the end of this period, “though it is certainly not a distinctive feature of 
the period as a whole”. But the French Revolution tended to inject political content to social 
disturbances on both sides of the channel (Rude 1959, 24ff) 
78 They also prominently included the naval mutinies in 1797/98 and the revolt in Ireland in 1798. 
(Philp 1991, 9) 
79 See footnote 57 for reference. Royle brings the example of the industrial city of Sheffield, where “in 
December 1791 local artisans crossed the threshold from traditional economic grievances to a more 
fundamental political critique” (Royle 1982, 49ff): “[T]he LCS [London Corresponding Society] began 
to speak with a collective voice for London’s distressed artisans and, more generally, for the 
dispossessed throughout the nation.” To refer to Wells again: “Time and time again political slogans 
appear, for example, during disturbances over food prices…Even outside the main centres of 
radicalism, there were handfuls of men who could politicize popular issues. Whenever economic, and 
with it social disaster struck, the resultant situation permitted ‘a conjunction between the grievances of 
the majority and the aspirations articulated by a politically conscious minority’” (Wells 1986, 21).    
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onto the political stage of his mind. With the events of the French Revolution in mind, 
he pictured “a mob”, “goaded by resentment for real suffering”, “clamouring for want 
of food”, “but totally ignorant of the quarter from which” the sufferings originate.
80 
This is, he contended, “of all monsters the most fatal to freedom”. He tells a story of 
fatal reproduction in which the political constitution is hastened to “euthanasia”: “[The 
mob] fosters a prevailing tyranny, and engenders one where it was not; and though, in 
its dreadful fits of resentment, it appears occasionally to devour its unsightly offspring; 
yet no sooner is the horrid deed committed, than, however unwilling it may be to 
propagate such a breed, it immediately groans with a new birth (PO 501). “Unceasing 
change and unceasing carnage” cannot but follow the “seeds of fresh discontents and 
fresh revolutions” (PO 500f), which are sown by “false expectations and extravagant 
demands” (PO 513). The familiar tropes of anti-Jacobin rhetoric underwrite this story 
of dying constitutional liberties, in which “utopian theories beget savage mobs, who 
rage out of control” and which “nothing but the establishment of some complete 
despotism could arrest” – Malthus feels compelled to admit, although he is such 
“friend of freedom and an enemy to large standing armies” (PO 501).
81  
                                                 
80 The full quote is as follows: “A mob which is generally the growth of a redundant population goaded 
by resentment for real sufferings but totally ignorant of the quarter from which they originate, is of all 
monsters the most fatal to freedom”; and “If political discontents were blended with the cries of hunger 
and a revolution were to take place by the instrumentality of a mob clamouring for want of food, the 
consequence would be unceasing change and unceasing carnage, the bloody carrier of which nothing 
but the establishment of some complete despotism could arrest” (PO 501; see also 494).  
81 “In all these works of the conservatives the revolutionary crowd is depicted as demons and monsters” 
(Sterrenburg 1979, 148). Malthus’ account of this familiar plot has a twist added, since not only the 
mob, but also the defenders of order ‘raged out of control’: “But not only have false expectations and 
extravagant demands suggested by the leaders of the people given an easy victory to government over 
every proposition for reform…but they have furnished the most fatal instruments of offensive attack 
against the constitution itself. They are naturally calculated to excite some alarm, and to check moderate 
reform; but alarm, when once excited, seldom knows where to stop” (PO 513). There are several 
mentions in the scholarly literature of how the “illuminate”, who were begetting such monstrous 
masses, were themselves depicted as monsters. This was the fate of Godwin and of Condorcet 
(Rothschild, 18) and (Avery 1997, 41).   
  48
The causes for the “euthanasia” of the constitutional liberties pointed for 
Malthus to the failures of political judgment on all sides. There were those “country 
gentlemen” who were “too easily convinced” by “exaggerated statements” and 
“exaggerated fears” to give up some of the “most valuable privileges of Englishmen” 
“without adequate necessity” (PO 502 and 513). There were also those who answered 
to the “exaggerated expectations of the people”, who in turn had the “power of 
creating these exaggerated fears, and of passing these acts”. And there is no doubt on 
Malthus’ side, that those latter ones had a severely impaired judgment on political 
matters: “If the vox populi had been allowed to speak, it would have appeared to be the 
voice of the error and absurdity instead of the vox Dei” (PO 502). But in the midst of 
all were those “discontent and turbulent men of the middle classes”, those “dissatisfied 
men of talents”, who have the power to persuade the lower classes of people that all 
their poverty and distress arise solely from the inequity of the government (PO 500 
and 505f)
82. It is they who imbue “the poor” with “extravagant demands”, who are “by 
no means inclined to be visionary” and whose “distresses are always real” (ibid.).  
The problématique which Malthus takes from the historical conjuncture is thus 
one of political judgment and the form of reason guiding it. His main allegations, 
uttered in so many versions, are directed to the ‘dissatisfied men of talents’ who have 
lost measure in their political visions and in whose hands ultimately the “melancholic” 
fate of the constitution of liberty is made. They have been carried away by the 
successes of reason and science in the eighteenth century; “elate and giddy” they have 
embarked upon “wild flights and unsupported assertions” (PO 328).
83  
                                                 
82 The “revolutionary horrors” are “to be expected from the people acting under such impressions” (PO 
506). 
83 It is a sense of the possible and the unlimited which Malthus finds in writers like Condorcet, who 
extended his account of the perfection of the “social art” to speculation about the “organic 
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There is almost no other theoretical boundary so charged and anxiously 
guarded than the one between the wild and speculative bent of reason and the sober 
and controlled recognition of reality: “The late rage for wide and unrestrained 
speculation seems to have been a kind of mental intoxication” and the “wildest and 
most improbable conjectures may be advanced with as much certainty as the most just 
and sublime theories…the grand and consistent theory of Newton will be placed upon 
the same footing as the wild and eccentric hypothesis of Descartes” (PO 325). “We 
might as well shut our eyes to the book to nature”, and Malthus predicts, that “there 
will be at once an end of all human science” and the “whole train of reasoning from 
effects to causes will be destroyed” (ibid, 324): “They are throwing us back again 
almost into the infancy of knowledge” (PO 328).  
The fear of the “unrestrained speculation”, in which “everything appeared to be 
within the grasp of human powers” (PO 325), is not severed from the problem of 
political judgment. The rhetoric of “extravagant” promises towards the people, the 
“mental intoxication” of the man of science and the inculcation of “visionary” hopes 
into those who only have “real sufferings” mingle into a single alarm about the lack of 
limitation and foundation for political reason and its judgments. Boundless reason 
threatens to throw all political constitution achievements “upon a wide sea of 
experiment” (PE 303) as a “general disappointment would probably lead to every sort 
of experiment in government” (PO 512). The image of the ‘wide sea’ has a long 
history in political thought and philosophy: from Plato’s Gorgias to Cicero’s De 
                                                                                                                                             
perfectibility” of man and concluded his sketch on the “progress of the human race” with the possibility 
that life itself might stretch infinitely. To this lack of limits, Malthus reacts with a rhetorical fervor 
which has no consideration of their common commitment to “patient investigation” and “well-
supported proofs”; instead, he generalizes about the “bewildering dreams” and “extravagant fancies” 
which have taken hold of his adversaries (ibid. and 324).  
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Republica to Kant’s Critique of Reason, the sea is always suspicious, tempting with 
“soaring hopes and dreams”. Kant, most contemporary to Malthus, conjured the image 
of a “shoreless ocean, which after alluring us with ever-deceptive prospects, compels 
us in the end to abandon as hopeless all the vexatious and tedious endeavour” and to 
return to the “coastline of experience”.
84 The images amalgamate, pointing all to the 
horrors of the lack of proper ground for the claims of political reason or speculation.  
They inversely call for the “island shores of refoundation” and the “terra firma” it is 
supposed to give.
85 Burke, to travel closer to Malthus in time and place, depicted 
unrestrained democratic exercise of political reason in a similar vein, as having ”no 
fundamental law, no strict convention, no respected usage to restrain it.” “Nothing in 
heaven or upon earth can serve as a control on them”.
86 
It is to this boundlessness and indeterminacy of political judgment that Malthus 
seems to answer with his fears about the “wide sea of experiment” and an unguided 
political reason. “The circulation of Paine’s Rights of Man” he says, “it is supposed, 
has done great mischief among the lower and middling classes of people in this 
                                                 
84 The reference to Plato was found in (Ranciere 1995, 1). Ranciere contends that “the whole political 
project of Platonism can be conceived as an anti-maritime polemic. The Gorgias insists on this: Athens 
has a disease that comes from its port…The great beast of the populace, the democratic assembly of the 
imperialist city, can be represented as a trireme of drunken sailors. In order to save politics it must be 
pulled aground among the shepherds” (ibid.). The reference to Cicero stems from a paper by Emma 
Rothschild, given to circulate at a seminar, with the title “Language and empire, c. 1800”. The “soaring 
hopes and dreams” are invoked by Romulus, when he decides not to found the city of Rome ‘down by 
the sea”. She gives the following reference: Cicero, De Re Publica. De Legibus, trans. C. W. Keyes 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 115, 117 (bk. II, ch. iii, para. 5, bk. II, ch. iv, para. 7). The quote from 
Kant stems from an article by Simon Jarvis (Jarvis 1997). 
85 (Ranciere 1995, 1) 
86 (Burke 1999, 436). Burke’s view on the prospects of unrestrained reason were even more 
disheartening than those of Malthus, but they certainly share the idiom of ‘false ideas’ and ‘vain 
expectations’: “The new conquering empire of light and reason is a purgatory of universal 
reflectiveness, a monstrous fiction of inspiring false ideas and vain expectations in men destined to 
obscurity. It promises a tumult of multiple, competing theories, in which individuals are hesitating in 
the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled and unresolved” (Rothschild 2001, 151).   
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country. This is probably true; but not because man is without rights, or that these 
rights ought not to be known; but because Mr. Paine has fallen into some fundamental 
errors respecting the principles of government, and in many important points has 
shown himself totally unacquainted with the structure of society…”. What is needed is 
thus a “general knowledge of the real rights of man” and the populace’s capacity to 
understand them (PO 504). Easily made to follow the “false ideas” and the 
“extravagant claims”, the proper political judgment is a frightfully insecure thing and 
fails with the “claimouring for food” and the “real sufferings”.   
Malthus had no high hopes about the democratic exercise of political reason. 
The “labouring classes”, due to the “scanty knowledge which fall in general to their 
share” are rather likely to “be deceived by first appearance” (PO 342). Unfortunately - 
he argues, alluding to Hume – “there is no science in which appearances are more 
deceitful than in politics”.
87 It requires the recognition “of a general good, which we 
may not distinctly comprehend, or the effect of which may be weakened by distance 
and diffusion” (PO 438). It is not the case that Malthus assumed, as Burke did, that 
people are “destined to obscurity” or that the “good laws” could equally be framed 
under despotism;
88 censorship was to him not a desired policy and he was a supporter 
of general education.
89 Malthus’ fears about the exercise of political reason rather 
                                                 
87 “[I]t has been observed by Hume, that of all sciences there is none where first appearances are more 
deceitful than in politics. The remark is undoubtedly very just, and is most peculiarly applicable to that 
department of the science, which relates to the modes of improving the condition of the lower classes of 
society” (PO 558). 
88 The “personal respectability” and more “equal and liberal mode of treatment from their superiors” 
associated with the representative system belonged to its advantages. But Malthus, it should be noted, 
completes this acknowledgement with a utilitarian argument about how this would increase the “fear of 
personal degradation” and thus powerfully co-operate with the “security of property in animating the 
exertions of industry” (PO 508). 
89 “From the general ideas which I have found to prevail on these subjects, I should by no means say 
that it would be a difficult task to make the common people comprehend the principle of population, 
and its effect in reproducing low wages and poverty” ( PO 215). “…it must always be the wish of those 
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belong to that long tradition of liberal skepticism, which is unsure about the merits of 
individual judgment. 
Sheldon Wolin has given a lucid account of this wavering in the liberal 
tradition, which he traces back to John Locke’s apprehension that the great majority 
would not arrive at an understanding of natural law.
90 The question of “knowledge and 
criteria of judgment” as appropriate to the political realm “have both guided and 
disquieted Locke’s intellectual efforts” (McClure 1996, 63 and 69). Wolin suggests 
distinguishing British radicalism – which employed all of the cherished political and 
economic categories of liberalism – from the liberal tradition on account of this 
skepticism, which they did not share.
91 But Malthus was plagued by it. Within the 
context of mounting political passions and contestations of what these rights entail, his 
                                                                                                                                             
who are better informed, that they [the labouring classes] should be brought to a sense of the truth, 
rather by patience and the gradual diffusion of education and knowledge than by any harsher methods” 
(PO 342). “And it does not seem entirely visionary to suppose that, if the true and permanent cause of 
poverty were clearly explained and forcibly brought home to each man’s bosom, it would have some, 
and perhaps not an inconsiderable influence on his conduct; at least the experiment has never yet been 
fairly tried. Almost everything that has been hitherto done for the poor, has tended, as if with solicitous 
care, to throw a veil of obscurity over this subject, and to hide from them the true cause of their 
poverty….it cannot be said, that any fair experiment has been made with the understandings of the 
common people” (ibid. 484). See also the discussion of Halevy on Malthus’ attitudes on education, 
especially on the utilitarian foundation of his argument in comparison to the already existing institutions 
of public education and their foundation in the hands of dissidents and Methodists, who had recourse to 
a notion of justice: “Entre 1796 et 1807, l’influence de Malthus s’est exercicée sur le parti liberal. Elle a 
été une influence démocratique. Pour ce qui touch en particulierer a l’éducation des pauvres, la théorie 
radicale de l’instruction populaire est d’oringne malthusienne.” (Halevy 1995a, 133 and 116) 
90 Since “natural law”, which provided the foundation for legitimate power and spaces of freedom, was, 
as Locke admitted, “unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of Men,” the judgment 
about its content was precarious. (Locke 1999, 358). 
91 “[C]ritics have lumped together two distinct traditions of political thought: democratic radicalism and 
liberalism. Although the former drew inspiration from Locke, its outlook was largely molded by 
eighteenth-century rationalism and the experience of the French Revolution. Liberalism, on the other 
hand, had its roots in the period before the French Enlightenment. It, too, leaned heavily on the political 
principles of Locke, yet most important to its development are the later stages in which it was filtered 
through classical economics and exposed to the philosophies of David Hume and Adam Smith, two 
thinkers distinguished by a profound respect for the limits of reason and the pervasiveness of irrational 
factors in man and society” (Wolin 2004, 263)  
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skepticism was accentuated together with his unwillingness to forego individual 
judgment on political matters. Political reason required firm guides and proper 
distinctions – grounds within the “wide sea of experiments”. These grounds had to 
teach “simple duties”, “intelligible to the humblest capacity” (PO 524). In Malthus’ 
writings about the “natural law” of population – at the same time an object of proper 
Newtonian science and the law of the social body – its simplicity and universality is 
cherished and praised. Inversely, “[i]f the laws of nature be thus fickle and inconstant, 
….the human mind will no longer have any incitements to inquiry, but must remain 
sunk in inactive torpor, or amuse itself only in bewildering dreams and extravagant 
fancies. The constancy of the laws of nature, and of effects and causes, is the 
foundation of all human knowledge” (PO 324).  
“We have reason to think”, he says, “that it is more conducive to the formation 
and improvement of the human mind that the law should be uniform” (PO 471). The 
requirements of secure knowledge and science and the proper grounds for political 
reason seem to shade into each other, simplicity and constancy are proper, and one 
cannot help but relate to the “humblest mind” who is overtaxed in finding the “general 
good we may not distinctively comprehend”. Seeing Malthus’ praise for the law – 
“constant” since “the world began” and fitting the requirements of the human mind 
which without it is lost in the arbitrariness of “wild flights”, lost without any “chain 
between causes and effects” – as the praise of the political philosopher for the proper 
foundation of political judgment, might also find support in the fact that Malthus was 
by no means so sure that “fixed” and “general” laws are appropriate for the field of 
economy. “General principles”, he said, “should not be pushed too far and  
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“propositions require limitations and exceptions” (PO 562; PE 8).
92 The drama 
between poor land, insufficient subsistence and hungry bodies – which the principle of 
population introduced as the eternal truth of the system – might be subdued by the 
course of time. Malthus even pondered, astonishingly enough, that “Smith has 
forgotten land”, but was more right than wrong for doing so (PE 233). 
Yet, all these qualifications did not change the search for the firm ground, 
associated with fixed and immutable, simple and unavailing laws. This search 
answered to the anxieties of the political philosopher who is embroiled in founding “a 
different politics, a politics of conversion which turns its back on the sea,” as Ranciere 
puts the matter figuratively, resorting to the metaphor of the “shoreless sea”.  It is this 
search for foundation and order, which propels the split of the body politic into its two 
constitutional sides. The first lesson Malthus has to tell Paine about the “real rights” of 
men is that – in contrast to all the imaginary flights about political reason – man has 
no right to live, simply because the provision for life “is principally an affair of power 
and not of rights.” And he who “ceased to have the power ceased to have the right (PO 
505).
93 And these powers are not only rarely amenable to a sovereign decree, they are 
also about a system of “general principles” and “laws” which do not belong to the 
realm of political reason. Historical experience seemed to have taught Malthus that the 
democratic exercise of political reason, the vagaries of political judgment and the issue 
                                                 
92 “…yet there is no truth of which I feel a stronger conviction than that there are many important 
propositions in political economy which absolutely require limitations and exceptions; and it may be 
confidently stated that the frequent combination of complicated causes, the action and reaction of cause 
and effect on each other, and the necessity of limitations and exceptions in a considerable number of 
important propositions, form the main difficulties of the science , and occasion those frequent mistakes 
which it must be allowed are made in the prediction of results” (8f PE). 
93 “The Abbe Raynal has said that ‘Avant toutes les lois sociales l’homme avait le droit de subsister.’ 
He might with just as much propriety have said that, before the institution of social laws, every man had 
a right to live a hundred years…” (PO 505).  
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of life can only result in a “carnage” against which firm walls needed to be erected. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SCARCITY THE MAKING OF THE ORDER OF BODIES 
 
The principle of population is disarmingly simple. Nothing in it seems to indicate that 
it would assume such paramount role for the modern understanding of ‘economic 
reality’. Malthus states its most general form in the introduction of his work: 
“Population must be always kept down to the level of the means of subsistence”. 
Confined to this general level, Malthus knows, the principle is “incontrovertible,” like 
an “impregnable fortress” of “abstract truth” (ibid), already known and widely 
accepted.
94 But few have inquired, he continues, into the “various modes by which this 
level is effected; and the principle had never been sufficiently pursued to its 
consequences” (ibid, ii; 47; 29). His inquiry into these various modes will lead him to 
stage dramatically the different ways in which needy and wanting bodies would 
encounter the conditions of their livelihood, often being denied what they need or 
condemned to misery or death. The most infamous passage of the second edition – 
removed later because of the uproar it caused – which contends that at “nature’s 
                                                 
94 The question of population was posed before Malthus – although in different terms than he did. The 
eighteenth century linked a rising population to the power and strength of the state Foucault sees the 
change coming in the middle of the century, when the notion of population became an object of 
governance, replacing the raison d’état as the horizon of political reflection. Thinkers like Mirabeau 
and Cantillon articulated the same simple rule  - that the means of subsistence are the measure of 
population - as Malthus did, but with a different theoretical import and different consequences to be 
drawn from it (Foucault 2004a, 110f.). Foucault refers mainly to the French context; for England, it was 
the work of Wallace and Townsend moves already into the same perspective on population as Malthus 
and he refers to him several times in approving fashion (James 1979, 58f). Polanyi describes the change 
as following: „The change of atmosphere from Adam Smith to Townsend was, indeed, striking. The 
former marked the close of an age which opened with the inventors of the state, Thomas More and 
Machiavelli, Luther and Calvin; the latter belonged to that nineteenth century in which Ricardo and 
Hegel discovered from opposite angles the existence of a society that was not subject ot the laws of the 
state, but, on the contrary, subjected the state to its own laws” (Polanyi 1957). For a short overview of 
different views on population before and after Malthus, see (Toye 2000).  
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mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him” who came into a “world already 
possessed”: “She tells him to be gone” (PO 697). These dramatic encounters with the 
limits of life are looming at the horizon when Malthus sets out to elaborate on other 
ways to encounter limits: those which are conducive to the happiness of society, 
forging it out of the recurrent attendance of catastrophe onto the long line of 
progression – in a word, those pertaining to a proper economy of the social body (PO 
29).
95  
The problem of population has since the time of Malthus been vividly 
imagined as a catastrophic misfit of bodies and their space or conditions of living: 
crowding in ships, falling from the earth or even exploding the earth itself. In each 
case the prospects for a viable social or political order are undone.
96 While they are 
repeated in quite different contexts, they seem to uniformly present dramatic 
instantiations of general fears and threats posed by disordered and alien ‘bodies’ 
towards all political and civilizational achievements. To Malthus, it was the precarious 
reign of liberal freedoms that could not hold against an uncontrolled social body: 
                                                 
95 How much Malthus takes the study of the different modes of ‘regulation’ of the population to its 
proper level of subsistence as his main aim can also be read in the following remark: “The question, 
applied generally, appears to me to be highly curious, and to lead to the elucidation of some of the most 
obscure, yet important points, in the history of human society. I cannot so clearly and concisely describe 
the precise aim of the first part of the present work, as by asking that it is an endeavour to answer this 
question as applied” (PO 47).  
96 This fear about the failures of order and reproduction has not ceased in the twentieth century – on the 
contrary. “Unease” and “alarm” are caused by the “implications of 6 billion human beings now sharing 
the limited resources of one planet in 1999; 1968 is the date when Paul Ehrlich published his 
international best-seller The Population Bomb echoing Malthus’ concerns two hundred years later. In a 
reference handbook on world population, Malthus’ text is included, still the landmark for basic 
theoretical wisdoms on population (Gilbert 2001, xi, 58). “No other phenomenon”, stated Pearson to the 
Board of Governors of the World Bank in 1969, “casts a darker shadow over the prospects for 
international development than the staggering growth of population” (Johnson 1994, 2). See Arturo 
Escobar and Timothy Mitchell for a political and cultural reading of the problem of population in 
discourses on development (Escobar 1995) and (Mitchell 2002). There is a staggering self-same 
prominence in the discussion of population for ‘developing countries’ – to which Mitchell gives an 
elucidating counter-narrative in the case of Egypt.   
  58
corporeal needs and the vagaries of political judgment only blended into the “absurdity 
of the vox populi”. The mob, which stormed the political stage, full of needs and “real 
suffering”, has been comprised of a “redundant population”, Malthus alerts his 
readers. It was this part of the population, which stood outside of the proper circles of 
self-reproducing order, that brought beings to “nature’s table” when it is already full: a 
remainder of failed order and reproduction, a piece not fitting, like the “rabble” in 
Hegel’s civil society, “ from where the evil emerges”.
97 The fears attach to those 
bodily disorders of the whole, “for a careful distinction should always be made, 
between a redundant population and a population actually great” (PE 68).  
The political philosopher inquires thus about those specific laws and 
constitution that are proper to bodily beings and saves the political constitution from 
“unceasing change and carnage,” providing securer foundations than Condorcet’s 
endless calculations, Paine’s revolutionary optimism or Godwin’s anarchical use of 
individual judgment.
98 The following pages are dedicated to reading the principle of 
population and the conception of economy in this light: as the attempt to write a 
second, bodily half of the political constitution. The political air it gives to Malthus’ 
economic writings aims therefore at a different level than the tracing of interests of 
different sections of society, which it supported. As many of Malthus’ opponents were 
keen to point out, his economic writing furthered the interest of the landowners and his 
                                                 
97 Hegel, very differently than Malthus, announces with certainty the right of the individual to 
subsistence. But then he turns towards the “unfolding of civil society”, with its increase in industry and 
population, which is despite all its riches incapable of changing the emergence of such “rabble”; 
reasoning within the parameters of political economy, he finds himself with an ‘empty’ normative 
demand and a ‘reality’ inhospitable to it – just the division he sought to undo (Hegel 1991, 389).  
98 It was Godwin’s unwavering commitment to the absolute importance of individual judgment against 
which no coercion by the state could be legitimate and no property rule would stand, which led Halevy 
to distinguish Godwin from utilitarianism, although he admitted nothing but the utmost ‘happiness of 
the whole’ and each as a reference point for political judgment and economic relations.  
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arguments against the rights for subsistence resulted in the position that “the rich 
man’s horses have a better right to be fed than the poor man’s children,” as one 
contemporary put it.
99 Important as those points are, they are still circumvented, in 
order to access Malthus’ contribution to the articulation of modern ‘economic 
objectivity’, which formed a much broader heritage than his political allegiances of the 
time and to which this work is directed.  
The argument proceeds in two steps that divide into the two following 
chapters. The first step, which occupies the rest of this chapter, is dedicated to 
unfolding a phenomenology of the ‘economic reality’, which emerges with the 
problem of population. It centers on the more abstract contours of this order, engaging 
deeply with the texts, their detours, rhetorical splendors and wagering as it exhibits the 
uncertainty of this wished-for foundation. The second step will follow more closely 
how these principles of ‘economic reality’ fashion the figure of economic man and an 
ordered social whole. They trace more concretely the political vision made in 
economy as it sets down proper subject-positions, legitimate modes of judgment and 
contestation and diverse embodiments of the regulatory epistemology of economy.  
The suggestion to read the figure of population as belonging to the elaboration 
of a particular form of political reason and vision finds its inspiration in an argument 
furthered by Michel Foucault. Some remarks might thus be in order, which 
acknowledge this work and the relation it bears to the argument at hand. In his later 
lectures, Foucault turned explicitly to the question of economy and liberal political 
reason, giving the figure of population a political significance that was rarely given to 
it before. Population is an “absolute new political figure”, he asserts, alien to the 
                                                 
99 (Huzel 2006, 27). McNally gives a very sensible account of the strategic impact of Malthus’ Essay 
against British radicalism (McNally 2000).  
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“collective subject of juridical and political thought before”.
100 He positions it – as I 
do here – as central to the constitution of ‘the economy’ and its science and as central 
for the elaboration of the specific modern problematique of political reason. The 
“naturalism” inherent to this “new political figure” and the paramount role it gives to 
the desiring and sentient being are both presented as ways to develop a form of order. 
Their economic valence is usurped in Foucault’s interpretation of the role they play for 
a particular political rationality - in each case their presumed ‘reality’ is deciphered as 
a correlate to a technique or technology of governing. In this perspective, economy, 
population and economic man create fields of intervention and serve as basis for 
reflection on governmental strategies. As always, epistemological claims, relations of 
power and subjects are in this Foucauldian perspective deeply enmeshed and 
constitutive of each other. In this broad sense, the reading of Malthus given here will 
take up these theoretical suggestions and elaborate such interrelations. Yet the story 
told here is different, and the paramount importance granted to population as a 
political figure has different sources than the borrowed phrases from Foucault’s work 
would suggest.  
The analysis of population, economy and political reason centers for Foucault 
on a “genealogy of the state”, seeking to counter “monolithic” accounts of this 
institution, which have tended to grant it a phantasmatic power. His strict recourse to 
“technologies” of governing is juxtaposed to the assumption of a central source of 
power. But here, it is not the phantasma of the state that is at stake, but the ‘dreams of 
order’ pertaining to views on economy. The contention is that there is a foundationalist 
                                                 
100 As already mentioned in the introduction, the quotes are my own translations given from the German 
translation of the lectures at the Collège de France in the year 1977-1979. The lectures of these years 
have appeared simultaneously by Gallimard, Paris and Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. The English edition is still 
pending, announced to come forth in 2007 by Macmillan (Foucault 2004a, 70, 103).   
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temper in which ‘the economy’ is caught, and which imposes a poverty of the political 
imagination in confronting such a “bewildering complexity of relations” and their 
specific modes of power.
101 The boundary between the ‘reality of economy’ and the 
realm of the political is therefore interpreted rather in terms of the urge to make order 
against the vagaries of political judgment - and the subsequent effects on limiting the 
political imagination - than in terms of liberal reflection on self-limitation as part of a 
strategy governing, as Foucault suggests.
102 Revolutionary upheavals were taken to be 
a break, which political reflection answered – to a large extent – with a search for “the 
reconstruction of order” which “was to be a restoration, above all, of unquestionable 
and unquestioned ways of thinking” (Rothschild 2001, 249). Ironically, it was 
Foucault himself who so prominently chronicled the general break that occurred then 
in Western systems of thought, but he did not bring it to bear with its full weight on 
his analysis of population and political reason. His genealogy of liberal reason 
stretches back to the mid-eighteenth century, where Paine, the Physiocrats, Stueart and 
Smith all conjoin in the making of a liberal political rationality – different from the 
                                                 
101 Political liberalism has concentrated its wisdom about freedom and the limits to power on the 
guarantees of rights. It is true that the economic realm is not exempted from these guarantees and the 
adoption of scarcity by the liberal tradition did not challenge these guarantees, most prominently of 
property rights, in the least – quite the contrary, they furnished them with a basis in necessity, which 
they had to find in natural law at Locke’s time. It is thus not quite correct to say that modern liberal 
political reason regards economy purely as a technical matter, as it also finds its political wisdoms 
satisfied therein. But within the realm of political philosophy and public debate, such political wisdoms 
are questioned, modified, supplemented with different understandings of power or freedom, which 
require other guarantees or reflections on limits. But the necessity underwriting economy has impaired 
the questioning of the political wisdom at stake in this field. The argument is thus that it is a certain 
foundationalist rendering of economy, which freezes the limited political visions embodied therein and 
even protects it from the challenge that would be posed by thinking about what indeed the questions of 
power and freedom could mean in respect to relations mediated by money, technology, objects, 
exchange, creation and needs.  
102 This limitation affects not only the liberal tradition, but can also be recorded for the Marxist 
tradition. While the theoretical aim was to undo the blindness of the liberal political constitution and the 
‘unreality’ of its political word, the way Marx accounted for the economy resorted to necessity, a 
rampant logic that would yet lead the way out of the predicament of scarcity.   
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distinctions maintained here. Thus, simultaneously close to and distant from 
Foucault’s theoretical narrative, the story that unfolds below reads the constitution of 
economy as a “field of reality” in light of the political visions they bespeak, in addition 
to the “technologies” of governing they harbor. We follow Malthus as a political 
philosopher and economist alike in his elaborations of proper foundations and 
techniques.  
Very much aligned with a general motive of modern political thought, 
Malthus’ search for foundation leads him to contemplate a state of nature. Found at the 
shores of the European colonial expansion and described in the travel diaries and 
letters of missionaries and explorers, these lengthy chapters are not “superfluous” to 
the concise argument about the principle of population, as Keynes would later 
claim
103. Those “wretched inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego” who have been “placed by 
the general consent of voyagers, at the bottom of the scale of human beings” (PO 23), 
tell what the absence of ‘economy’ as a mode of ordering consists of and inversely 
teach us about its contours.
104 Nothing delightful, but utter disarray of the social and 
the individual body marks Malthus’ state of nature. “I am inclined to think”, he says, 
“that our imaginations have been carried beyond the truth by the exuberant 
                                                 
103 Prominently among them were the accounts by James Cook, whose explorations had settled by 1793 
for his contemporaries the horizon of the existing continents on the earth and might have contributed to 
the vividness of the experience of limits. Malthus cites among other An account of the voyages 
undertaken…for making discovering in the southern hemisphere (…); A voyage to the South Pole, and 
round the world (…); A voyage to the Pacific Ocean (…). Also worth mentioning are, Friedrich 
Heinrich Alexander von Humboldt, Essai politique sur le royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne, 1811.  
104 The distinctions on a scale of civilization and the progress from one to the other deeply belong to the 
conceptualization of economy – not only to Malthus’ writings, but also to those of the eighteenth 
century. As Michael Adas has shown, technology and mastery of nature, and the accumulation of things 
and tools belonged to the European definition of colonial superiority and civilizational progress (Adas, 
115f). Tierra del Fuego seem to have had a prominent role in the colonial imagination. See (Buck-
Morss 1995, 451) for the photos of a French scientific expedition in 1882, chronicling the progress in 
civilization by picturing the change from ‘nakedness’ to ‘clothing”; the argument also points to the role 
of object-mediation in making the modern social body, to which the chapter turns later on.   
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descriptions which have sometimes been given to these delightful spots” (PO 53). One 
is reminded of the bleak condition of the Hobbesian state of nature, but it is not a 
political covenant that leads the way out of it. Living, corporeal beings – in whom 
moral and physiological characteristics intermingle – appear to need a different 
‘constitution’ in order to compose a proper social body.  
Malthus does not spare the reader with details about the misery of the state of 
nature. It is written all over the individual body of the savage: their “stature seldom 
exceeds five feet; their bellies are protuberant, with high shoulders, large heads and 
limbs disproportionably slender”, nor are they “tall nor well made”. Their children are 
usually “deformed, dwarfish, mutilated, blind and deaf” and they suffer from all sorts 
of “indigestions… pleuritic, asthmatic, and paralytic disorders”. The disorders of the 
individual body and the social body serve as a mirror to each other. In the eyes of their 
European observer, these “naked and despicable” human beings, “reduced to skeletons 
and starved to death” (PO 23-33), these women ”more wrinkled and deformed by age” 
at twenty-two “than European women at sixty”, arouse nothing but disgust: “Nothing 
can be so disgusting as their mode of living” (ibid, 97ff)
105. It could not be more 
obvious that civilization will be measured by the distance that a social body will be 
able to manifest between this unfortunate, weak and hampered life and its own mode 
of living.  
The rhetorical excess of endless descriptions of physiological deformation is 
only matched by an equally embellished account of the social deformation that 
                                                 
105 It is quite remarkable how the text dwells on this disgust, as Malthus presents how “they never wash 
their hand …and the excrements of children are never cleared away”. “Pérouse declares that their cabins 
have a nastiness and stench to which the den of no known animal in the world can be compared” (35). 
He goes on to describe the food as being as repulsive as their houses: “From a piece of water-soaked 
wood, full of holes, he had been extracting and eating a large worm. The smell both of the worm and its 
habitation was in the highest degree offensive” (PO 102; 35; 24).   
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accompanies it. It is “a horrid mixture of famine and ferocity”, in which “children 
desert their parents and parents consider their children as strangers”, where “the 
prelude to love” is “violence”; in which wars are only fought for destruction, the dead 
cannot be buried, the “hearts” are “narrow and hardened” and “feelings of sympathy” 
are “extinguished”. The epitomy of this undoing of social and natural ties is the 
cannibalism of those, who are “reduced to the dreadful extremity of supporting 
themselves on the flesh of two of their children” (PO 41).
106  
It is not self-interest – this great stronghold for the imagination of legitimate 
order in modern political thought
107 -, which is missing on this scene; the  “father will 
sell his son for a knife or a hatchet” (ibid, 36), and cannibalism still has the rational 
contours of interest in self-preservation.
108 It is not equality in strength and wit, which 
turns their striving for self-preservation into such destructive bend, as it did for 
Hobbes. Neither is the misery of savage life due to an original and natural scarcity in 
which they find themselves – this might be most surprising, given that,  “their whole 
                                                 
106 It is worthwhile to listen to the tone of these description in their full length: “The prelude to love in 
the country is violence, and of the most brutal nature…The savage selects his intended wife from the 
women of a different tribe…having first stupefied her with blows of a club, or wooden sword, on the 
head, back, and shoulders, every one of which is followed by a stream of blood, he drags her through 
the woods by one arm, regardless of the stones and broken pieces of trees that may lie in his route”. 
They have “scars on their shorn heads, cut in every direction” more than could be counted (PO 24f). 
The relation to the “female sex” serves as one example of a lack of civilization, the lack of a code of 
honor and measure in war as another: “To meet an enemy on equal terms is regarded as extreme folly. 
To fall in battles, instead of being reckoned an honourable death is a misfortune…But to lie in wait day 
after day, till he can rush upon his prey when most secure, and lest able to resist him; to steal in the dead 
of night upon his enemies, set fire to their huts, and massacre the inhabitants, as they fly naked and 
defenceless from the flames are deeds of glory, which will be of deathless memory in the breasts of his 
grateful countrymen” (PO 38). It is their “strange spirit of retaliation and revenge, which prompts the 
midnight murder, and the frequent shedding of innocent blood” (PO 26). “Their object in battle is not 
conquest, but destruction” (PO 36). 
107 For the classical account of this political genealogy of interest see (Hirschman 1997) 
108 “It seems to be a worse compliment to human nature and to the savage state, to attribute this horror 
repast to malignant passions, without the goad of necessity, rather than to the great law of self-
preservation, which has at times overcome every other feeling, even among the most humane and 
civilized people” (PO 37).  
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time is spent in search of food” (PO 22). Instead, the contrary of scarcity applies to the 
unmediated encounter between human life and its natural condition: The earth’s 
relation to man is not “niggardly”: “her first intercourse with man was a voluntary 
present”, “sufficient as a fund for his subsistence” (PO 392).
109 The fundamental 
condition of man is thus marked by a present given to him -“a gift of nature to man”, 
which consists in an excess of “raw produce” over the work needed to procure it (PE 
113). Malthus records the ease with which subsistence is guaranteed, “with a very 
trifling quantity of labor”, due to the “extreme fertility of these countries”: “What 
immense powers of production are here described!” (PE 270). 
And yet, while nature has bestowed the gift of abundance, it turns into its 
contrary: misery and famine are constantly reproduced in the savage condition of life, 
as Malthus does not tire of showing. The more precise description of the state of 
nature consists therefore in the constant oscillation between the poles of abundance 
and scarcity. “[I]n whatever abundance the productions of these islands may be found 
at certain periods…the average population…presses hard against the limits of the 
average food”. Thus, savage life vibrates “between two extremes, and consequently 
the oscillations between want and plenty are strongly marked, as we should naturally 
expect among the less civilized nation” (PE 58; 154). Scarcity is thus attendant to the 
savage condition, but it is an ever reproduced consequence out of plenty and 
abundance itself. Plant life, animal life and human life share with nature the over-
abundance in what they procure. “Englishmen” would like “fennel seeds” replenish an 
                                                 
109 “And the power to procure a greater [subsistence] was given to him in that quality of the earth by 
which it may be made to yield a much larger quantity of food, and of the material of clothing and 
lodging, that is necessary to feed, clothe and lodge the persons employed in the cultivation of the soil” 
(PO 392). See also (PO 154).  
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empty space from their single nation, if they were let loose to do (PE 8f)
110. Population 
then manifests the general traits of a life force itself; it is in a sense this force that 
Malthus cannot but also welcome as a necessary, important trait, without which life 
could not flourish. “That an increase of population, when it follows in its natural order, 
is both a great positive good, and absolutely necessary to a further increase in the 
annual produce of the land and labour of any country, I should be the last to deny” (PE 
454)
111.  But it is a force, which carries the seeds of its own destruction, if not 
answered with the right order. Ready at any moment to exert itself like a “spring”, it is 
“making a start forwards at every temporary and occasional increase of food, by which 
means it is continually going beyond the average increase and is repressed by the 
periodical returns of severe want” (PE 20; 171).
112  
The reference to such over-flowing force of life residing in its “procreative 
powers”
113 and operating as a kernel in the “animal economy” of human beings, stands 
thus behind Malthus’ account of the material and social disorganization the state of 
nature. But there is still a more precise way to put these causes of destruction. What 
                                                 
110 “It is observed by Dr Franklin [Benjamin Franklin], that there is no bound to the prolific nature of 
plants or animals, but what is made by their crowding and interfering with each other’s means of 
subsistence. Were the face of the earth, he says, vacant of other plants, it might be gradually sowed and 
overspread with one kind only, as for instance with fennel: and were it empty of other inhabitants, it 
might in a few ages be replenished from one nation only, as for instance with Englishmen” (PO 8f). 
111 A declining reproductive force in whatever form belongs for Malthus thus to the unfortunate and 
destructive situation of the state of nature, where life’s force itself is hampered. Examples of this can be 
found in his descriptions: “Women treated in this brutal manner must necessarily be subject to frequent 
miscarriages…the too early union of the sexes in general, would tend to prevent the females from being 
prolific.” In America, Malthus finds that the “unfruitfulness” of women is due to “a want of ardour in 
men towards their women”, which “probably exists in a great degree among all barbarous nations, 
whose food is poor and insufficient, and who live in a constant apprehension of being pressed by famine 
or by an enemy.” (PO 25; 29). 
112 Malthus’ rendering of life as a force takes up the physiological discourse at that time, which had also 
underwritten the ties he establishes between the moral and physiological aspects of human beings 
(Williams 1994, 11).  
113 “A large proportion of the procreative power appears to have been called into action, the redundancy 
from which was checked by violent causes” (PO 153).  
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characterizes life in the state of nature is the belated fashion in which it learns about its 
conditions of existence. Life meets its own condition of existence in such a 
catastrophic manner, violently, with the “positive checks” being “famine, sickness and 
death”, because it has before blindly reacted to the stimulus given to it - with no 
proper judgment pertaining to the real limits of its resources and hence its own 
conditions. Abundance and blindness to the reality of one’s own continual existence 
are tied together at the moment of the exertion of life’s desires and forces. Malthus 
will never untie this link; inversely, the experience of the limits of scarcity and the 
proper cognition of reality seem now to belong together. It is this peculiar 
epistemological claim that deserves our attention in the overall reference to the vital 
forces of life, which we find in Malthus. It alerts us to the intermeshing of an 
epistemological principle – with all its generality and weight of giving access to reality 
– and a mode of ordering. After all, the conditions of blindness belong to the most 
miserable and unhappy form of ‘animal’ existence in Malthus’ story. In this peculiar 
combination of epistemology and order one might find a reason why ‘economy’ – that 
principle of order, which leads the way out of the destruction of the state of nature - 
came to be the most privileged discourse in defining society:  order according to 
‘economy’, recognition of the conditions of existence, and the threat of utter 
destruction are enmeshed in a single knot. More than two centuries later, George Soros 
would say that the market always helped him to get a sense of reality. It is tempting to 
see him relying on a link defined by a clergyman two hundred years earlier.
114  
In this epistemology, to which economy points, the existence and experience of 
                                                 
114 It seems that after Malthus, this tie has been kept stable. The economist Gary Becker in the twentieth 
century relies on the same tie when he says that economic action – referring to choices in a situation of 
scarce resources - is action that accepts reality. To be found in Becker, Gary Irrational Behavior and 
Economic Theory, (cit. in Foucault 2004, 394).  
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limits or even scarcity seem to have a paramount role, which needs attention and 
elucidation. The thesis to be developed in what follows is that the principle of 
population and the theme of reproduction is neither about a wise concern for the 
ecological limits, nor a truism, but a principle of order and epistemology, which 
hinges on limits and lack. The fact that it fastened the perspective on bodily 
reproduction should therefore not be understood in any narrow way as referring solely 
to the “powers of procreation”. Rather, those bodily predicaments enshrined in the 
question of reproduction are inextricably intermingled with a much more general 
concern about reproducing order as such. The rise of the conception of self-production 
and re-reproduction as the preeminent model of order belongs thereby to Malthus’ 
time in general. It traveled across the fields of philosophy, biology and political 
economy. Müller-Sievers, in his study on Self-Generation, points out how in this 
period an “entirely new method of argumentation and legitimization is introduced into 
a variety of discourses”, in which “all modes of differentiation” “become entirely 
immanent; all traces of intervention by exterior forms of powers…shall be explicable 
as a function of the system”. The model of self-generation of order has the form, he 
points out, of a “last instance” and “reorients” in this light “the questions of 
reproduction, relationality and productivity”.
115 What Müller-Sievers traces among 
                                                 
115 (Mueller-Sievers 1997, 47, 25, 6 see also p. 60f). The concept of epigenesis, stemming originally 
from Aristotle, furnished the basis for those philosophical searches for self-generation. “It stated that 
organisms generate themselves successively under the guidance of a formative drive” (ibid, 6). Müller-
Sievers traces these concepts in German Idealism and Romanticism, where they were much more bound 
up with the question of the autonomous subject and reason. The organic associations of self-generation 
were injected with a “spiritual residue” in turn, which produces “the body as a possible subject of 
oppression”. While Malthus and British Utilitarianism seem to be terribly far from this, there are some 
traces of even this romantic recourse to an oppressed body: Malthus’ first edition of the Principle of 
Population, this short and utterly pessimistic book, which put not much regulatory hope into anything, 
obtained its pessimism from exactly this source of romantic melancholy about the evils stemming from 
a repressed life force. About the changes in the edition, Malthus mentions to his readers: “To those who 
still think that any check to population [including moral restraint, ut] whatever would be worse than the 
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others in Kant’s search for the foundation of autonomous reason, other scholars have 
recorded more extensively in the newly emerging definitions of life in terms of 
organization and function.
116 While these neighboring developments cannot stand as 
distant proofs for the specific case at hand, they point to the ubiquitous turn towards 
the issue of reproduction and help to grasp the philosophical and metaphysical 
significance of this gesture of self-foundation, in which “an interminable chain of 
causes and effects be bent back onto its own origin”, with the tendency to “close itself 
off” onto itself (ibid, 4).  
Unsurprisingly, the blindness attendant to the exertion of “procreative powers” 
of life in the state of nature is linked to lack of proper judgment in the savages – they 
are as ignorant as the mob on the political stage. Exemplifying the colonial and 
cultural hierarchies of the West, Malthus accounts for this blindness to reality in terms 
of the immediacy of passions, which are given supreme reign. “The ignorance and 
                                                                                                                                             
evils which it would relieve, the conclusions of the former Essay remain in full force” (PO iii). A 
“restraint on a strong natural inclination” he contemplates, will “produce a certain amount of temporary 
unhappiness” (ibid, 8; 15). The difference in the editions lies the more and more positive emphasis put 
on moral restraint. 
116 Closer to Malthus and this British-French context are the examples of the rising social sciences and 
their specific adoption of biological models of self-governing organization. The French political 
economist Jean-Baptiste Say defined political economy as the “physiology of society” and Saint-Simon 
announced “My friends, we are all organized bodies”. “Their central concept was no longer sensibility, 
it was organization”, summarizes Heilbron in his study on The Rise of Social Theory (Heilbron 1995, 
110 ). While Malthus stood at some distance from them, for him alike, the “subject matter of political 
economy was a complex and living totality” and the regulatory kernel of its order (ibid., 184). But 
nature itself only provided the force and its destructive regulation; the key to self-reproducing viable 
order, founded only in itself, was still missing - a vacant spot, one already suspects, which will be 
occupied by the principle of economy, which comes to conjoin absolutely inextricably order, nature and 
material civilization. Malthus searched for this key, but it should be noted that this search bears much 
recognition of the instability upon which it worked. Malthus remained, more than Ricardo or even Say, 
a connection between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. The making of new sensibilities, the 
artifice of bridging uncertain processes through time, the acknowledgment of worrisome dependencies 
and insufficiencies remain visible in his writings. In between the sensibilities of the old and the 
organization of the new century, Malthus can give us therefore the clues about the genealogy of these 
closed-off figures of thought, aiming at self-foundation.  
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indolence of the improvident savage would frequently prevent him from extending the 
benefits of these supplies much beyond the time when they were actually obtained” 
(PE 28)
 .
117 Thus, “among animals and the uncivilized states of man”, the population is 
much below what the soil could support (PE 87). It is this blinding immediacy that 
stands behind all these hyperbolical accounts of population growth, numbers of 
numbers toppling each other. Without the assumption that food is immediately 
translated into more mouths to be fed, all these numbers and the gravitational pull of 
the principle would not hold. On the basis of this peculiar certainty, Malthus reasons 
that any increase of the means of subsistence “not be distributed to the lower classes 
consequently would give no stimulus to population” (PE 21). Ireland with its cheap 
potato is an much-preferred example by Malthus, which for him exemplifies this 
immediate multiplication of food into more bodies.
118 The improvident savages and 
ignorant Irishmen are just like the “labouring poor” at home, who “live from hand to 
mouth”, “enjoy themselves while they can”, never thinking about tomorrow (PO 366) 
                                                 
117 “As savages are wonderfully improvident, and their means of subsistence always precarious, they 
often pass from the extreme of want to exuberant plenty, according to the vicissitudes of fortune in the 
chase, or to the variety in the produce of the seasons” (PO 33). Also see Adas for the descriptions of 
Africans in colonial accounts as having “no sense of history”, and being “presentist like animals” 
(Adas, 241f). 
118 “I shall only observe therefore, that the extended use of potatoes has allowed of a very rapid increase 
[of population] during the last century. But the cheapness of this nourishing root, and the small piece of 
ground which, under this kind of cultivation, will in average years produce the food for a family, joined 
to the ignorance and the depressed state [this expression replaced the original “barbarism”, ut] of the 
people, which have prompted them to follow their inclinations with no other prospect than an 
immediate bare subsistence, have encouraged marriage to such a degree, that the population is pushed 
much beyond the industry and present resources of the country; and the consequence naturally is, that 
the lower classes of people are in the most impoverished and miserable state. The checks to the 
population are of course chiefly of the positive kind, and arise from the diseases occasioned by squalid 
poverty, damp and wretched cabins, by bad and insufficient clothing and occasional want…” (PO 277f; 
also see 389; 545): “…the common price of labour would soon be regulated principally by the price of 
potatoes instead of the price of wheat, as at present; and the rags and wretched cabins of Ireland would 
follow of course.”  
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and reproducing without sense or meaning.
119  
The truth, which evades these ignorant and improvident beings, pertains to the 
conditions of a continual, stable order of their own life, which exceeds the 
predicaments of the moment. It is worth remarking that the explicit interest in the 
stability of the body political through time has been a concern of civic humanism and 
republicanism; it was a specific republican virtue to be able to answer to the 
contingency of the future and assume responsibility for the maintenance of the 
republic
120. While Malthus certainly was concerned with the dangers of the 
“euthanasia” of the constitution, the future of it was not any more made in the political 
stance of the citizens, but in the social body and its economy. With respect to this aim, 
the absence of limits and lack seem to show their whole destructive power. Malthus 
engages with this possibility of a ‘lack of lack’ of food in curious speculations, 
embellished in long, rhetorically over-bearing passages. It is worth repeating the 
length of the whole speculation on unlimited food, which goes as follows:  
“[T]he population which might have been produced from a single pair since the 
Christian era, would have been sufficient, not only to fill the earth quite full of people, 
so that four should stand in every square yard, but to fill all the planets of our solar 
system in the same way, and not only them but all the planets revolving round the stars 
which are visible to the naked eye, supposing each of them to be a sun, and to have as 
                                                 
119 On the basis of this elucidation of the meaning of the principle of population, it is unfortunately not 
surprising that the development discourse always had a special liking for the problem of population and 
seems to reproduce the same fears about the “copulating poor”. Mary Poovey puts it thus: “In the first 
instance, then, nineteenth-century political economy can be said to have been an expression of and 
defense against anxiety about the poor” wondering about “how society would survive if the poor 
continued to eat and reproduce” (Poovey 2001, 157). 
120 See the article by (Chowers 2002) for an instructive account of the political provenience of the 
preparation for the future and the cultivation of republican virtue as its proper stronghold. It contrasts 
tellingly with trust the liberal tradition shifted to the private, economic realm.  
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many planets belonging to it as our sun has. Under this law of population, which, 
excessive as it may appear when stated in this way is, I firmly believe, best suited to 
the nature and situation of man, it is quite obvious that some limit to the production of 
food, or some other of the necessaries of life, must exist […] It is not easy to conceive 
a more disastrous present, one more likely to plunge the human race in irrevocable 
misery, than an unlimited facility of producing food in a limited space” (PO 169). 
The limits of earthly space seem to be much more conspicuous at the end of 
the quote, spilling over from a ‘bad infinity’ of bodies and bodies in space. It is an 
endless series with no principle of inner regulation, stretching out without form. 
Against this limitlessness of expansion of stuck bodies, internal limits seem to be 
necessary – not because of a natural necessity, but because of a necessity of proper 
form. Within the textual universe of Malthus, this spatial expansion of bodies recalls 
his discussion of barbarian expansion and the constant warfare brought about by it. 
The spatial limits of a determinate political territory are crossed in warfare, as always 
more bodies than sustainable within are produced by the “carelessness of the barbaric 
character” (PO 65). It is not only “savage life” against which the economy of the 
social body emerges, but also the “hydra-headed monster” of barbarians, “gathering 
fresh darkness and terrors as they rolled on”, obscuring the “sun of Italy” and sinking 
“the Western world in night” (ibid, 67)
121. Traced to the superiority of the power of 
population, which is not turned into misery, but into war, the discussion of the 
barbarian brings to light even more the political bearing of the question of limits, 
                                                 
121 In his lecture-series on The defense of Society Foucault gives a elucidating discussion of the 
barbarian and the savage as two different figures of modern thought. Whereas the savage is the natural 
ground, the point, from where society is created, the barbarian always exists as the outside to an already 
existing civilization, straddling its borders and threatening its existence. See lecture from the 3
rd March 
1976 in (Foucault 2003).  
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space and population. The making of internal limits would not only provide the direly 
needed ordered form of the social body securing its internal working, it would also 
provide the proper form of an external, peaceful order.  
The limits of food, fertile soil, earthly habitats, which are there as natural facts 
and also should be there – this is how Malthus has ended his speculation of limitless 
subsistence. The limit, that he searches out, are internal regulatory principles, making 
the desired order. The curious intermingling between the factual and the normative, 
between the is and the ought, pervades the accounts of limits conspicuously. Limits 
are as visible and comprehensible as the boundedness of a small island in a wide sea, 
on the one hand. The image of the island is a preferred epistemological figure, 
capturing the givenness of a limited situation: “As the bounds to the number of people 
of islands, particularly when they are of small extent, are so narrow, and so distinctly 
marked, that every person must see and acknowledge them…The difficulty is here 
reduced to so narrow a compass, is so clear, precise and forcible that we cannot escape 
from it”.
122 Yet, these absolute limits are on the other hand, neither actual nor decisive; 
“allowing of the produce of the earth to be absolutely unlimited…scarcely removes the 
weight of a hair from the argument, which depends entirely upon the differently 
increasing ratios of population and food” (PE 461), Malthus triumphs against those 
who cannot see that those limits have immediate bearing. The “absolute refusal of 
nature to yield any more” recedes in importance to the limits actualized internally, so 
                                                 
122 The quote continues as follows: “It cannot be answered in the usual vague and inconsiderate manner, 
by talking of emigration, and further, cultivation. In the present instance, we cannot but acknowledge, 
that the one is impossible, and the other glaringly inadequate. The fullest conviction must stare us in the 
face, that the people on this group of islands could not continue to double their numbers every twenty 
five years; and before we proceed to inquire into the state of society on them, we must be perfectly 
certain that, unless a perpetual miracle render the women barren, we shall be able to trace some very 
powerful checks to population in the habits of the people” (PO 46; 50).  
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that he can say, that if we “refer to the practical limits of population, it is of great 
importance to recollect that they must always be very far short of the utmost power of 
the earth to produce food” (PO 405f). One image in particular captures this proposed 
significance of limits, which are at the same time absolute as the boundary of an 
island, but never to be reached and yet absolutely important for each moment: a man, 
says Malthus, “who is locked in a room may be fairly said to be confined by the walls 
of it, though he may never touch the walls” (ibid, 461). There is a constant referral of 
the external and the internal limits into each other, which finds no rest. One grants the 
weight of unquestioned reality to the other, while each experience of limits becomes 
an instantiation of this absolute boundary. While Malthus claims that the principle of 
population does not refer to causes “remote, latent and mysterious, but near us, round 
about us, and open to the investigation of every inquiring mind” the opposite seems to 
hold (PO 312).  
This oscillation signals the role limits are designated to play in the order whose 
regulatory key Malthus was to expound. It marks precisely the theoretical difference 
he entertains from his adversaries Condorcet and Godwin, who see the question of 
limits as radically external, arising only “at a great and almost immeasurable 
distance”: No “difficulty would arise from this cause, till the whole earth had been 
cultivated like a garden” (PO 319)
123 – this is how Malthus presents their position and 
admits, if this really is the case, “I cannot think that our ardour in the pursuit of such a 
                                                 
123 Malthus refers in this description to Wallace, but these authors all shared this view of the problem of 
population. See also the explicit reference to Condorcet in this respect: “M. Condorcet thinks that it 
cannot possibly be applicable but at an era extremely distant…it will appear, on the contrary, that the 
period when the number of men surpasses their means of easy subsistence has long since arrived, and 
that this necessary oscillation, this constantly subsisting cause of periodical misery, has existed in most 
countries ever since we have had any histories of mankind, and continues to exist at the present 
moment” (PO 322).   
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scheme ought to be damped by the contemplation of so remote a difficulty” (ibid.). 
But instead of this externality of the question of order and the problem of limits, 
Malthus poses its internality and claims that the dangers of population are imminent 
and immediate.
124 Not only this, it is also desirable that such limits should be 
actualized before they become incumbent. The internal character of these limits carries 
at the same time factual and normative weight. They actualize factual limits, not yet 
real, and they simulate virtual limits for the sake of order itself.
125  
Taking a step back from the oscillating nature of limits, one can see more 
clearly where the search for a proper foundation of the ‘order of bodies’ has led 
Malthus so far: his argument links the condition of possibility of order to an internal 
experience of limits as its sine qua non. They assume the regulatory power so direly 
needed by threats of war and danger of meaningless heaps of bodies. The catastrophic 
absence of the proper recognition of these internal and immediate limits is staged in 
the misery of the state of nature. There blindness reigns towards them, and only 
belatedly they are thrust upon those “redundant bodies” to which nature tells “to be 
gone”. The gift of nature, which tells nothing about limits, and the abundant responses 
to it, which know nothing about limits, amount to an utter lack of comprehension of 
the conditions of material order. Inversely, only the lack of abundance teaches a 
                                                 
124 “But the truth is, that if the view of the argument given in this essay be just, the difficulty, so far 
from being remote, is imminent and immediate. At every period during the progress of cultivation, from 
the present moment to the time when the whole earth was become like a garden, the distress for want of 
food would be constantly pressing on all mankind if they were equal. Though the produce of the earth 
would be increasing every year, population would have the power of increasing much faster, and this 
superior power must necessarily be checked by the periodical or constant action of moral restraint, vice 
or misery” (PO 319).  
125 For Malthus, these limits traveled into the heart of the social order, framing its very making. 
Foucault’s theory of the change of episteme between the classical and the modern age, which occurred 
around 1800, seem to point to exactly this transformation of the significance of limits; hence, the 
modern age became the age of finitude and a lack, determining and residing within the human being 
(Foucault 1970).  
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proper sense of reality, regardless of how real abundance might be actually at that 
moment. It seems as if boundlessness was the univocal mode through which to state 
the problem that needed a solution. On the political stage, political reason has been 
charged with intoxication and lack of limits; in the “lower” realms of societal and 
colonial hierarchies, bodily needs and desires exhibit a similarly destructive 
boundlessness. To cure the excesses of political reason, the excesses of bodily needs 
and desires will have to find their apt and powerful mode of governance. 
Misrecognition and disorder will be answered with a regulatory epistemology of 
limits, which claims to bring about the ‘truth of society’, as it talks about how to make 
more things and riches and needs no reference to political reason. 
“Man cannot live in plenty”, Malthus exclaims hence against his opponents 
Godwin and Condorcet (PO 331). He brings to bear against them this double demand 
of epistemological and regulatory powers and finds them to fail, as they only provide 
some intoxicated reason and calculation, in the case of Condorcet, and some misplaced 
hopes in the powers of individual reason, in the case of Godwin. Both seem to Malthus 
utterly incapable of actualizing the necessity of these limits (PO 321). Malthus 
predicts that Condorcet’s probabilities and social mathematics about how to prevent 
credit “from being the exclusive privilege of great fortunes” and how to render 
commerce “less dependent on great capitalists”, will be “absolutely nugatory” when 
“applied to real life”. Extrapolating the effects of blinding abundance out of Godwin’s 
utopian social order, he concludes: “Alas! What becomes of the picture, where men 
lived in the midst of plenty, where no man was obliged to provide with anxiety and 
pain for his restless wants; …where the mind was delivered from he perpetual anxiety 
about corporal support, and free to expatiate in the field of thought which is congenial 
to her? This beautiful fabric of the imagination vanishes at the severe touch of 
truth…The rosy flush of health gives place to the pallid cheek and hollow eye of  
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misery” (PO 334). This peculiar reality and necessity, which Malthus states so matter-
of-factly, as if he had seen the gravitational pull of the apple, as it falls to the ground, 
is about a certain envisioning of the viable foundations of a social body – meshing the 
reference to the corporal predicament of human life with a vision of order, which 
crosses the boundaries of the factual and the normative and presents scarcity as the 
most real reality.  
How much the alleged blindness concomitant to plenty or abundance is about a 
mistrust of plenty in the wrong hands is descriptive of the principle of population 
itself. The immediacy of translation it posits between subsistence, animal instincts and 
the resulting abundance of “wretched beings” belongs to the uncivilized races: the 
colonial subjects abroad and “lower orders” at home. Against this mistrust, which 
pertains alike to the exercise of proper political reason and economic reason of the 
uncivilized, the governance of passions by a regulatory epistemology, capable of 
attending to the limits and the language of the uncivilized gains precedence. The 
making of the economic subject by ordering its passions and breaking the immediacy 
of blind instincts becomes thus utterly central in the economy of the social body. The 
anthropological truth, which economic thought still professes today to be its building 
block – upon which a whole methodology and elaborate theories are built - might find 
in these reflections about the vagaries of judgment and the search to avoid them their 
legitimate political genealogy. As we will see in the next chapter, ‘economic reality’ is 
geared towards creating and rendering effective this coherent regulatory epistemology, 
in which economic man is made and which he (sic) propels forward. To address the 
overarching worries about uncertain judgments in the hands of the many and the 
“vexatious task” of understanding the “common good”, “made in a frightening 
complexity of relations,” clarity was needed, which would unburden the political 
being. Henceforth, only one simple law, “one important political truth” (PO 526)  
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“intelligible to the humblest capacity” would teach the ‘members of society’ what 
needed to be known about social and political matters: “It is merely, that he is not to 
bring beings into the world, for whim he cannot find the means of support” and he 
need not try to “pursue a general good, which we may not distinctly comprehend” (PO 
483).
126 
                                                 
126 That Malthus took the calculations of Condorcet to be so nugatory lies, I think, in this need to ‘make 
the proper subject’ with much much different ways than talks about structures of credit. Malthus 
judgment of “absolutely nugatory” calculations followed indeed immediately upon this exposition of 
Condorcet’s sketches of progress and comment directly on this question of credit and commerce (PO 
321) Keynes, exposing something of a similar line of thought – as we will see - might have as well 
returned back to Condorcet as his predecessor, instead of finding it in Malthus. But then it will be for a 
reason that he turned to Malthus and Burke and not to Condorcet.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CIVILIZED BODY POLITIC, ECONOMIC MAN AND NECESSITY 
 
The over-boarding force of life - born out of the mixture of images of growing fennel-
seeds, murderous mobs, savage life and intoxicated political minds – had to find its 
proper governance.  As all pervasive as it was portrayed by Malthus, as 
comprehensive was the regulatory answer he envisioned for it. His liberal sensibilities 
revolted against the idea that direct laws and despotic powers, could come to “examine 
the claims of each individual, and to determine whether he had or had not exerted 
himself to the utmost, and to grant or refuse assistance accordingly”, or if punishments 
had to be devised for “the man who marries early” (PO, 321, 345). Before being 
subjected to the “miserable alternative between universal want and the enactment of 
direct laws”, the social body had to be reminded of and geared effectively towards its 
conditions of ‘good life’ and away from the recurrent catastrophe of the state of 
nature. The “happiness of the whole” was at stake.
127  
                                                 
127 Malthus asks, “[i]s the man who marries early to be pointed at with the finger of scorn? Is he to be 
whipped at the cart’s tail? Is he to be confined for years in prison? Is he to have his children exposed? 
Are not all direct punishment for an offence of this kind shocking and unnatural to the last degree?” 
(PO, 345). “My greatest objection to a system of equality and the system of the poor laws (two systems 
which, however different in their outset, are of a nature calculated to produce the same produce the 
same results) is, that the society in which they are effectively carried into execution, will ultimately be 
reduced to the miserable alternative of choosing between universal want and the enactment of direct 
laws against marriage” (ibid.,381). “If assistance be to be distributed to a certain class of people, a 
power must be lodged somewhere of discriminating the proper objects, and of managing the concerns of 
the institutions that are necessary; but any great interference with the affairs of other people is a species 
of tyranny” (ibid., 367). “If an inquisition were to be established to examine the claims of each 
individual, and to determine whether he had or had not exerted himself to the utmost, and to grant or 
refuse assistance accordingly, this would be little else than a repetition upon a larger scale of the 
English poor laws, and would be completely destructive of the true principles of liberty and equality” 
(ibid.,321). Against the Greek City states, he finds no “stronger argument”, “than the necessity of such 
laws as Aristotle himself proposes”. Those laws are positive and direct regulations respecting age for 
marriage, forced abortions etc. (ibid., 143). The Poor Laws subject the “whole class of the common 
people” to “a set of grating, inconvenient, and tyrannical laws, totally inconsistent with the genuine 
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The “happiness of the whole” as the telos of the body politic is an equivocal 
term. It might host quite different meanings and might serve different political ends 
and it was ubiquitous at the time of Malthus (Halevy 1995b). Regardless of what it 
comes to mean, it haunts its adherents with the question of how to define such 
happiness, the contribution to it and the consequences that follow. Malthus and his 
most intimate adversary, William Godwin, were both willing to take happiness, and all 
what is conducive to it, as a measuring rod for political reason. But while Godwin 
went in length in thrusting the weight of these questions onto the reasoning of the 
individual alone, Malthus wanted to circumvent its vagaries. In between the fears of 
despotic churchwardens and of the uncertainty of political judgment, Malthus offered 
instead the workings of an internal regulatory epistemology guiding the individual and 
the social body at the same time.  The envisioned social epistemology set up mirrors 
of recognition throughout to teach the individual and the whole the alignment to the 
conditions of material civilization - before the “miserable alternative” of universal 
misery or despotism would impose itself.
128 It is this epistemological frame, which 
seems to determine the constitution of ‘modern economic objectivity’ at its core, 
conditioning and limiting the theoretical reflection about it.  
The utilitarian reasoning of Malthus, geared towards this epistemological and 
regulatory consistency, was strict to the utmost: assessed in its light, old laws – like 
the Poor Laws – were to be shunned, because they renewed the blindness of the state 
of nature. The “state of equality” envisioned by Godwin or Condorcet was subjected to 
                                                                                                                                             
spirit of the constitution” (ibid., 367).  
128 So that Malthus could declare that “if any man chose to marry, without a prospect of being able to 
support a family, he should have the most perfect liberty to do so…the punishment of nature falls 
directly and most severely upon the individual who commits the act…When Nature will govern and 
punish for us, it is a very miserable ambition to wish to snatch to rod from her hands, and draw upon 
ourselves the odium of executioner” (PO, 516).  
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the same verdict and therefore denied to be conducive to viable happiness. Old 
customs of discriminating against single mothers should, by contrast were to be 
upheld, argued Malthus. Even if it constituted a “breach of natural justice”, that a 
“woman should at present be almost driven from society for an offence, which men 
commit nearly with impunity”, for the regulation of society towards future happiness, 
blame had to fall somewhere, the “offence is more obvious and conspicuous in the 
woman”: “[T]he sins of the fathers should be visited upon the children; and if in our 
overweening vanity we imagine, that we can govern a private society better by 
endeavoring systematically to counteract this law, I am inclined to believe, that we 
shall find ourselves very greatly mistaken“ (PO, 337, 519f). 
From the same requirement of such comprehensive epistemological clarity, 
other questions are approached. Malthus thunders against the idea, that a piece of land 
for some potatoes and a cow should form the minimal support for poor families. These 
seemingly inconspicuous potatoes would be the “most cruel and fatal blow to the 
happiness of the lower classes of people in this country that they had ever received” 
Malthus expounds with certainty and bemoans the disjuncture introduced this way 
from any clear signals about how many labouring bodies would be in demand (PO, 
541, 543). The potatoes and the cow constituted a dangerous clouding of the ways to 
know one’s real conditions of viable existence: they offer food to the immediate 
dynamic of population in disjunction to the needs of the social body as a whole and 
thus mislead the many. 
While these examples are firmly wedded to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, they indicate the force, with which Malthus insists that all aspects of life had 
to be encompassed by the same epistemological grid: While potatoes, the state of 
nature, support for ‘illegitimate’ children, the Poor Laws and the state of equality, all 
exhibited the same structures of blindness and catastrophe, the “two fundamental laws  
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of society, the security of property, and the institution of marriage” carry the 
lightening torch away from scarcity (PO, 338). In view of the current project, the 
significant aspect of Malthus’ argumentation lies less in the unsurprising praise of 
property and marriage – but in the way it is founded and the epistemological weight 
given to these social institutions.
129 It is the specific problem of a “populous kingdom, 
the largeness of the subject and the power of moving from place to place”, Malthus 
deliberates, that “obscures and confuse our view. We lose sight of a truth, which 
before appeared completely obvious” (PO, 166). What cannot be ascertained anymore 
within “the view of the individual” is now brought into his limited range of reason by 
such general laws (PO, 159).
130 
Epistemologies of the social body are not peculiar to the nineteenth century or 
the history of economic thought. The claim to expose “important political truth” is 
                                                 
129 The form of reasoning alluded to sounds in respect to the question of marriage as follows: “[W]hile 
every man felt secure that all his children would be will provided for by general benevolence, the 
powers of the earth would be absolutely inadequate to produce food for the population which would 
ensure…that some check of population therefore was imperiously called for; that the most natural and 
obvious check seemed to be, to make every man provide for his own children; that this would operate in 
some respect as a measure and a guide in the increase of population, as it might be expected that no man 
would bring beings into the world for whom he could not find the means of support; that, where this 
notwithstanding was the case, it seemed necessary for the example of others, that the disgrace and 
inconvenience attending such a conduct should hall upon that individual, who had thus inconsiderately 
punished himself and his innocent children into want and misery…This institution of marriage, or at 
least of some express or implied obligation on every man to support his own children, seems to be the 
natural result of these reasoning in a community under the difficulties that we have supposed” (PO, 
337). 
130 “From the small number of people, and the little variety of employment, the subject is brought 
distinctly within the view of each individual; and he must feel the absolute necessity of repressing his 
inclinations to marriage, till some such vacancy offer (PO,159). In contrast, large countries offer distinct 
epistemological problems, “this subject is always involved in great obscurity” (ibid.,161): “If our 
attention were confined to one parish, and there were no power of emigrating from it, the most careless 
observer could not fail to remark that, if all married at 20, it would be perfectly impossible for the 
farmer, however carefully they might improve their land, to find employment and food for those that 
would grow up; but when a great number of these parishes are added together in a populous kingdom, 
the largeness of the subject, and the power of moving from place to place, obscure and confuse our 
view. We lose sight of a truth, which before appeared completely obvious;” (ibid.,166).  
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neither. At stake is the analysis of the specificity of this “regime of verisdiction”. How 
does it figure a comprehensive social body and how does it relate this ‘body’ to 
questions of power, normativity and the contingency of this particular way to order 
life? - is the guiding question. The preceding chapter elucidated in a more general 
fashion, the relation between limits and order to be found in Malthus. The genealogy 
of scarcity and its epistemological bearings, which has commenced there, will be 
furthered in the current chapter by showing how economic interests and institutions 
manifest such epistemology. The overarching characteristic of this epistemology is the 
way, limits or scarcity function within it. The experience of necessity belongs to the 
requirements of proper recognition. Malthus elaboration of the working of capital, the 
right to property, the desire for objects, the sacrifices given for them and – surprisingly 
or not – the norms of marriage and procreation all belong to the fashioning of this 
epistemology of scarcity. 
In each case, the peculiar double status of scarcity, described before, assumes a 
central role. While economy is about producing wealth against the foil of the 
“wretched” naked being at home and abroad, the threats of scarcity and the ‘body in 
pain’ remain imminent and internal: without it, the epistemological and regulatory 
powers would falter and the mirrors of recognition would cloud.  
As already visible from the complex and somewhat circuitous presentation of 
Malthus’ thought, the simultaneous internality and externality of scarcity 
circumscribes a quite bewildering figure of order: the catastrophe is to be left behind, 
but it also has to be present; the truth of the economy was posited against the danger of 
misery, but misery remained the condition of the production of its truth. One wonders, 
if it was not Malthus, rather than Condorcet who suffered from an “intoxicated mind”. 
The reason to dwell in these ‘bewildering’ figures of thought – a most impressive 
manifestation of the “analytic of finitude”, as Foucault might have thought – results  
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from the theoretical suspicion, that it provides the ‘opening’ to understand how 
thinking about ‘the economy’ has taken on such regulatory coherence and air of 
necessity, which shields it like a “wall” from considerations about power, plurality of 
modes of living and spaces of experimentation.  
The constitution of a more bounded and self-standing economic objectivity, 
which is traced here, can only be found in the specific ways, in which wealth, capital, 
scarcity and the passions and reasoning of economic man are articulated in the text of 
Malthus. But they cannot be read off an explicit discussion of ‘the economy’ 
undertaken by Malthus himself. He does not use the notion of economy extensively. 
When relied on, it mostly means the “parsimonious use of resources”. He also refers 
sparingly to the “internal economy” of the republic. While only so rarely used, both 
reflect this long-standing double meaning of economy, which histories of this term 
elucidate (Stemmler 1985). Within the epistemology of scarcity, parsimony and the 
order of the whole achieved a tighter coherence and stronger determination. To unfold 
this making of ‘modern economic objectivity’ we have to follow Malthus into the 
elaboration of the old notions of political economy, which commences with capital 
itself.  
The Making of the Social Body and the Wisdom of Capital 
Capital is the most comprehensive and over-arching key, which Malthus introduces as 
a guarantor of the proper and cognizant reproduction of the social body as a whole. 
The laws which regulate capital, Malthus observes, “bear a very striking and singular 
resemblance to the laws which regulate…the progress of population” (PE,, 263). They 
are, he stipulates later, “certainly just of the same kind” (PE, 265). It is similar in 
scope and direction, but it modifies the catastrophic reproduction of nature into a more  
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steady and progressive course. As a consequences, the “check from want of 
employment will be much more steady in its operation and much more favourable to 
the lower classes of the people, than the check from the immediate want of food” (PO, 
451). Unfortunately, in Malthus’ view, capital is so much like the laws of corporal 
reproduction, that it is subjected to the same causes of death and interruption: 
redundant capital, just as redundant bodies, brings the progress of wealth to a halt and 
thus itself to perish.
131  
In this respect, Malthus is a peculiar political economist. That capital could be 
redundant, wasted, just as dying bodies, was something neither his French, nor English 
colleagues would want to think.
132 It will give ground to J.M. Keynes for claiming 
Malthus as part of the “ranks of heretics” in economic thought. It is certainly right, 
that Malthus entertained uncertainties and paradoxes about this regulating principle, 
which mark him out against his followers, who eschewed his doubts. But Malthus also 
belongs to the core of the orthodox tradition in economic thought. The epistemology 
of scarcity, established with him, is the foil against which capital appears to carry with 
it a ‘truth’ of the social body, which – despite all mishaps and paradoxes – is 
juxtaposed to the blindness of the “copulating poor” and “savage life”.  
“Capital is that particular part of these possessions” destined to produce future 
wealth, with the expectation of a higher return than expended before – thus defines 
Malthus, concurring with the wisdom of common sense (PE, 212). The origins of 
                                                 
131 “[I]t is equally vain, with a view to the permanent increase of wealth, to continue converting revenue 
into capital, when there is no adequate demand for the products of such capital, as to continue 
encouraging marriage and the birth of children without a demand for labour and an increase of the funds 
for its maintenance” (PE, 265f).  
132 Most notably that is David Ricardo and Jean-Baptiste Say. A general glut of capital means that all 
this accumulated wealth becomes worthless through its sheer abundance – something that Ricardo, who 
used the scarcity of nature to build his notion of value on the time of sweating labor contained in it, 
would not admit. See (PE, 253f) for Malthus’ discussion of it.  
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capital hark back to the “gift of nature”, without which “no manufactures or idle 
persons could ever have existed”; neither would there have been the leisure for a 
greater number of persons “to employ themselves in all the inventions which 
embellish civilized life” (PO, 392). Instead of transforming the “gift of nature” into a 
senseless production of bodies – as would happen in savage life - capital emerges in 
the civilized distance from the immediacy of needs and desires. While Malthus 
professes, that the restraint from the consummating desires of consumption, will never 
be sufficient later on to augment the force of capital, the restriction of use and 
dissipation in the hands of the many is constitutive of it: “[T]he providence, foresight, 
and postponement of present gratification for future benefit and profit, which are 
necessary for this purpose, have always been considered as rare qualities in the 
savage” (PE, 72). The power to commence the process of creation, given in the shape 
of money, is hence accounted for in terms of the “moral” capacity to defer 
gratification into the future. Civilization, morality, capital are conjoined in a 
comparison, which associates immediacy with blindness, and deferral with recognition 
of reality.  
The will to use this “gift of nature” for the making of the means of life and a 
world of things has limits; it is a power used only reluctantly, when the promises for 
return cease to be bright and when profitable results are uncertain or even improbable. 
These limits will be reached at the end of progressive history: when the soil is 
exhausted and the “gift of nature” has dried up. It is a “barrier which cannot be 
passed” (PO, 222). But fortunately, Malthus maintains, capital serves to halt the march 
before utter exhaustion and the reign of scarcity proper. “[T]he extreme practical limit 
to the progress of population, which no nation has every yet reached, nor indeed ever 
will” reach, results from the fact that under the limits of capital, no one can ever be 
“employed on the soil, who does not produce more than the value of his wages”. Thus,  
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it will not happen, as it might be “under the forced direction of the national industry 
into one channel by public authority”, that “the whole people of a country” are 
working “for the production of mere necessaries, and no leisure be left for other 
pursuits of any kind” (PO, 405). 
In the universe circumscribed by the epistemology of scarcity, capital turns 
into a principle, cherished for the limits it enacts. It unfolds all its epistemological and 
regulatory virtues against the two poles of receding and looming scarcity: it interrupts 
the recurrent catastrophe of the state of nature and the premature fate of scarcity and it 
shields the principle of population from reaching absolute scarcity and the end point in 
history. This way, there will always be a certain amount of abundance, even in the 
midst of scarcity. The impending lack of surplus was indeed a worry for the political 
philosopher in Malthus: it would put at risk the “enjoyment and leisure” even of the 
few who are “sufficient to leaven and animate the whole mass” (PE, 173). It is with 
them that, the civilization finds its first harbor and the fate of the republic rests, since 
they would be able to embark on “gradually improving their governments, without 
apprehension of revolutionary excesses” (PO, 574f).  Reminiscent of the ancient 
wisdom about “how difficult it is under any circumstances to establish a well-
constituted republic and how dreadful the chances are against its continuance as the 
experience of all history shows”, Malthus fears the economy of mere subsistence, its 
poverty, lack of power and narrow reason (PE, 301; 304). Just as in ancient times, 
leisure and political virtues were to be secured against the necessities of life. But one 
should not forget that the reference to such ‘necessities of life’ contain a mixture of 
fears and apprehensions about the dangers of unlimited reason mingled with the 
question of life – out of which, Malthus was sure, only monsters could be born. 
The transformation of capital as a power of world-making - and the attendant 
possibility to subject it to an “analytics of power” - into the dignity of an  
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epistemological principle thus hinges on the two poles of scarcity, against which the 
conditions for a viable republic are to be made. The virtues of capital stem from the 
distances created to both of them and the effective limits it poses to the – apparently – 
only thing worthwhile to be controlled: the limitless production of bodies. But while 
capital thus is presented as the proper instance of guarding the perspective of the 
whole, it occupies only the most global sites of regulation. It is thus accompanied by 
the more minute attention to the ‘body and heart’ of economic man, who populates 
with his wife this republic made by progress and scarcity. Akin to the “totalizing and 
individualizing poles” of modern power described by Foucault, the envisioning of the 
regulatory epistemology of economy attends to both sides. Economic man, the 
anthropological figure to be fashioned out of the raw passions of the savage, assumes a 
paramount role in economic thought and regulatory attention is concentrated around 
him.  
The analytical perspective developed by Foucault, geared towards the 
understanding the constitution of the modern subject, is a helpful inspiration for the 
theoretical account of economic man. It helps to unlock the constitutive relations, in 
which his ‘anthropological truth’ is made. Yet, it seems also important to keep in mind 
the question, concerning from where this intense focus on the subject stems.  
For Foucault, the theoretical development a new analytics of power furthered 
such focus. He has elaborated with great plausibility the mechanisms of discipline and 
the ‘regime of truth’, in which modern subjectivity is constituted. It remains important 
for the analysis here. But the division of this field into the regulatory pole of an 
epistemological principle on the one hand, and the making of the rational-cum-moral 
virtues of the subject on the other hand, belongs to the effect of this particular 
envisioning of ‘modern economic objectivity’ described here.  It does not seem to 
point the way to the possibilities of thinking about economy in a way, which is more  
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open to contingency and the “analytics of power”. Instead it seems to be born out of its 
specific relation to political reason, limiting its horizon. Such are the theoretical 
suspicions, to which it is necessary to return. But before wondering about the limits, 
the analytical advantages of the Foucauldian understanding of the subject are brought 
to bear on this most lasting figure of civilization: economic man and his wife.  
The Passions of Economic Man 
Economic man is often taken to mark the factual orientation of the discipline of 
economics. It claims to reckon with man, as “he really is”, requiring no high-minded 
ideals to be followed and entertaining no ‘metaphysical theories’ about ‘society as a 
whole’ (Hirschman 1997, 103f). Hirschman’s classical work has embedded these 
claims in their historical and political genealogy, reminding us that it has been first the 
provenience of modern political thought to claim such ‘anthropological realism’. 
Among the first modern philosophers is Machiavelli, who juxtaposed the effective 
truth of things with the imaginary republics of the ancients. Spinoza followed him 
with his claim that, “man as he “really is”’ should be the proper subject of political 
thought. Hirschman traces these forms of political anthropology through the 17
th and 
18
th centuries, positing them in the context of the political hopes to render the world 
more predicable and reliable. He ends his political genealogy of the notion of self-
interest at the end of the eighteenth century. To him, it was with Adam Smith that self-
interest achieved its economic ‘coup de grace’, as its role as a support for the political 
order was undercut and the economic world came slowly to stand on its own (ibid., 
103f). 
But it is possible to continue such political genealogy of economic man. Given 
that Malthus, more than Smith, defined the passage into the self-standing reality of  
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economy, it is instructive to follow the attendant changes and to pick up the thread left 
behind by Hirschman. The narrative of how economic reason serves the political 
republic does not end, but it has changed shape: it is now achieved through its very 
division from and displacement of the political horizon. Adam Smith work was 
certainly a stepping-stone towards this division. But this ‘stepping stone’ assumed a 
different position in the changed political atmosphere in the aftermath to the French 
Revolution and the high running political passions of the time.
133 The fear of the 
‘monstrous’ political passions and savage desires changed the account of the subject. 
While Adam Smith assumed a continual and universal striving of the human mind 
“from the cradle to the grave” to “better his own conditions”, the ground of this 
assumption seemed to have crumbled.
134 
The “desire of bettering our condition and the fear of making it worse” is the 
“vis medicatrix reipublicae in politics”, announced Malthus, taking up the words of 
Adam Smith (PO, 370). But it was neither universal, nor self-evident anymore. 
 The 
natural condition of man is one of “sloth” and one needs to take into consideration the 
“influence of so general and important a principle in human nature as indolence or 
love of ease” (PE, 257): “Temptations to indolence will generally be too powerful for 
human weakness when the question is merely about a work which may be deferred or 
neglected, with no other effect than that of being obliged to wear old clothes a little 
                                                 
133 But this stone was appropriated for a political vision, which was akin, but not quite that of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. The “folly of political reason”, which Adam Smith recorded and the 
“Candide’s Garden” of economic progress he hoped for, belonged at first to the historical context of the 
Scottish Enlightenment (Hirschman 1997, 104): intellectual life blossomed from 1750 in favorable 
circumstances, which developed in after the incorporation in the Union with England, which had meant 
the loss of parliament. The importance given to history as a “refinement of both, physical and social, 
feeling”, taken to be “the bond of true society and guarantor of taste” and the vision of a civilization 
made in these bonds took a distance to the primacy of the political world, which was also their own very 
politico-historical predicament (Lawrence 1979). 
134 See for this quotation from Adam Smith (Rothschild, 25).  
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longer (PE, 278).
135 Against the alleged presentist savage mind, which was willing to 
sacrifice the fate of all and each to the impending catastrophe, a sense of future had to 
be inculcated.
136 Only by breaking the circles of immediacy and by widen the mind to 
include a longer time and a wider horizon of things, the “proper cultivation of the earth 
and the fabrication of those conveniences and comforts, which are necessary to his 
happiness” (PO, 342) would commence. The list of stimulants of exertion, drawn up 
by Malthus, included the “goad of necessity”, hope, colonial objects and heterosexual 
pro-creation and the prohibition of contraception: all these concurred in teaching the 
savage about how to ensure the stability and well-being of the republic and himself.  
It might be not unexpected to find again the colonial hierarchies employed in 
this argument; it might also not be unexpected to find that call for the discipline of the 
“goad of necessity”, which Malthus’ argument prominently includes.
137 But what is 
remarkable beside the expected, is the uninterrupted line this argument draws 
connecting fear, heterosexual norms, civilization, the making of wealth, taste for 
objects and the concern for the fate of the body politic as a whole. All those together 
conjoin in teaching the subject to develop the “distinctive superiority in his reasoning 
                                                 
135 “If the labourer can obtain the full support of himself and family by two or three days labour; and if, 
to furnish himself with conveniences and comforts, he must work three or four days more, he will 
generally think the sacrifice too great compared with the objects to be obtained, which are not strictly 
necessary to him, and will therefore often prefer the luxury of idleness to the luxury of improved 
lodging and clothing. This is said by Humboldt to be particularly the case in some parts of South 
Maerica, and to a certain extent prevails in Ireland, India, and all countries where food is plentiful 
compared with capital and manufactured commodities (PE, 446f). 
136 Such is also the “miserable peasant”, who “will seldom be deterred from gratifying his passions by 
the prospect of inconveniences, which cannot be expected to press on him under three or four years” 
(454). 
137 With the assumption about the civilizing goad of necessity, Malthus goes back to his most immediate 
forerunner, Joseph Townsend, who had published A dissertation on the poor laws, by a well-wisher of 
man-kind in 1787. Polanyi summarizes his position in following words: “Hunger will tame the fiercest 
animals, it will teach decency and civility, obedience and subjection, to the most perverse. In general it 
is only hunger which can spur and goad them on to labour; yet our laws have said, they shall never 
hunger” (Polanyi 1957, 113).  
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faculties”, which enable “him to calculate distant consequences” (PO, 14), since “the 
sacrifices of temporary to permanent gratification” is “the business of a moral agent 
continually to make” (ibid, 15). They conjoin thereby in making economic man and 
his reason. Economy, in the very old meaning of the term is the prudential care for 
one’s household, coagulates into stricter meaning: it posits, that the sense of the future 
and the making of the future is made by the deferral of gratification by fear of 
subsistence. The same meaning stretches thus from the making of the civilized subject 
to the virtues of capital, manifesting the same epistemology of scarcity against the 
consummation of abundance and the blindness it bespeaks. The making of objects and 
the love for them is not a question of “world-making”, but of warding off savage 
threats.
138 
It is important once more to remind oneself of the political roots of this 
concern for the future now at home in economic reason. As already pointed out before, 
it had been an explicit political virtue oriented towards the maintenance of the 
republic. In the hand of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, most notably 
David Hume, the reference to those political virtues was replaced with the question of 
how to modulate the immediate and momentary passion of the individual, so that these 
widened their concerns further in time and space – becoming only thereby apt to 
underwrite political contracts and obligations. This political horizon vanishes in 
Malthus’ writings about economic man: it is his reason and his world alone, which 
bear now the weight of the political virtues. Those are hence displaced into the 
individualized hopes and fears attaching to precluded or deferred fulfillment.  To 
reason is to defer and this form of individual reason is made in those regulatory 
                                                 
138 See the book by Elaine Scarry for a different perspective on the question of world-making and the 
role of objects (Scarry 1985).  
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devices, which teach the subject such virtues. The recognition of the physiological and 
emotional sensibilities, which the Scottish Enlightenment furthered and which 
Malthus incorporated deeply into his political vision, serves here the elaboration of 
these regulatory devices, which are capable to mend the passions in this desired way: 
the making of economic reason had to work through the body and heart of economic 
man.  
The Insights of Fear and the Detours of Love 
 “Misery” and “the fear of misery” Malthus holds to be the “necessary and inevitable 
results of the laws of nature”, which can “never be removed” (PO, 330; 335). “A strict 
inquiry into the principle of population obliges us to conclude that we shall never be 
able to throw down the ladder, by which we have risen to this eminence”.
139 Those 
who are closest to the savage mind will always need the “goad of necessity” and the 
“want of necessaries” to work for the future.
140 The regulatory and disciplining aspects 
of scarcity assume against those raw and immediate desires their most prominent 
form. As the “ladder, which can never be thrown away”, thus scarcity can never be left 
                                                 
139 The sentences immediately preceding this citation are as follows: “To the laws of property and 
marriage, and to the apparently narrow principle of self-interest which prompts each individual to exert 
himself in bettering his condition, we are indebted for all the noblest exertions of human genius, for 
everything that distinguishes the civilized from the savage state…..the structure of society…will 
probably always remain unchanged” (PO, 575).  
140 “ Few indeed and scanty would be the portion of conveniences and luxuries found in society, if those 
who are the main instruments of their production had no stronger motives for their exertion than the 
desire of enjoying them. It is the want of necessaries which mainly stimulates the labouring class” (PE, 
268). “No other reason can well be assigned, than because he conceives, that the labour necessary to 
procure subsistence for an extended population will not be performed without the goad of necessity. 
[Malthus infers here from Condorcet’s writings what he necessarily has to assume, ut]. If by 
establishments upon the plans that have been mentioned, this spur to industry be removed; if the idle 
and negligent be placed upon the same footing with regard to their credit and the future support of their 
wives and families, as the active and industrious; can we expect to see men exert that animated activity 
in bettering their condition, which now forms the master-spring of public prosperity?” (ibid., 321).  
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behind for the very impulse it gives to progress further. Again, one finds Malthus’ 
contemplation of the “great” and “general” law of population to cross the line between 
the factual and the normative: “The desire of the means of subsistence would be 
comparatively confined in its effects” he admits, “and would fail of producing that 
general activity so necessary to the improvement of the human faculties were it not for 
the strong and universal effort of population to increase with greater than its supplied. 
If these two tendencies were exactly balanced, I do not see what motive there would 
be sufficiently strong to overcome the acknowledged indolence of man and make him 
proceed in the cultivation of the soil”.
141  
The ‘body in pain’ (Scarry), who exerts itself for the care of the direst 
necessities, thus remains the necessary horizon, which neither can, nor should truly 
recede. The regulatory force of scarcity enforces the progressive march through 
history and ensures the path of civilization. While in a sense therefore always 
indispensable, it is also not a sufficient lever. The most dramatic fear about one’s own 
subsistence only guides the subject to the narrow care for his immediate needs at the 
lowest level. China stands out to Malthus as the cultural marker of the fate of a 
republic under such limited horizon of desires: Dedicated to the production of food 
alone and thereby fuelling the making of bodies with food, they ended with an 
industrious people, whose “efforts and labour are beyond conception”, “digging the 
whole day in the earth and being happy to eat a little spoonful of rice and to drink the 
insipid water in which it was boiled” (PO, 131). The richest and most flourishing 
                                                 
141 The quote continues as follows: “The population of any large territory, however fertile, would be as 
likely to stop at 500, or 5000, as at 5 millions or 50 millions. Such a balance therefore clearly defeat one 
great purpose of creation; and if the question be merely a question of degree, a question of a little more 
or a little less strength, we may fairly distrust our competence to judge of the price quantity necessary to 
answer the object with the smallest sum of incidental evil” (471).  
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empire of the world” is therefore “notwithstanding, in one sense, the poorest and the 
most miserable of all” (PO, 130f). 
Desires for objects, splendid and exotic, and the hope to attain them, promises 
to be a much securer path into the future, stretching further and guiding exertions 
away from the ‘naked’, ‘miserable’ and ‘savage’ body to the well-ordered republic. 
But the “clumsy manufactures” and the “cotton goods” of Glasgow lack the allure (PE, 
267; 305). The peasant, who might prefer “indolence to a new coat”, might be spurred 
to work for “tea or tobacco”. Desires and allures are indispensable to Malthus in the 
making of economic man and his flourishing relations: “[F]ew indeed would attend a 
counting house six or eight hours a day in order to purchase commodities which have 
no other merit than the quantity of labour which has been employed upon them” (PE, 
281).  
But Malthus seems never really content to trust these allures pertaining to the 
world of objects. Self-interest, the care for one’s own subsistence and the need for 
objects to embellish one’s own life circumscribe a narrow sphere of interest, rapidly 
turning into indifference. The social body, he fears, might come to exist in a state of 
scanty connections, thinned and with irregular motions.
142 These fears of Malthus 
seem to attach to an inverse image of the happy state of nature of Rousseau, where 
rarely people meet, barely they experience dependence of objects or otherwise and the 
ties between children and parents, especially those of the fathers, are contingent and 
estranged. But while Rousseau feared the advent of social ties, their dependency and 
                                                 
142 “It is a very great mistake to suppose that the passion between the sexes only operates and influence 
human conduct, when the immediate gratification of it is in contemplation. The formation and steady 
pursuit of some particular plan of life has been justly considered as one of the most permanent sources 
of happiness, but I am inclined to believe, that there are not many of these plans formed, which are not 
connected in a considerable degree with the prospect of the gratification of this passions, and with the 
support of children arising from it” (PO, 469).  
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lack of independence and freedom they bring, Malthus feared the absence of these 
dependencies and social ties, which would leave the social body under-developed. The 
family and marriage become so heavily invested in this economic objectivity of 
Malthus, because they force self-interest to stretch out in time, to travel into the future 
along the lines of familial descent. They force desires into this state of waiting and 
deferral, while keeping them alive and making them “burn with a brighter, purer, and 
steadier flame” after they had been “repressed for a time” (PO, 476). Waiting civilizes 
the passions, sends them into detours; it makes them “gentler”, but only “where 
obstacles are thrown in the way of very early and universal gratification” (PO, 469f).   
Without awaiting the deferred “gratification of the passion between the sexes”, 
Malthus assumes, the “steady pursuit” of plans in life would not occur, since the 
exertion for “the house, the warm meal and the comfortable fireside” would lose “half 
their interest if we were to exclude the idea of some object of affection, with whom 
they were to be shared” (PO, 469). Economy, this labor for objects and their exchange, 
appears here indeed fully as a ‘libido-economy”, worked through the heart and body of 
economic man. Without this one animal desire, when properly “centred in one object, 
and generally when full gratification is delayed by difficulties” (PO 476), all other 
desires loose their hold; without this one, most prized object, the women, all other 
objects are worth less than the exertion necessary. In the most civilized state, where 
not fear of subsistence, but fear of descending in society governs the subject, those 
remain mediated through this object of affection: “Can a man easily consent to place 
the object of his affection in a situation discordant, probably to her habits and 
inclinations?” (PO, 236). 
Economic man is therefore not a singular subject; he is accompanied by a wife 
and children, who could only together properly populate that other half of the double 
constitution and make it prosper – without the desire for marriage fulfilled at a proper  
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age, he would “fail of rescuing society from the most wretched and desperate state of 
want” (PO, 473). Thus, “promiscuous intercourse”, a state of celibacy, which would 
be “a matter of indifference”, or the “facility of illicit intercourse” are all likely to 
disrupt this widening of perspective into the future and the detours of desire into the 
world of objects, and are for this reason a matter of failing to “rescue” society.
143 The 
clear moral stance of Malthus’ argument might be ill-understood if it is taken to be an 
expression of his religious bearings or theological commitments
144; the morals 
designed for economic man are utterly modern, based on a utilitarian reasoning about 
mending the passions to a progressing social body, ordered and internally cohering. 
They are part of making a modern subject, which “experiences lack in the midst of 
abundance” (Vogl 2002, 345), is always failing his fulfillment, but engaged in 
laborious detours of making an objective world.  
While attending to Malthus’ views on matters of celibacy, sexual desire, his 
strange prejudices about early marriages and subsequent impotence, we seem to have 
strayed far from the issues, usually grouped under the theme of economy, like 
productions, money, stock-exchanges and prices. But we are nevertheless attending 
how the modern reality of economy became conceptualized, by following this 
reasoning, which seems to foreshadow Freud’s work on sexuality, its sublimation, and 
                                                 
143 “It is clearly the duty of each individual not to marry till he has a prospect of supporting his children, 
but it is at the same time to be wished that he should retain undiminished his desire of marriage, in order 
that he may exert himself to realize this prospect, and be stimulated to make provision for the support of 
greater numbers” (PO, 472).  
144  Heavner discusses the claims that Malthus should be understood in the perspective of his religious 
beliefs. The most prominent argument for such perspective is given by Winch in his book Poverty and 
Riches, where he claims that the transformation of Smith’s science of political economy in the early 
nineteenth century can not be interpreted without reference to Malthus’ Christian beliefs and his natural 
theology. Haevner underwrites more the perspective taken here, that the utilitarian origins of his 
theories give a more appropriate understanding of his thought. While he comes from the Angelican 
tradition, he religious principles are subjected to a logic of analysis, which is secularized and utilitarian 
to its core. (Haevner 1996; Winch 1996, 411).  
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the reality-principle more than anything else. The discursive production of a savage 
life force – this mixture of political fears, observations on nature and colonial 
hierarchies – is the other side to the rendering of a regulatory epistemology of 
economy. The utilitarian demand on the internal production of truth against the 
dangerous blindness shapes the account of the more familiar economic categories: it 
makes capital into a principle of progress; it creates a homology between the morality 
of deferred passions and the understanding of capital; it makes scarcity into never 
receding measure of economy; it focuses all regulatory and disciplinary attention on 
the desires of economic man; and finally, it gives economy an epistemological weight 
which underwrites its privilege to define the most ‘real’ reality of society and 
establishes an tightly knit relation between civilization, material progress, capital, 
families, all conjoining to “rescue” the body politic. 
The Vagaries of Value and the Certainty of Scarcity 
The poles of regulatory wisdom of capital and the reason of economic man are knitted 
together at a place, which has always seemed like the most cumbersome aspect of 
economic thought in the nineteenth century. This place is marked by the notion of 
value. The expectations put towards this notion are indeed high and it seems to belong 
to the most cumbersome element of economic thought. Debates of the nineteenth 
century about value have this very old-fashioned air to them and are full of traps: long-
winded mathematical equations are supposed to link hours of labor and prices in the 
wake of Ricardo and Marx, crisp calculations of marginal difference in the individual 
agent are supposed to dissolve them, promised the Marginalist Revolution of 
neoclassical economics.  But as Mirowski has shown, the notion of value remains 
entangled with ‘unclean’ assumptions and not so ‘crisp’ uncertainty. It has to show  
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how so diverse objects and human endeavors are made comparable and „even more 
outlandish“, claims to establish how such comparisons can be reduced to a „single 
common denominator“ (Mirowski 1990, 685). He maintains, that theories about the 
conversion of value in exchange lie at the heart of any economic science „for without 
it, there is no justification for a separate inquiry into the nature and causes of 
pecuniary wealth“ (ibid., 702).  
That the fate of their science would depend on a clear notion of value, Malthus 
would certainly not have denied: For political economy to be a positive science, it has 
to be able to know, how, why and in which proportion objects relate in a productive 
fashion to each other.
145 The regulatory principle of capital, the mended desires of 
economic man and finally, the desires of the political economists to give account of it 
have to coalesce. It is “not a little discreditable to a branch of knowledge which claims 
to be called a science…that it terms should not be settled” (PE, 96). We might add that 
it was not just the scientist, who wanted the certainty about this regulator or exchange, 
production and sacrifice. The political philosopher in the search of foundation needed 
it no less.  
Value is “the great stimulus to production” and “the great regulator of the 
forms and relative quantities, in which they shall exist”, says Malthus as if in 
confirmation of the above given account of the specific role of value in economic 
thought (PE, 244). But disquietude speaks through Malthus when he ascertains 
commercial relations and the vagaries and dependencies they imply. In his 
                                                 
145 Malthus cites Jean-Baptiste Say approvingly in search of those objects of his science “que, ce n’est 
que la possibilité de les determiner, de connaître par consequent quand, et comment les bien 
augmentent, quand et comment ils diminuent, et dans quelles proporitions ils se distribuent que a fait de 
l’économie politique une science positives que a ses experience, et fait connaître des résultats” and he 
adds, “Nothing could be more just than this” (PE, 25).  
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elaborations of value and commerce, Malthus was still very much wedded to the 
eighteenth century. Like Turgot and Condorcet, he assumed that commerce depends 
ultimately on equality and furthers it:
146 no “large and permanent returns” are possible, 
“variously affected by indolence, industry and caprice” of others, no “security against 
want” is to be found there. “The power of purchasing” accruing to one commodity 
“may vary in any degree” and “we should be quite at a loss to say, whether it would be 
necessary to sacrifice the worth of ten days’ labour to obtain the cloth, or a hundred 
days’” (47f). To the dependencies and insecurities of this world, not offering much to 
the desire for a scientific, positivist account of it, are added the paradoxes of the 
epistemology of scarcity: “two pair of stockings” double the conveniences of life, but 
they might command much less on the market into the hands of the owner, than one 
(PE, 242). A heap of things does not have a regulatory power by itself, and a country 
might be wealthy without having anything to command to its use from others (PE, 
241).
147  
Any step away from the beaver and the deer in exchange on account of the 
hours needed to hunt them – the most cherished examples of Ricardo – seems to add 
more impossibilities to account for how, who, what and which commands and is 
commanded by the mediations through objects and money. If anything that is “useful 
or delightful” for man is relied upon, Malthus contemplates, the “bounds of a single 
science” would be overturned and “confusion” would be introduced into the “language 
                                                 
146 “[A] country which is obliged to purchase both the raw materials of its manufactures and the means 
of subsistence for its population from foreign countries, is almost entirely dependent for the the increase 
of its wealth and population on the increasing wealth and demands of the countries with which it trades” 
(396). Malthus therefore assumes that the concentration of manufacturing in one country cannot but be 
an “accidental and temporary, not a natural and permanent division of labour” (397 and 404).  
147 What we want further to know, is the estimation in which the cloth and money were held in the 
country, and at the time in question founded on the desire to possess, and the difficulty of obtaining 
possession of them” (48).   
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of political economy” (PE, 21): Impossible relations, as between the delights of an 
“intellectual attainment” and a “mercantile product”, make the estimation of wealth 
“hopeless” (PE, 22).
148 Malthus sifts through possible objects of exchange and 
possible measures, searching for what might make such measure of things reliable, 
shifting from one criterion to the other.  The possibility of accumulation could not 
serve as a basis, as many talents, Malthus asserts, might be accumulated, and on what 
grounds could it then possibly be asserted” that “musicians…do not increase the 
national capital?” (PE, 25).
149  Expenses in the case of education – something for 
which funds are invested and gratifications forgone – do not give a measure for the 
value of its outcome – on the contrary, those who pay most might benefit the least 
(PE, 27). It would be an “absolute impossibility” to try to give a valuation “of tunes” 
played on an instrument and how could it be possible to “estimate the value of 
Newton’s discoveries or the delight communicated by Shakespeare and Milton by the 
price at which their works have sold?” (PE, 40). “Nor would it be less groveling”, 
Malthus continues, “to estimate the benefit which the country has derived from the 
Revolution of 1688 by the pay of the soldiers and all other payments concerned in 
effecting it” (ibid).   
The boundaries of the science and its knowledge and the boundaries of this 
regulatory epistemology is and should, so it seems, reside, where the just estimation of 
value comes to an end. But where does it start? There is only one place of certain 
                                                 
148 “In short, if we include under the denomination of wealth all the qualities of the mind and body 
which are susceptible of being hired, we shall find that by the restriction of the term wealth, to that 
which has exchangeable value, we have advanced but little towards removing the confusion and 
uncertainty attendant upon the former definition; and all idea of estimating the increase of wealth in any 
country or making any moderate approaches towards it, must be absolutely hopeless” (22). 
149 “…it is quite impossible to deny that knowledge, talents, and personal qualities are capable of being 
accumulated” (25).   
  102
measurement in Malthus’ universe
150; one place, where capital will not die because it 
has heaped so many objects that it loses its power of command
151; there is only one 
place, where two stockings would indeed keep requiring the same amount of 
sacrifice
152; only one place, where “permanent and large returns” and the leisure they 
allow are not undone in commercial exchange: it is the economy of soil, sweat, 
subsistence and rent. “But such are the qualities of the necessaries of life, that, in a 
limited territory, and under ordinary circumstances, they cannot if properly distributed 
be permanently in excess” (PE, 146). While machines, which produce hats, cannot 
produce the demand for hats, the principle of population ensures, that necessaries have 
the “power of raising up a population to consume it” and the “value of corn is thus 
prevented from falling like the value of muslins” (PE, 115f). Land produces excess 
and demand at the same time. The pure abundance of a heap of things, unable to 
command, regulate or measure, would thus not occur, as sufficient scarcity, necessity 
to sacrifice and exert, willingness to do so and desire for the objects produced, are 
constantly reproduced.  
This peculiar place Malthus reserves for land, rent and agriculture, signals his 
support for primogeniture, against the free trade in corn and has singled him out from 
                                                 
150 “In common monopolies, and all productions except necessaries, the laws of nature do very little 
towards proportioning their value in exchange to their value in use…in the production of the necessaries 
of life alone, the laws of nature are constantly at work to regulate their exchangeable value according to 
their value in use…the excahgenable value of a given quantity of necessaries always tends to 
approximate towards the value of the quantity of labour which it can maintain in such a manner as to 
support at least a stationary propulation, or in other words, to its value in use”(PE, 118). 
151 “…this surplus, necessary and important as it is, would not be sure os possessing a value which 
would enable it to command a proportionate quantity of labour and other commodities, if it had not a 
power of raising up a population to consume it, and, by the articles produced in return, of creating an 
effective demand for it” (PE,, 114) 
152 “It must be allowed then, that facility of production in necessaries, unlike facility of production in all 
other commodities, is rarely or never attended with a permanent fall of their value. They are the only 
commodities of which it can be said that their permanent command of labour has a constant tendency to 
keep pace with the increase of their quantity” (PE,, 131).  
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the orthodox tradition. But the form of searching, the certainty he requested and the 
return to scarcity it implied has stayed prominently with this tradition. It seems that 
only where necessity and scarcity are abounds, does the regulatory wisdom of 
economy take hold together with the scientific satisfaction of the political economists. 
It might have been Malthus’ sensibilities towards the shifting, temporally uncertain 
and dependent relations of commerce, which made him develop this peculiar solution. 
Those who came after him, did not share those sensibilities and achieved the 
regulatory and epistemological certainty by taking value out of the realms of sacrifice 
and desire and the question of command, into the hours contained in the thing itself. 
The solution looks different, but the quest is the same. This quest for order and 
knowledge seem to always hark back to the “body in pain” and the necessity it is 
subjected to. The words of the philosopher Halevy wrote around 1900 are worth 
repeating: “Bref, l’utilité ne saurait devenir objet de science que dans les cas où elle 
s’achète au prix d’une peine” (Halevy 1995a, 11). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DOUBLE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS AND THE RETURN OF THE 
POLITICAL  
The double constitution of the nineteenth century proved itself to be a protean 
creature. The juxtaposition of a self-sustaining economy to a limited sphere of rights 
did not only underwrite Malthus’ vision of republican limitations; it also 
accommodated without major rupture Britain’s continual colonial expansion 
throughout the century.
153  The social body was easily understood as encompassing a 
much wider space, which cohered all colonial posts into a “single whole”, as the 
economist Jevons has phrased it.
154  By the end of the century, Britain had extended its 
formal and informal rule through trade and selective military force, in order to create 
“valued and dependent commercial partners and congenial allies” abroad (Hopkins 
2000, 220f). The “continuing ability to settle its accounts depended on a growing 
network of increasingly specialized and far-flung connections, all of which had to be, 
in Palmerston’s phrase, ‘well kept and always accessible’ ” (ibid., 234). During a 
“hundred years’ peace”, as Polanyi named this time, Britain had managed its affairs 
                                                 
153 Hopkins draws attention to the continual British expansion, countering the assumption that the first 
several decades of the nineteenth century were anti-imperialist: “Britain’s record after the loss of the 
American colonies is scarcely that of an anti-imperial power”. Britain pushed ahead with further 
annexations in India (including Ceylon), Sind (1843), Punjab (1849), in Burma (1824-52), Deliberate 
efforts were made to promote emigration and settlement as in South Africa or New Zealand (Hopkins 
2000, 220f) 
154 How deeply the global space of colonial expansion belong to this single British social body in the 
imaginary of British economic thought testifies V.W.S. Jevons, one of the representatives of the 
marginalist revolution from 1870, whose view of the market remains influential until today: “Modern 
Britain does not and could not stand alone. It is united on the one hand to ancient agricultural Britain, 
and on the other hand to the modern agricultural nations of our stock, which are growing in several 
continents. Of the same language and manners, and bound together in the same real interests of trade, 
Britain and her colonial offspring must be regarded for the present as a single whole” (Jevons, W.S. 
(1965/1906), The Coal Question (cit. in Toye 2000, 23).  
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successfully, considering itself as the pinnacle of civilization and a gift to the world.
155  
But with the 1870s pride and security started to wane. A “new state of mind of 
uneasiness and gloom”, which pertained to an increasing and generalized anxiety 
about the foundations of the inherited order, started to rise (Hobsbawm cit. in Arrighi 
1994, 171). The ‘Great Depression’ of 1873 marks the beginning of that sense of 
uncertainty and agony; it brought an era of “indefinite progress” and optimism to its 
close.
156  While the historical assessment of today takes ‘Great Depression’ to be a 
rather hyperbolical coinage, this term still bespeaks the new worries of the time 
(Arrighi 1994, 163f). Dreads of a far-flung empire impossible to defend and dreads 
about the insecurity of England itself occupied the public mind: “[B]etween 1880 and 
1920, Liberalism represented the English to themselves and to others in ways that 
were increasingly regarded as inadequate for a nation facing serious social “issues” 
within, and carrying a large and growing Empire without” (Colls 1986a, 30 and 46f). 
The period between the 1880s and the 1930s can be described – with all due 
caution against labeling large periods with a single characterization - as a period of 
                                                 
155 “Nineteenth-century Liberalism represented English freedom as an ideal force, deep within the 
national character, and capable of universal dissemination as England’s special gift to the world” (Colls 
1986a, 30)  
156 See (Landes 1969, 231) He describes the period from 1873 to 1896 in the following words: “The 
years from 1873 to 1896 seemed to many contemporaries a startling departure from historical 
experience. Prices fell unevenly, sporadically, but inexorably through crisis and boom…It was the most 
drastic deflation in the memory of man…And profits shrank, while what was now recognized as 
periodic depressions seemed to drag on interminably. The economic system appeared to be running 
down” (ibid). This stood in marked contrast to the two decades before, which either confirmed or 
promised expectations of increased prosperity for the future. The agitation of trade unions had 
concentrated “on extracting maximum benefits from the existing economic system” and “working-class 
memories in the 1860s naturally referred to the recent past of the Hungry forties and the triumphs of 
free trade”. Liberalism still believed in the “reconcilability of competing interests” (Shannon 1974, 29f). 
During the 1850s and 1860s “[t]he economy thus tended to be looked upon as a fixed entity, sanctified 
by free Trade and expressive of the genius of the greatest industrial society in the world. In the 1860s 
this confidence was still wholly intact, and every major economic sector seemed secure. By the later 
1870s confidence had shaken” (ibid., 109).  
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growing contestation and politicization in all areas of social life - on the British island 
and abroad. There is nothing unequivocal about these diverse and ever more explicit 
militant cleavages in the hegemony of the specific form of liberal rule practiced by the 
British during the nineteenth century. They consisted of rising social strife, uprisings 
in the colonies no less than challenges to inherited categories of thinking and 
perception or doubts leveled against the morality of the time. What unites them across 
their vast differences and makes them apt to be enumerated together is solely the open 
problematization, which they commonly manifest, of the inherited order and its 
foundations. The liberal hope has always been to tame political passions and their 
respective objects of contention under the auspices of the alleged neutrality of science, 
law and trade. But in all respects this displacement turned out to have a limited 
efficacy at this historical conjuncture. Whatever was deemed to be neutral, reliable or 
natural turned out not to be so. Political theory declared that underneath law founded 
on natural rights there was an unfounded sovereign decision; philosophy detected 
underneath truth the will to power and psychoanalysis found under the tiny island of 
conscious control a vast and deep realm of unconscious rule. Cosmopolitanism was 
found guilty of just dreaming the more fundamental reality of national enmity away 
and trade was only to be had with political expansion.  Even the laws of historical 
materialism turned out to be insufficient for the world and apparently needed 
conscious aid from the political will properly organized in a vanguard party.
157 
Especially in respect to the sphere of economy and its presumed “automatism” 
                                                 
157 This list refers to the writings of Carl Schmitt, Nietzsche, Freud, Cecil Rhodes and Lenin. Hannah 
Arendt’s account of imperialism quotes Rhodes and elaborates his influence on the political minds of 
the time: “They believed Cecil Rhodes when he told them to “wake up to the fact that you cannot live 
unless you have the trade of the world”, “that your trade is the world, and your life is the world, and not 
England,” and that therefore you “must deal with these questions of expansion and retention of the 
world” (Arendt 1994, 132).  
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and “self-regulation” - qualities with which it was characterized during the hey-day of 
free trade, the gold standard and informal imperial rule - such contestation took the 
form of growing claims of the primacy of the political. The question of what 
determined “the price of a cup of tea” as Robinson dryly summarized the theoretical 
concerns of the neoclassical tradition of the 1870s, had just become irrelevant by the 
same move that had made obsolete the seemingly eternal and global division between 
the neutral “silently humming machine” of the market and its political assurance in 
constitutional law (1962; Robinson 1973). The Russian Revolution transgressed these 
lines – to the horror of some and the hopes of others - as much as the imperialist 
rivalries had done before.  
It is not surprising that the more general contestation and the reassertion of the 
political takes place in conjunction with a challenge to the inherited conceptions of 
economic objectivity. Because such a conception is part and parcel of a political vision 
of order tout court – as the current project would like to maintain - the economy 
cannot go unchallenged in the series of disputes of the old and the pursuit of a new 
foundation for the body politic. The “sane imperialism” of English liberals, the rising 
state socialism in Russia and the making of a totalitarian state body all present such re-
envisioning of overarching principles of order and cohesion.
158  They all refigured the 
relation of the two halves of the double constitution and their respective meaning. 
Looking back at this period and across the political spectrum, there was a marked 
dominance of a particular understanding of the political, the primacy of which was 
newly asserted.
159 This understanding favored strength of will and leadership – both 
                                                 
158 About the “sane Imperalism” of political liberalism see (Colls 1986b, 49f; Smith 1986, 262f.) 
159 The fate of the Russian Revolution, after it had opened a space of aesthetic and political 
experimentation, was very much determined by the political rationalities characteristic of the period as a 
whole:  they favored central control, strength of will and large-scale organization. If one considers the 
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directed toward the rational and smooth organization of the life of the social body. 
This pertained not only to the extreme form of totalitarian rule, but characterized also 
“progressive liberalism” in England at the time, which aimed for “national and 
imperial efficiency”: “In all of them there was the lingering image of a society of 
solidier-citizens who are rationally and collectively deployed against the anarchy of 
the free market” (Colls 1986a, 53). 
The writings of the J.M. Keynes form one voice in this choir of various re-
envisionings of the political and the body politic. Unlike the murderous and traumatic 
re-assertions of the primacy of the political during this time, Keynes’ vision has had a 
lasting impact for the post-war order. He was the co-author of the international 
monetary regime in place until 1973 and provided the theoretical and political 
template for national economic development during that time. Keynes, a vivid 
journalistic writer and public intellectual throughout his life, saw himself as the heir 
                                                                                                                                             
issue of economic planning, it becomes exemplarily apparent how techniques of fashioning a productive 
order traveled from right to left, from West to East. The first elaboration and the acclaimed success of 
planning took place in the context of the war-economies, the example of the German case under the lead 
of Rathenau provided the model for the Russian policies later on. For a short, but instructive account of 
it see (James 2002, 53f). A sustained homology between the imagination of the political and material 
civilization thus crossed the differences between East and West (Buck-Morss 2002). A similar dominant 
role – although for wholly different political aims - for conscious design, leadership and organization 
for the sake of material production of things, people and order alike was exhibited in the policies of 
imperialism from the 1870s onward. While economistic explanations look at the deployment of the 
martial powers of the nation for the sake of expansion as an unbroken expression of the narrow 
business-interest for profits, its valence as a political vision and the support it could elicit, are 
irreducible to it. The imperial state “relocated the relationship between people and state” (Colls 1986a, 
49), as it took upon itself the comprehensive aim to ensure the health and vigor of the nation in the 
making of its unified body. Abroad, in the colonial laboratories of modernity, imperialism elaborated 
not only the virtues of “bureaucratic administration” of a people deemed “hopelessly inferior”, but also 
the viability of national reconstruction. South Africa is often taken to be the “culture bed of 
imperialism”, as is Egpyt, for the very reason that they became exemplary objects of conscious 
creation– exactly at the point when their strategic economic relevance was undone, in the case of Egypt, 
for instance, with the building of the Suez Canal (Arendt 1994, 151; Shannon 1974, 320). “Imperialism 
was, in this sense, synthetic and artificial, it was an effort to create form in a formless world” (Shannon 
1974, 251).   
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and champion of English liberalism.
160 “The mind of the progressive section of 
England to-day is essentially liberal,” he asserted in an interview with Kingsley 
Martin, in which he proceeded to present the Liberal Party as “the centre of gravity” 
which “ought to be the focus of a new alignment of the progressive forces”
161 (CW 
xxviii, 197). At the point at which Keynes commenced to become a public intellectual 
in the 1920s, liberalism had already changed its face to the form of “progressive 
Liberalism” mentioned above. In an address given at a Liberal Summer School with 
the title “Am I a Liberal?” he recorded this altered outlook, enumerating what had 
already become “common ground”: issues like progressive taxation, social insurance, 
housing or public health.
162  Liberalism had thus turned, long before Keynes, towards 
state-financed social reform, in order to address the rising social strife at home.
163 The 
people’s budget had been passed in 1909 and a series of reforms had taken place 
before the First World War. Scientifically guided reform had been the liberal answer 
to the rise of Labor. Before the “Great War”, the arguments for more social equality 
resorted more often than not – and across the whole political spectrum - to the call for 
imperial strength, combining the critique of poverty with the call for a more healthy 
                                                 
160 “My own aim is economic reform by the methods of political liberalism” (Keynes 1971g, 28f). The 
references to Keynes will subsequently use the abbreviation CW, for the Collected Writings and 
indicates in small roman letters the volume referred to. 
161 (Keynes 1971j). Hereafter abbreviated as (CW xxviii). 
162 This list also included “civil and religious liberty, the franchise, the Irish question, Dominon self-
government, the power of the House of Lords” (ibid., 296). 
163 Lloyd George, the liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1908-1915, who had been responsible 
for the “people’s budget”, had said: “I don’t know exactly what I am, but I am sure I am not a Liberal. 
They have no sympathy with the people” ((Shannon 1974, 436 and 401f). Enlightened paternalism was 
to counter the “the depth and extent of a great mass of ingrained and obstinate poverty” revealed with 
the new techniques of social analysis and reported in the Royal Commissions. The development of 
English sociology began by putting “before the public studies of contemporary poverty”. Among them a 
seventeen volume long study by Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People, begun in 1889 and 
completed in 1903. These studies made, so Hynes, “poverty in England actual” (Hynes 1968, 54f).  
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“heart of empire”.
164  Keynes’ advocacy for a renewed liberal cause after the First 
World War was more wary about belligerent Imperialism and more silent about 
Empire; instead, he turned towards science, reform and the nation, in order to envision 
a new body politic in a changing international context. The Liberal Party was ideally 
to become the “disinterested” voice for enlightened politics – taking from Labor the 
“love for the ordinary man” but remaining a bulwark of “criticism, precaution, and 
technical knowledge” against the “catastrophism of Labour and the die-hardism of the 
Conservative Party” at once - in order to further the public “control of economic 
forces” and the cause of individual liberty (CW ix, 300, 311).
165 
Much of the historical context, in which Keynes wrote and in which his vision 
crystallized, is predominant in the memory of Keynes today. State interventionism for 
the sake of managing the economy for the welfare of all remained the dominant 
political horizon after the Second World War and Keynes’ name is firmly attached to 
it. Commonly, Keynes’ General Theory is taken to have offered the theoretical 
                                                 
164 see (Colls 1986a, 52). The Fabian Society, a socialist group including Bernard Shaw and Beatrice 
Webbs, were exposing this strand of progressivism linked to the ideal of national efficiency and “sane 
imperalism”: “In the manifesto  Fabianism and the Empire, edited by Bernard Shaw in 1900, the 
Society dedicated itself to the spread of efficiency at both national and international levels”.  As long as 
imperialism would involve a moral obligation and not just a dedication to trade and power interests, it 
was supported. This became the position of the Fabian Society only after discussion and a split of the 
membership after a slight majority voted against declaring the Boer-War as an act of imperialism 
(Kaarsholm 1989, 115). Enlightened Empire and breeding an Imperial race at home through social 
welfare became two sides of the same coin (Peppis 2000, 22f). Anna Davin quotes a liberal politician, 
who, after having outlined a program of social subsidies, said: “All this sounds terribly like rank 
Socialism. I’m afraid it is; but I am not in the least dismayed, because I know it also to be first rate 
Imperialism. Because I know Empire cannot be built on rickety and flat-chested citizens. And because I 
know that it is ‘not out of the knitted gun or the smoothed rifle, but out of the mouth of babes and 
sucklings that the strength is ordained which shall still the Enemy and the Avenger” (Davin 1989, 208); 
The debates around the Boer-War thematized poverty in terms of the lack of fitness of the working-
class with respect to the need for military strength and health. (Summers 1898, 242). Paternalism, 
national interest, reform and the overarching reference to the essential English character of liberalism 
had turned it into a ubiquitous force in Britain. But whereas liberalism flourished, the liberal party did 
not:  the lines had become too blurred.  
165 The Essays in Persuasion, to which the abbreviation CW ix refers, were published in 1932.  
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foundation of an already established practice and given intellectual support for its 
refinement.
166 In the wake of his theory, the conception of a “macro-economy” took 
hold in economics and economic policies, “accompanied by the creation of a novel 
vocabulary and methods in statistics for estimating and representing the new 
aggregates”.
167 Translated into the terms of economic science, Keynes’ model became 
a four-variable system offering the leverage points for the state apparatus to 
intervene.
168  The scientific model even had its material counterpart: a “Keynesian 
machine”, built at the London School of Economics, featuring a hydraulic apparatus 
designed to illustrate and predict the behavior of the macro-economy (Skidelsky 1992, 
540).  
But for some time now the wisdom of Keynes has fallen into disrepute. The 
recipes of macroeconomic management were delegated to the history of economic 
                                                 
166 Keynes had given political support for the program, proposed by Lloyd George in 1929, to increase 
public spending to alleviate unemployment. Roosevelt’s New Deal had received critical comments by 
him in the Open Letter to the President, but he had previously sent his paper Means to Prosperity and 
wrote an open letter to Roosevelt, giving intellectual armor to programs of recovery. (Skidelsky 2003, 
506f). But there is little evidence as to the actual influence on the President (Sowdon 1994, 8). 
167 See (Desrosieres 2003, 55). Timothy Mitchell accounts for these developments. He maintains, very 
differently from the thesis exposed here, that the economy as a “self-contained sphere” only emerged 
during the thirties. He argues that the word economy previously referred to “the principle of seeking to 
attain, or the method of attaining, a desired end with the least possible expenditure of means”. This is 
not at all to be doubted; in fact, Keynes referred to economy in this sense, as did Malthus. But this does 
not exclude the projection of such an internally cohesive field of order, knit together into a single 
dynamic – as I hope the previous part of this work has rendered plausible. What is new with Keynes is 
the fact that scarcity and the economy of means and ends do not any longer circumscribe the ‘economy 
as a whole’. We observe thus a divergence between these two understandings of economy, not the birth 
of the second, as the following chapter of this second part will seek to show. (Mitchell 1998, 84f; 
Mitchell 2002). 
168 see (Adelstein 1991) and (Sowdon 1994, 1f). The Keynesian model of the national economy became 
especially virulent for the “development discourse” and especially “development economics”, which 
believed to have caught the mechanism of ‘development’ by the singular causal nexus of investment 
and general output. See Arturo Escobar’s lucid account of the rational dream development and 
“economics as culture” in his book Encountering Development. The making and unmaking of the Third 
World, especially chapter three ‘Economics and the Space of Development: tales of Growth and 
Capital’ (Escobar 1995).  
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thought, having failed in their very application. For the economists, the events of the 
seventies provided the empirical falsification of the model; unlike scientific prediction 
and political hopes would have it, the state policies of cheap money led at the time to 
inflation and stagnation alike – in a word, to stagflation. Textbooks and overviews of 
the “legacy of Keynes” all prominently point to this unhappy result and the following 
rise of monetarism as the successor and succeeding theory (Skidelsky 2003, 846; 
Sowdon 1994). After the excesses of the Welfare State, the dominant story thus 
continues, the discipline of the market was necessary again. It would be the sole 
guarantee for sustained growth, even if painful at times. In between the poles of the 
state and the market, the history of the nineteenth and twentieth century seems to 
unfold. Then and now, these poles present the frame in which events are rendered 
intelligible and in which political choices are articulated. Keynes, linked to the 
“wrong” pole in the world of globalized markets, shares its fate and is thus delegated 
to the history of economic thought 
The story told here aims to be different – but neither in order to salvage the 
“Keynesian machine” nor to claim that Keynesianism distorted its author’s intentions 
– which is a common fate for authors in any case. Rather, it suggests halting the 
narrative from old orthodoxy to the new one, in order to dwell in the space between 
them – that is, to turn attention towards the moment of contestation that lies between 
the two proper economic models. It is to seize upon this moment of dislocation and 
politicization, which made the inherited “double constitution” of the nineteenth 
century appear limited and particular. Keynes understood himself as having worked 
himself out of the “tunnel” of economic orthodoxy (CW xiv, 85)
169; as having written 
                                                 
169 (Keynes 1971i) hereafter abbreviated as (CW xiv)  
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a book that would “revolutionize the way the world thinks about economic problems” 
and to have knocked away “the Ricardian foundations of Marxism” (CW xxviii, 42). 
Instead of falling too quickly for the “new constitution” he projected and instead of 
remaining within the all too familiar poles of market versus state, it is worthwhile to 
inquire into the kind of critique of economy that Keynes developed. What kind of 
account of economic objectivity allowed granting the political a more prominent role? 
From where did the inherited conceptualizations of economy ceased to appear as the 
“truth” of the body politic?  
After the “long nineteenth century,” which had projected the foundation of the 
body politic in economy, this foundation was challenged. This challenge harbors –the 
thesis here maintains - more possibilities of thinking than actually taken with the 
“Keynesian machine”. Thus the aim of the following two chapters is twofold: to 
identify the theoretical ground where this critique of economy has its condition of 
possibility and to search for the theoretico-political decisions which collapsed this 
field of critique into a managerial account of the economy. The first query involves a 
meticulous reading of Keynes’ economic writings, their technical terms and their 
modes of reasoning to retrieve from them the economic objectivity they circumscribe. 
Before entering into this necessarily complex story, it is important and helpful to 
attend to the modes of problematization that Keynes employed in view of the 
crumbling foundations of the Victorian “double constitution”. Both halves of this 
constitution, the “economic reality” and its political counterpart, need to be attended 
to. The economist is also the statesman and the philosopher; he framed a certain 
problématique and sought to respond to it within a particular historical conjuncture. 
Troubled by his time, the critique of the old and the search for the new foundation 
emerges from there. 
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The Vanity of Politics 
It is rarely remembered that Keynes entered the political stage and achieved public 
fame not as an economist, but as a political commentator on the peace negotiations in 
Versailles in 1919. The Economic Consequences of Peace published in December 
1919 became “an international bestseller and, over the coming month and years, one 
of the most influential books of the twentieth century” (Skidelsky 2003, 237). It was a 
work about disappointment with politics, one preceded by his resignation of the 
Treasury position. Keynes had been a member of the British delegation, because he 
had been responsible for war finance in the Treasury. He thought that the agreements 
on reparations followed the logic of “starving the enemy” (CW ix, 20) even at the cost 
of sacrificing the future possibility of stable and “civilized life” in Europe.
170 In a 
critical review, the Consequences of Peace was called “a misplaced revolt of 
economics against politics”.
171 Misplaced or not, Keynes did juxtapose the “false 
gods” of “nation, state, emperor” to the sobriety of economy (Skidelsky 2003, 258). 
Keynes charges political reason with outrageous stupidity and narrowness, because it 
had divested itself from economic life and revolved around the issues of honor, power 
and the seat in parliament. “The thoughts which I have expressed…were not present to 
the mind of Paris. The future life of Europe was not their concern; its means of 
livelihood was not their anxiety. Their preoccupations, good and bad alike, related to 
                                                 
170 “If the European civil war is to end with France and Italy abusing their momentary victorious power 
to destroy Germany and Austria-Hungary now prostrate, they invite their own destruction also, being so 
deeply and inextricably intertwined with the victims by hidden and psychic and economic bonds” (CW 
ix, 4) 
171 This critique was leveled by Etienne Mantoux in his book The Carthagian Peace or the Economic 
Consequences of Mr. Keynes, arguing that Keynes’ book was influential challenging the moral standing 
of the treaties and led finally to the appeasement policy. While Skidelsky disagrees with this charge, he 
avers that the book is hardly a fair and balanced assessment (Skidelsky 2003, 246f and 237).  
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frontiers and nationalities, to the balance of power, to imperial aggrandizement, to the 
future enfeeblement of a strong and dangerous enemy, to revenge, and to the shifting 
by the victors of their unbearable financial burdens on to the shoulders of the 
defeated”.
172 
The three statesmen - Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George – embody in 
Keynes’ descriptions the flaws of the political world left to itself. Clemenceau stood 
for the old game of the “balance of power”; his intention was to further the particular 
security-interests of France, not to think about “humanity and European civilization” 
(CW x, 7)
173. Wilson stood at the other end of the spectrum, in all respects the 
opposite of Clemenceau: “He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever 
for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the 
White House” (ibid, 11). He presents thus the old political dreamer and religious 
preacher, who confuses the values of heaven with the demands of the world. Lloyd 
George, the last of them, was cast in the role of “femme fatale”: he was “rooted in 
nothing”, showed “final purposelessness, inner irresponsibility” and “the love of 
power”.
174 The panoply of political reason manifested in these three figures was a list 
of its ills: it was at the same time prone to be an ineffective dream, a superficial game 
and a limitless striving for power without due regard for the consequences. The 
political stage is dangerously aloof from reality: the “theatrical trappings of the French 
                                                 
172 (Keynes 1971e) abbreviated here and hereafter as (CW ii). 
173 (Keynes 1971f) abbreviated here and hereafter as (CW x). The book Essays in Biography, to which 
these abbreviations refer, was published in 1933. 
174 As Keynes presented the argument, he gave much weight to these studies of characters. After having 
outlined that no substantial conflict of interest stood between the Fourteen Points of Wilson and the 
British demands, he turned towards the “intimate workings of the heart and character”, taking place as 
the “the president, the Tiger and the Welsh witch were shut up in a room together for six month and the 
Treaty was what came out…An old man of the word, a femme fatale, and a non-conformist clergyman 
– these are the characters of our drama. Even though the lady was very religious at times, the fourteen 
Commandments could hardly expect to emerge perfectly intact” (CW x, 22).  
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salons of state” presented claims for significance, but the decisions had “unreality” 
about them and the “air whispered that the word was not flesh” (CW ix, 5). Reality, it 
seems, easily evades the political word. Politicians, Keynes maintained elsewhere, are 
“not the masters of our fate. Their job is to register the fait accompli” (CW ix, 82).  
Keynes’ suspicions about the failures of unbound political reason stem not 
only from the lofty realms of conference rooms, but also from the observation of more 
earthly sites. Extension of the vote had been a subterranean theme in Britain since the 
1860s.
175 It became a more open and militant question in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, which saw “rapid expansion of trade unionism”, intensified social 
unrest and the militant struggle of the suffragettes.
176 Again, like a hundred years 
earlier, the question of political voice coalesced with the rising politicization of issues 
of “life” and “subsistence”.
177 Progressive liberalism, as mentioned above, had been 
eager to mend the rising polarization of the body politic by the reform acts and to 
integrate the “other” class into a harmonious whole, always accompanied by profound 
mistrust and anxiety about this strata of society which seemed as alien as the colonial 
subjects abroad.
178 The growing awareness of the extent of “obstinate poverty”, 
brought to light by the numerous new techniques of sociological investigation at the 
time, and the growing political relevance of this poverty, threatened this liberal 
                                                 
175 “Gladstone [liberal Prime Minister during the 1860s] insisted that politics would have to respond to 
the ideals and aspirations of an age characterized by the movement, for the first time in history, of large 
bodies of people from levels of subsistence and (in Marx’s phrase) ‘idiocy’ to awareness of the reality 
and relevance to them of ideals such as ‘progress’ and ‘freedom’” (Shannon 1974, 54f and 30f). 
176 (ibid., 382 and 435). Universal male suffrage was granted 1918.  
177 Upon the comment that “now it seems as though…the political and the territorial questions won’t be 
solved till the economic world is righted”, Keynes commented, “how true this was and that he never 
thought about it that way” (Skidelsky 2003, 232). 
178 Colls makes an instructive comparison the descriptions of the Congo in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
and those of London’s People of the Abyss. “The natives of Conrad’s Congo and London’s Stepney are 
each ruled by another race, and live in sunless, torpid lands, uprooted, cast aside, and dying from 
degeneracy. It is difficult at times to tell Congo and Stepney apart” (Colls 1986a, 46).   
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solution (Peppis 2000, 28; Shannon 1974, 210). Even more so since the course of the 
Russian Revolution and contemporary socialist thought created a “new sense of 
possibility” for change and a general and worried perception emerged on the other side 
“that ‘social mass’” would transmute “into ‘political class’”.
179 Keynes did share these 
worries: expression of wariness and suspicion in respect to the extension of democratic 
political judgment in the context of social unrest are recurrent topics in Keynes’ 
writings. Passions of “jealousy, malignity and hatred of those who have wealth and 
power” pervade the Party of Labour. The masses of “ill understanding voters” need to 
be persuaded that their interests are promoted or the passions will be gratified”. It is 
“necessary for a successful Labour leader to be, or at least to appear, a little savage” 
(CW ix, 295 and 300).
180 The “intellectual elements” in politics only find support 
against those masses through the means of “sufficiently autocratic” party-structures 
(ibid, 296).  
Keynes was neither someone who believed in the “Bolshevik boogey”, nor 
someone whose “fear of the masses” did not know qualification.
181 Nevertheless, they 
still prominently circumscribe – together with the folly of imperialist wars - the 
political problematique he established and to which he made himself answer 
                                                 
179 See (ibid, 221). “Labour had emerged from the status of a social issue to that of a political issue’ 
(ibid, 225). 
180 As always with Keynes, intellectual and cultural faults go together and the prejudice against the 
ignorant passion of the many is combined to a dictum about the “boorish proletariat” (CW ix, 258) 
proletariat and the indignation about Marxism as a creed, which prefers the “mud to the fish” (CW ix, 
258) 
181 “Democracy is still on trial, but so far it has not disgraced itself…The temper…maybe better 
restrained and modified by a means of expression, that by confinement under an authority, however 
will-intentioned” (UA 20/3/1, 62) In an review on Churchill, Keynes comments on Churchill’s Anti-
Bolshevism as follows: “But the Bolsheviks remain for him, in spite of his tribute to the greatness of 
Lenin, nothing more than an imbecile atrocity. His imagination cannot see them as the Great 
Scavengers, and the officers on the Whites as better employed in the films. Yet can he believe that his 
fine perioration….is really the whole of the truth?” (CW x, 54).  
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subsequently. Stupidity and unbridgeable hostilities seem to wait if the political sphere 
reigns.  
Against the “false idols” and passions of the political world, allegiance to 
science and economic tasks promised a solution (CW ix, 29). “The princes of the old 
world had left a dreadful mess; it was the task of the scientist to clean it up” 
summarizes Keynes’ biographer who continues that this stance “immediately raised 
the question with which Keynes was to wrestle for the next sixteen years of his life: 
was the inherited economics of the nineteenth century adequate to the tasks?” 
(Skidelsky 2003, 248f). It was not, was the answer given in the General Theory.  
Dangerous political reason, endangered civilization and economy are the 
corners of a triangle in which Keynes posits himself – like his predecessor Malthus 
over a hundred years earlier. Much has been said about the resemblance between 
Keynes and Malthus, sparked by Keynes’ own reference to Malthus as his forbearer 
and theoretical kin.
182 
But they share above all a political problematique, which was articulated in a 
historical time of dislocation and contestation. The differences between these two 
historical moments are of course substantial, yet parallels exist: a general sense of utter 
upheaval, revolution abroad and calls for change in all spheres of life was present. 
Most significantly, at both times the threat of change and democracy – partially 
welcomed and partially feared – reached such profound dimensions that it drew the 
question of modes of life and livelihood into the orbit of the political. The contestation 
                                                 
182 Keynes understood himself in two different respects to be the heir of Malthus. While he was still 
working to a larger extent within the horizon of the inherited tradition, he championed Malthus’ account 
of the population problem (see later part of this work). After writing the General Theory he emphasized 
much more the point that Malthus had already seen the relevance of demand, the problem of time and 
the limits to self-adjustment (ibid).  
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of the “partition of the sensible” (Rancière) vis-à-vis the political stage visibly and 
audibly affected the foundation of the body politic and required a new settlement.
183 
Both Malthus and Keynes articulated such a new settlement in consideration of the 
threats, changes and hopes of political reason.  They show a similar appreciation for 
and skepticism of the viability of the democratic exercise of political reason and of 
political reason in general and they both search for the foundation of the new possible 
order.  
Yet, there is a decisive difference: for Keynes, the triangle of civilization, 
viable political reason and economy did not gain its stability and progressive nature 
from the economy anymore. Whereas Malthus turned towards economy to envision a 
visceral order, able to propel the many into civilization and to increase wealth and 
political stability, Keynes did not - at least not without profound qualification. At the 
end of the long nineteenth century, economy had become part of the problem instead 
of being an unequivocal solution. 
Thus, to understand the political problématique Keynes articulated, it is not 
sufficient to attend solely to his views on the dangers of political reason, the stupidity 
of the many and the few alike. One has to attend in equal measure to the other side of 
the double constitution and the terms in which it was cast into doubt, since economic 
reason and its firm and reliable sense of reality fell alongside the search for a different 
foundation of the body politic. References to economic reality by political reason – 
this has been the contention throughout this work – are ill understood if they are taken 
                                                 
183 Ranciere describes the “partition of the sensible” in terms of a “symbolic constitution of the social”, 
which “defines the forms of part-taking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are 
inscribed. The partition of the sensible is the cutting-up of the world and of ‘world’. It is characterized 
by the “absence of a void or a supplement”. Thus loosely adopting his notions here helps to describe the 
attempts to achieve such “partition of the sensible” in economy and the crisis it enters if it is traversed 
by fundamental contestations (Ranciere 2001, 9).  
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to be faithful claims to a world of facts. Instead, they comprise the political dream of 
finding foundations, delineating the proper exercise of political reason, displacing 
inexorable questions to the working of a visceral and automatic level and  - very 
prominently – envisioning the subject of this order, in whose senses, affects and 
exercise of reason it could find its support. The discussion of Malthus showed how 
inextricably economy and civilization are connected: the latter is not to be had without 
the former, the former is the making of the latter. The binding of all these elements 
into one has been the heritage of the nineteenth century. Before venturing into the 
account of economic objectivity, from where Keynes articulated the “limits of 
economy”, it is apt to attend to the modes of problematization leveled against the 
economic side of the constitution. This will give a first taste of Keynes’ coming 
challenge to the economic objectivity presented by the nineteenth century.  
The Epistemological Vertigo of Economy 
For the nineteenth century, economic man had been the place from where the truth of 
the social body as a whole was emerging. Not because this subject marked the position 
from where the outlines of the whole were apparent to his eyes, but because his 
civilized passions - his desire for objects, his fear of subsistence and his private love  – 
were the levers of an ever more integrated and civilized society. With Keynes, 
economic man loses his exclusive claim on the definition of economic reality and 
ceases to be the kernel of viable order. In the same stroke, he loses his intimate 
connection to the progress of civilization. He becomes a figure of sorry degeneration. 
Economy was not any longer the “royal road” to civilization and its very 
manifestation, but rather a doubtful and limited convention. The senses and desires of 
economic man were increasingly betraying himself and the body politic. Blindness  
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instead of sight resulted – the more unaware about the limited nature of these 
conventions, which economic man took as the lenses with which to perceive truth, the 
more blindness would ensue. The cultural contempt for economic man, which we will 
witness below, certainly belongs to the cultural heritage of the nineteenth century.
184 
Yet, the difference of this cultural critique of economic man from the nineteenth 
century was the intimate link cultural critique was now entertaining with the 
epistemological claims of economy: the cultural critique of degeneration and the 
charge of blindness went hand in hand.
185 Epistemological failure seems to consist in 
the inability to perceive, to understand and to answer to the conventional nature of 
economy.  
There are two main economic sites, which manifest the conjoined cultural and 
epistemological disaster of the “economic reality principle” in exemplary ways: the 
stock market and the combined “wisdom” of the leaders of the City and the Treasury. 
All of these had been presented during the nineteenth century as the very institutions, 
which guarantee that economic rationality and a proper sense of reality would reign – 
but in 1936, when the General Theory appeared, matters looked differently. 
“Bankers”, Keynes asserts “are the most romantic and least realistic of all persons”: “It 
is part of their business to maintain appearances and to profess a conventional 
                                                 
184 Pierro Mini argues to see Keynes in the context of the “anti-rationalistic” and romantic critics of the 
emerging commercial England, as Coleridge, Carlyle, the Arnolds, Ruskin and William Morris (Mini 
1991, xvii).  
185 Shaw once commented to Keynes about how the “sentimentalist and no alternative system to offer. 
Dickens in Hard Times left the Ricardian theorem quite unshaken. The demonstration that it was 
inevitable, and that all sentimental interferences with it did more harm than good, dominated even its 
opponents”. For Shaw it was thus only with Marx and “scientific socialism” that “those things came to 
an end” and “knocked Ricardo into cocked hat” (CW xxviii, 42). Keynes took this situation to heart. 
The system of the nineteenth century, he said “bred two families – those who thought it true and 
inevitable, and those who thought it true and intolerable. There was no third school of thought in the 
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, there is a third possibility – that it is not true” (CW xxviii, 32).  
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respectability”. A banker, he continues, “is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, 
but one who, when he is ruined, is in a conventional and orthodox way along with his 
fellows, so that no one can really blame him” (CW ix, 156). The orthodoxy, Keynes 
refers to, is the policy of dear money and the Gold Standard, which was the 
unquestioned economic wisdom of the age.
186 Gold promised “honest money”, that is, 
a stable medium of exchange, which cannot be tinkered with by state intervention. 
Furthermore, the international standard was deemed to be an essential element in the 
proper order of trade. A country that imports more than it exports would suffer – 
through the gold nexus - the gradual increase of its prices abroad and be forced to turn 
back to equilibrium. To Keynes, this wisdom needed more than urgent 
reconsideration, as it was about to ruin the prospects of international prosperity. The 
rhetoric used by Keynes to question the policy of the Bank is unanimously that of 
blindness and “ignorance” due to “absence of thought” and “belief in old customs” 
(CW ix, 193). Not cognizant of the circumstance, they remain enthralled by a moral 
bond: the unquestioned allegiance of the Gold Standard has the air of a bachelor’s 
striving for matrimony being presented as the most urgent, desirable and prosperous 
state of being.
187 It seems, he speculates, that the recognition of their “vast 
                                                 
186 The issue of money and the gold standard will occupy us in the next chapter. But for the moment it is 
as instructive as enjoyable to listen to Polanyi’s account of this “faith of the age” in full length: “Belief 
in the gold standard was the faith of the age. With some it was a naïve, with some a critical, with others 
a satanistic creed implying acceptance in the flesh and rejection in the spirit. Yet the belief itself was the 
same, namely, that bank notes have value because they represent gold. Whether the gold itself has value 
for the reason that it embodies labor, as the socialists held, or for the reason that it is useful and scarce, 
as the orthodox doctrine ran, made for once no difference. The war between heaven and hell ignored the 
money issue, leaving capitalists and socialists miraculously united. Where Ricardo and Marx were at 
one, the nineteenth century knew not doubt. Bismarck and Lassalle, John Stuart Mill and Henry George, 
Philip Snowden and Calvin Coolidge, Mises and Trotzky equally accepted the faith” (Polanyi 1957, 
25). 
187 The “financial fashion plates” display “marriage with the gold standard as the most desired, the most 
urgent, the most honorable, the most virtuous, the most prosperous, and the most blessed of all possible 
states”. They are also to “remind the intending bridgroom that matrimony means heavy burdens from 
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responsibility” surpasses the banks and being so huge, “there is a great temptation to 
them to cling to maxims, conventions and routine”.
188 “Those who sit at the top tier of 
the machine” (CW ix, 225) fail to perceive the conventional nature of their beliefs, 
even less are they capable of judging their appropriateness or developing conscious 
strategies to secure their own position of power. It is thus absurd to assume a bankers’ 
conspiracy, concludes Keynes, as they share with other citizens the utter 
incomprehension of the dangers ahead: “A bankers’ conspiracy! The idea is absurd! I 
only wish there were one!” (CW ix, 158).  
The second institutional site does not offer a more cheerful picture. The stock 
market, supposedly the place where “skilled investment” defeats the dark forces of 
time and ignorance that envelop our future”, is populated by a mass of ignorant 
individuals entirely unable to answer to this task. Neither acquainted with the special 
circumstances of the business in question, nor engaged in finding long-term 
perspectives, they fall prey to “ephemeral and non-significant information”. Waves of 
undue optimism and pessimism result in unfounded and short-term investment 
policies. Not the search for appropriate estimations, but the “second-guessing” of the 
average opinion of this ignorant mass provides the grounds for decision. “We have 
reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be” (Keynes 1964, 154-56).
189 The 
                                                                                                                                             
which he is now free; that it is for better, for worse, that it will be for him to honour and obey; that the 
happy days, when he could have the prices and the bank rate which suited the housekeeping of his 
bachelor establishment, will be over – though of course, he will be asked out more when he is married; 
that Miss G. happens to be an American shop that in future the prices of grapefruit and popcorn are 
likely to be more important to him that those of eggs and bacon” (CW ix, 192f). 
188 See (CW ix, 200). The City is “blind as night” to some fundamental principles “of which the truth is 
as certain as the day (CW ix, 201). “To suggest social action for the public good to the City of London 
is like discussing the Origins of Species with a bishop sixty years ago. The first reaction is not 
intellectual, but moral” (CW ix, 287). 
189 Hereafter abbreviated as GT.  
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ability to deal with the conventional nature of the required investment-decisions is 
here compromised by the incapacity to maintain the firmness of a well-rehearsed 
individual decision against adversarial opinions or short-term fluctuations. Whereas 
the failing wisdom of the banks was due to an excessive loyalty to once adopted 
principles, the masses of the stock market are incapable of adopting any firm principle 
when faced with irretrievable uncertainty. They just jolt into indecisive wagering, “as 
though a farmer, having tapped his barometer after breakfast, could decide to remove 
his capital from the farming business between 10 and 11 in the morning and reconsider 
whether he should return to it later in the week” (GT 151). The institution, where the 
representation of what is valuable to undertake, is overtaken by “mass psychology”; 
the validity of the judgments, which gain societal significance, is for Keynes more 
than compromised by the lack of individuality and principle the “man of the masses” 
brings with him (GT 172).  
The resonance of this epistemological and cultural critique with the skepticism 
of democracy is unmistakable. Keynes finds that in America, where the 
democratization of the stock market is most pronounced, its weakness is most 
apparent: “Even outside the field of finance Americans are apt to be unduly interested 
in discovering what average opinion believes average opinion to be; and this national 
weakness finds its nemesis in the stock market” (GT 158). And while he fears the 
“mass psychology” has turned the stock market into a casino, he rather prefers to have 
the stock market organized like a casino: “sufficiently expensive” and “inaccessible” 
(GT 158) as to keep the many out of its bounds. 
The critiques of the flaws of the political and economic world bear much 
resemblance: either there is an excess of allegiance to conventions, blinding one 
towards the change of circumstance, or there is a lack of principled conduct altogether 
as conventions are not carried through time. It is either the clergyman or the femme  
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fatale – to recall the names Keynes reserved for Wilson’s high-minded morality and 
Lloyd George’s wagering to circumstance. Whereas political reason is always prone to 
lose touch with reality in any case, as it is even at its best caught up with the chimeras 
of honor or patriotism, the epistemological failures weigh much more in the economic 
realm.
190  In between the ignorant democratic masses and the incapable elites, proper 
political and economic judgment finds no secure ground. Economic reason and 
political reason suffer from the same pathologies and neither can give foundation for 
the other. Against democracy, Keynes holds: “There is not very general an a priori 
probability of arriving at desirable results by submitting of the decision of a vast body 
of persons, who are individually wholly incompetent to deliver a rational judgment on 
the affair at issue” (UA 20/3/1, 60). The terms of critique are almost indistinguishable 
from his account of the stock market: there, the vast majority “knows almost nothing 
whatever about what they are doing. They do not possess even the rudiments of what 
is required for a valid judgment, and are the prey of hopes of fears easily aroused by 
transient events and as easily dispelled. This is one of the odd characteristics of the 
Capitalist System” (CW vi, 323).
191 Proper judgment is lacking all around. 
If economy had been for the nineteenth century the visceral epistemology for a 
civilized social body, it had ceased to be so. Instead, economic conventions were 
hampering the progress of wealth and civilization and its epistemological virtues had 
turned into vices. 
Underneath the epistemological vertigo of economy stood the anxious and 
                                                 
190 Keynes entertains “[a] little envy, perhaps, for his undoubting conviction that frontiers, races, 
patriotisms, even wars need be, are ultimate verities for mankind, which lends for him [Churchill] a 
kind of dignity and  even nobility to events, which for others are only a nightmare interlude, something 
to be permanently avoided” (CW x, 57). 
191 For the purpose of reference, the bibliography reads: (Keynes 1971l)  
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ignorant individual, incapable of dealing with the conventional nature of its world and 
categories. Worst of all, this incapability seemed to be growing due to the economic 
character itself. Malthus had placed the passions of fear and hope at the center of the 
civilized individual. But fear and hope, and its concomitant orientation towards the 
future, seem to find no reasonable limits. With Keynes these economic and civilizing 
passions produce their own excesses – just as the political passions did for Malthus – 
and these excesses in turn produce the most miserable version of man. Cultural 
critique of degenerated subjects and epistemological failure join: “The ‘purposive’ 
man is always trying to secure a spurious and delusive immortality for his acts by 
pushing his interest in them forward into time. He does not love his cat, but his cat’s 
kittens; nor, in truth, the kittens, but only the kittens’ kittens, and so on forward for 
ever to the end of catdom. For him jam is not jam unless it is a case of jam tomorrow 
and never jam today. Thus by pushing his jam always forward into the future, he 
strives to secure for his act of boiling it an immortality…Perhaps it is not an accident 
that the race which did most to bring the promise of immortality into the heart and 
essence of our religions has also done most for the principle of compound interest and 
particularly loves this most purposive of human institutions” (CW ix, 330). The 
economic character is thus striving for the future, in hope of what it brings and fearing 
that it might not succeed in bringing the fruits of its work and investment. Anxiety 
about loosening discipline, anxiety about committing the wrong undertaking and thus 
the temptation to not commit at all – these are the two vices that stand behind the 
“treasury view” and the masses on the stock market. The businessman of the day is 
equally enthralled by economic categories gone hay-wire: “Frigid penguins” they have  
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become, “hysteria” reigns over them as slight changes in digestion or the weather 
makes them “flap away with the golden eggs inside them” (CW ix, 235)
192. Long gone 
are the days when business man had a taste for creation and a “strong nervous force” 
and “will”.
193 But even without this loss of their own role and the air of heroism, they 
are talked about with pity: “That is why, unless they have the luck to be scientists or 
artists, they fall back on the grand substitute motive, the perfect ersatz, the anodyne 
for those who, in fact, want nothing at all – money...[they] flutter about the world 
seeking for something to which they can attack their abundant libido. But they have 
not found it. They would so like to be apostles. But they cannot. They remain business 
men” (CW ix, 320). 
There are arguably Nietzschean undertones in this critique of weak characters, 
unable to live and caught in slavish concerns. The similarity shows itself in the 
attention given to the contingency of convention and morality, the critique of culture 
and the hatred of utilitarian concerns of subsistence and equality.
194 It also is 
                                                 
192 (Keynes 1971g) 
193 See (GT 150). Keynes quotes Marshall’s depiction of the ideal business man in (CW ix, 286f). 
194 Similar arguments than those employed by Nietzsche might be seen in the following: Morality and 
conventions were, to Keynes, essentially rules for those who “are in the grip of the machine”. Those 
outside, as the Apostles, only committed to the individual judgment about the idiosyncratic good, “have 
hardly any duties, as I understand” except the search for beauty and the good. “But in the Kingdom of 
moralities and duties, the Galiaean will himself be conquered, not by words or argument or proof, but 
equally with his predecessors by the irresistible trend of human affairs and the need for an adequate and 
relevant morality”. Thus, morality fits the needs of life and articulate the precepts of action for those, 
not able or strong enough to answer to the unfounded nature of these conventions and the strength 
needed to form an “art of life” without rules. The quotes above stem from a paper, which Keynes gave 
to the Apostles, the other intellectual group he belonged to – a secret society in Cambridge – titled 
“Modern Civilization” (UA 22, 1-10). Toye alludes to this resemblance with Nietzsche, as well as 
Skidesky. The way Keynes posited the question of morality as a choice in between altruistic concerns 
and the beauty of one’s own life, included a reference to the “dreadful Stoics” and their “semitic 
founder”, who had introduced the “Negroid negro” question into morality (UA 26, 6). Toye comments 
that the “parallelism of ideas is so close that it is hard to believe that Keynes was no deliberately 
alluding to the relevant section of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power” (Toye 2000, 139). There are other 
parts, which sounds like Nietzsche juxtaposition of the reign of truth and law, versus the Greek concern 
with the public stage for tragedy and heroic life in the same piece: “The world is no longer a stage, as in 
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manifested in contempt leveled against the stupidity of the many and the existing elites 
alike. Within the intellectual circle of Bloomsbury, in which Keynes participated, the 
concern with the prospects of civilization and the contempt for elites was linked to the 
hatred of the Victorian order and the search for new styles of living, new styles of 
making art and new styles of writing.
195 “Contempt for the stupidity of the dominant 
                                                                                                                                             
the earlier view; it has become a police court. Grace of life and of language yields place to the bulkier 
and more somber majesty of law” (UA 26, 7). In Keynes’ writing there is no explicit reference to 
Nietzsche. The only explicit visible trace of Nietzsche consists in the books in Keynes’ personal library. 
The following list has been put together by the very helpful archivist at the King’s College Archive in 
Cambridge. The references in parenthesis refer to the signatures, under which  these books are classified 
in the King’s College Library: Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, 8 Leipzig, 1872 
(Keynes Cc. 3. 25), Götzen-Daemmerung oder wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert 8 Leipzig, 1889 
(Keynes Cc.3.24); Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft 8 Leipzig 1886 
(Keynes Cc.3.23); Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Ein Buch für freie Geister 8 Chemnitz 1878 
(Keynes Cc.3.26): Morgenröthe. Gedanken ueber die moralischen Vorurtheile 8 Chmnitz 1881 (Keynes 
Cc. 3. 22); Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. Drittes Stück: Schopenhauer als Erzieher 8 Schloss 
Chemnitz 1874 (Keynes Cc. 3.27); Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. Viertes Stück: Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth 8 Schloss Chemnitz 1876 (Keynes Cc.3 28); Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift 8 
Leipzig 1887 (Keynes Cc. 3.21). There are all original editions and bespeak also Keynes’ passions of 
collecting books. On the spreading of Nietzsche at this time in England see (Thatcher 1970). 
195 ‘Bloomsbury’ is the name of the cultural and social group emerging around Virginia Woolf, Vanessa 
Bell, Duncan Grant, Clive Bell, Lytton Strachey, Desmond MacCarthy, Roger Fry, Adrian and Karin 
Stephen, Leonard Woolf and Maynard Keynes – they were writers, artists, editors “out to construct 
something new” in the words of Leonard Woolf: “we were the builders of a new society which should 
be free, rational, civilized, pursuing truth and beauty” (Raymond Williams in (Crabtree 1980, 47)). 
Raymond Williams describes their attitudes as “appealing to the supreme value of the civilized 
individuals, whose pluralisation, as more and more civilized individuals, was itself the only acceptable 
social form” The group was “in its personal instances and in its public interventions” “as serious, as 
dedicated and as inventive as this position has ever, in the twentieth century, been” (ibid, 62). To 
mention just two very important their ‘public activities’, not even going into the writings of Clive Bell, 
Virgina Woolf or the art of Vanessa Bell or Duncan Grant: Roger Fry organized the first Post-
Impressionism exhibition in London 1910 – showing Cézanne, Gaugin, can Gogh, Matisse, Picasso. 
The reaction surprised even Roger Fry. The public was convulsed by ‘paroxysms of rage and laughter’ 
(Mini 1991, 92). Besides introducing the art of the continent to England, the group is also responsible 
for “effectively introducing Freudian thinking into English”. Adrian and Karin Stephen, and James 
Strachey had all studied with Freud in Vienna. James Strachey was the general editor of the Standard 
Edition of Freud in English and Leonard and Virgina Woolf’s Hogarth Press was its publisher 
(Winslow 1986, 554). Shone describes the fate of the group in following terms: What had appeared in 
the 1920s as a way of life that was refreshingly free of convention, liberal and delightfully pliant, 
seemed to many in the later decade as spineless, frivolous and uncommitted. The death of Julian Bell in 
the Spanish civil War appear appears as the most poignant symbol of that confrontation (cit. in Crabtree 
1980, 27).  
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sectors of the ruling class” was a point of longstanding convergence between them and 
consisting of “saying bosh to that vast system of cant and hypocrisy which made lies a 
vested, the vested interest of the ‘establishment’, of the monarchy, aristocracy, upper-
classes, sub-urban, the Church, the Army, the stock exchange” (Crabtree 1980, 48). 
The sense of crisis and worry about the future of the “Victorian synthesis” of order 
was there welcomed as a fresh breath of air.
196 The death of queen Victoria in 1903 
could be the “beginning of the Age of Reason”
197 as Lytton Strachey put it, and Woolf 
recalled, that “in the decade before the 1914 war there was a political and social 
movement in the world, which seemed at the time wonderfully hopeful and exciting. It 
seemed as though human beings might really be on the brink of becoming civilized” 
(Crabtree 1980, 63). The search for “what it meant to be civilized” were the main 
preoccupation of the Bloomsberries, as they called themselves. This search also took 
place among the Apostles, the secret group of Cambridge students who were taken by 
the philosophy of Moore and his anti-utilitarian conception of the good.
198 From this 
                                                 
196 As late as 1917, Keynes wrote to his mother about the probable “disappearance of the social order 
we have known hitherto”: “With some regrets I think I am on the whole not sorry. …and as I lie in bed 
in the morning I reflect with a good deal of satisfaction that, because our rulers are as incompetent as 
they are mad and wicked, one particular era of a particular kind of civilization is very nearly over” 
(Skidelsky 2003, 174) 
197 “It’s no surprise that Bloomsbury would come to regard 1903 as the anno mirabilis, the 
dawn of a new era, ‘the beginning of the Age of Reason’, as Strachey put it” (Mini 1991, 81) 
198 Keynes became as an undergraduate in 1903 a member of the ‘Apostles’, “a secret society with a 
tradition of philosophical discussion”. The “indisputably dominant intellectual influence on Keynes and 
the Apostles at that time was Moore, his Principa Ethica…being their first text. (O'Donnel 1989, 12). 
Keynes reflects in looking back at this time “I never heard of the present generation having read it. But, 
of course, its effect on us, and the talk which preceded and followed it, dominated, and perhaps still 
dominate, everything else” (CW x, 435). Moorean philosophy offered an anti-utilitarian conception and 
individual judgment of the good, shedding it from consequences or achievement. As sort of neo-
Platonism, in Keynes later judgment (ibid, 436): “We lived in the precious present, nor had begun to 
play the game of consequences. We existed in the world of Plato’s Dialogues; we had not reached the 
Republic, let alone the Laws” (ibid., 445). While being later somewhat appalled by the puritan and 
other-worldly character of these philosophical engagements, he still cherishes the way it offered out of 
the “Benthamite tradition” (ibid., 445). Bentham was the worm gnawing at civilization, “responsible for 
moral decay” based on the “over-valuation of the economic criterion” (ibid, 446). Keynes “This view 
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early period stemmed several pieces of Keynes’ concerned with the notion of beauty, 
the good, and the state. 
The intense preoccupation with the civilized individual, culture and character; 
the taste for literary style; the contempt for economic man; the urgency to attend to the 
world so as to secure the preconditions for such civilized life; these all form the points 
of departure from where Keynes approached the “crisis of the double constitution” and 
the re-envisioning of something new.
199 The traces of these departure points remain 
visible in Keynes’ economic and political writings – not the least in his style of 
writing. Within Bloomsbury, the art of character study was practiced and praised; 
Virginia Woolf, otherwise rather distant to Keynes, was full of admiration of those 
works coming from his pen (Skidelsky 2003, 221). But there is more to this prominent 
position of “character-masks” in his writings than merely being a trace of Bloomsbury 
within the otherwise dry dramas of economy and bureaucracy. They are powerful 
means of rendering visible the workings – or rather mishaps– of the web of social 
relations mediated by money, objects and machines. They dramatize in person the 
outlines of the imagined order and its interruption, the making and the perversion of 
the body politic; the problematizations they contain have as their inverse image what 
ought to be. They need to be handled with care as they tempt to regard matters of 
                                                                                                                                             
was the utilitarian and economic – one might almost say financial – ideal, as the sole, respectable 
purpose of the community as a whole; the most dreadful heresy, perhaps, which has ever gained the ear 
of a civilized people. Bread and nothing but bread, and not even bread, and bread accumulating at 
compound interest until it has turned into a stone” (CW xxviii, 342). 
199 It is important in this respect to note that Keynes’ early pre-occupations with questions of probability 
in the context of radical uncertainty – it was to become his dissertation – belongs into this contexts of 
ethics and individual judgment about the goods to be striving for. Countering Bentham also entailed 
countering the model of certain knowledge, which stood behind the utilitarian calculus. It assumed that 
“all possible consequences of alternative courses of action were supposed to have attached to them, first 
a number expressing their comparative advantage and secondly another number expressing the 
probability of their following from the course of action in question.” It was a “mythical system of 
probable knowledge” (CW xiv, 123/4).   
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social and political relations in terms of a moral judgment about different characters.  
In this context, they were meant to expose – as in a panoramic site – the 
outlines of the political problématique. By attending to them, one can discern how 
economy has been firmly located by Keynes within the realm of conventions, proper 
judgment and the respective institutional settings and devices: stock market decisions, 
investment strategies, and monetary regimes have ceased to be manifestations of the 
most rational approach to the necessities of life and progress. Instead, they present 
outworn dogma, excessive anxiety and ignorance. Economic man has always been a 
conventional figure, most apt to the demands of civilization, the making of riches and 
political freedoms alike. But these conventions are presented by Keynes as limited, 
narrow, prone to perversion and growingly inept – not only in respect to civilization, 
but also in respect to the order of things. There is no “truth of the economy”, which 
could found the flights of political reason and ensure the progress and stability of the 
body politic. Both of the two halves are limited and lack foundation.  
But as vivid as the characterization of political and economic institutions 
which Keynes provides might be, as plausible as it might be to read off of them the 
conventional character of economy, the question remains: what is the theoretical 
condition of possibility to present economy in this way? What understanding of 
economic objectivity guides Keynes’ own assertions? If the truth of the economy is 
not rendered any more within the passions and decisions of economic man, from 
where do these limits become visible? Questions such as these lead us into a 
philosophical inquiry of Keynes’ rendering of this specific reality, the modes in which 
he envisions the ‘whole’ of the body politic as it is no longer exhausted within the 
confines of economic man. Instead of resting with the characters of frigid 
businessman, jam savers, clergy-man, failed apostles, wagering stock-market brokers 
and femme fatales, it is necessary to know what kind of relations they dramatize and  
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encapsulate in their characters. Only later are they to be re-visited so as to see how 
these characters are employed in a moral story, which fits the new constitution.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TEMPORALITY AND THE CONVENTIONS OF ECONOMY 
 
“Sitting tight-buttoned in the present…with no hope or belief in the future” (CW 
xxviii, 345), the social body was shackled by some “abstruse financial reasoning”, by 
some “few old gentlemen tightly buttoned-up in […] frock coats” full of timidity and 
“instincts to restrict” (CW ix, 125).
200 “The patient” is “wasting away from 
emaciation” (ibid, 118), it needs exercise, “a breath of life” (ibid, 125) – Keynes did 
not shy away from colorful images to persuade the public of a rosy future.
201 The most 
pressing obstacles were fears and lack of conviction
202, such as the fear of 
uncontrolled dissipation of scanty resources, the concomitant worry over where their 
renewal would come from and the conviction that consumption in whatever form ‘eats 
the future away’. Saving had been the combined moral, economic and religious 
wisdom of the nineteenth century and still dominated the general mindset. It meant 
restriction and deferral of consumption, which in turn was taken to be the very 
cornerstone on which access to a better future for everyone rested.
203  The echo of 
                                                 
200 See also (CW ix, 91) for Keynes’ rhetoric on the “mysterious, unintelligible reasons of high 
finance”, which “not only looks like nonsense”, “but is nonsense”. 
201 The essay “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” appeared in the midst of the slump (1930), 
but projected that mankind will be “solving its economic problem” within the next hundred years – 
work-shifts of fifteen hours a week might then be feasible until man had learned to live happily without 
economic duties (CW ix, 326 and 328f). 
202 See (CW ix, 238, 336, 323). Concerning the budget question, Keynes maintains: “This is not to deny 
that there is a budget problem. Quite the contrary. The point is that the state of the budget is mainly a 
symptom and a consequence of other causes, that economy is in itself liable to aggravate…these other 
causes, and that consequently the budget problem, attacked merely along the lines of economy is 
insoluble” (CW, ix, 240). He utters the same opinion about “pious resolutions concerning the abatement 
of tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions”, which are “ a waste of time” since “in so far as these 
things are not the expression of deliberate national or imperial policies” they are symptoms (CW, ix, 
357). 
203 For this use of the word economy see: “At this point the opponents of expansion…think that we 
must not only postpone all ideas of expansion, but must positively contract, by which they mean reduce 
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Malthus is still discernable in this unshaken commitment – exemplified for Keynes by 
the Treasury - to the virtues of postponing, the discipline of the balanced budget, and 
the promise for betterment it supposedly harbors.
204 It answers, not surprisingly, to the 
requirements of scarcity: proper ‘economy’ is about making ends meet while 
restriction is exercised in the use of means. Marshall, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, still presents as eternal verities the findings of Malthus: “Everyone is aware 
that the accumulation of wealth is held in check…by the preference which the great 
mass of humanity have for present over deferred gratifications, or, in other words, by 
their unwillingness to “wait”” (GT 242). Financial discipline and the maintenance of 
the gold standard only secure and protect the necessary and tight circle knit by 
‘economy’.  
“There is”, Keynes remarks, a harmful “exclusive concentration on the idea of 
‘economy’, national, municipal, and personal – meaning by this the negative act of 
withholding expenditure… - [which] may, if under the spur of a sense of supposed 
duty it is carried far, produce social effect so shocking as to shake the whole system of 
our national life” (CW ix, 238). What Keynes maintains here is not that the 
commitment to saving hampers political, culture or artistic life – although it does, to 
his mind - but that such concentration on ‘economy’ is unwarranted in respect to ‘the 
economy’ itself: “Yet, if we carry ‘economy’ of every kind to its logical conclusion, 
we shall find that we have balanced the budget at nought on both sides, with all of us 
flat on our backs starving to death from a refusal, for reasons of economy, to buy one 
                                                                                                                                             
wages and make large economies in the existing expenditure of the budget” (IX 234). 
204 “There are still people who believe that the way out can only be found by hard word, endurance, 
frugality, improved business methods, more cautious banking and, above all, the avoidance of devices” 
(CW ix, 336).   
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another’s services” (IX 239).
205  
It seems as if the meaning of the word economy starts to multiply into 
incommensurable pieces. “Economy”, Keynes asserts against the wisdom of his time, 
“can have no other purpose or meaning except to release resources” (CW ix, 148). 
Otherwise, the social bond and the relations of interdependence “by which we live” 
will be severed: only those “happy few” will be employed who grow their own 
potatoes” (CW ix, 147). The use of the word “economy” is here reminiscent of the 
hopes put to it by some thinkers in the eighteenth century, where trade and exchange 
induced reciprocity, equality and interdependent social life vis-à-vis sovereign claims 
for power. Indeed, Keynes emphasizes several times the inexorable link between 
economy and reciprocity, the complete separation of which can only lead to paradox; 
the “fate of Midas” awaits those who try to undo this link by taking rather than giving. 
To restrict expenditure as an “all-round remedy” is senseless and harmful (CW ix, 350 
and 130f), the result of reasoning “by false analogy” (CW ix, 232) from what benefits 
the individual, “who finds himself in danger of living beyond his means”, to what 
benefits the economy as a whole (ibid). Instead, what is necessary is a perspective on 
the economic problem “in the strictest sense…or to express it better, as suggesting a 
                                                 
205 “When we already have a great amount of unemployment and unused resources of every description, 
economy is only useful from the national point of view in so far as it diminishes our consumption of 
imported goods…But it is an extraordinarily indirect and wasteful way of reducing imports” (CW ix, 
239). “[Y]et I doubt if one in a million of those who are crying out for economy have the slightest idea 
of the real consequences of what they demand” (ibid., 240); “This is not in the direction of denying that 
there is a budget problem. Quite the contrary. The point is that the state of the budget is mainly a 
symptom and a consequence of other causes, that economy is in itself liable to aggravate rather than to 
remove these other causes, and that consequently the budget problem, attached merely along the lines of 
economy, is probably insoluble” (ibid., 240); “To say that our problem is a budget problem is like 
saying that the German problem is a budget problem, forgetting all about reparations” (ibid., 240);  
“Their policy is to reduce the standard of life of as many people as are within their reach in the hope 
that some small portion of the reductions of standard will be at the expense of imports. Deliberately to 
prefer this to a direct restriction of imports is to be non compos mentis” (ibid., 242).  
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blend of economic theory with the art of statesmanship, a problem of political 
economy” (CW ix, 336).
206  
A breach thus appears between the  “logic of economy”, revolving around 
scarcity of means, and the proper ways to think  “the economy” of the social body. 
What Malthus sought to align closely in the hope of fashioning the order of the body 
politic ceases with Keynes to line up so smoothly: the senses, hopes and fears of 
economic man do not form the regulatory kernel of the whole. The cultural and 
epistemological doubts leveled at this figure – as exposed in the previous chapter – go 
hand in hand with a renewed need to fashion a perspective on the life of the social 
body as the epistemology of scarcity and its attendant logic of economy need to be 
substituted or at least supplemented in toto.
207 A different foundation of the body 
politic is required. 
For Keynes, economy never ceased to be an issue of “life and death” (CW ix, 
4f), of civilized subjects and proper order. Nor would he entirely shun scarcity in his 
account of economy.
208 Yet, for a moment, the anthropological figure of man, “who 
                                                 
206 “Nevertheless, as a contribution to statecraft, which is concerned with the economic system as a 
whole and with securing the optimum employment of the system’s entire resources…the early pioneers 
of economic thinking…may have attained to fragments of practical wisdom which the unrealistic 
abstractions of Ricardo first forgot and then obliterated” (GT, 340). These different meanings of 
economy are not newly fashioned and elaborated at the beginning of the twentieth century. They can all 
be found in it’s the word’s rich etymology, even if the second edition of Palgrave’s Dictionary of 
Political Economy in the 1920s refers to economy only in the sense of  “the principle of seeking to 
attain, or the method of attaining, a desired end with the least possible expenditure of means.” Mitchell 
takes this as proof that  “the economy” as a “general structure of economic relations” was only 
conceived as such in the wake of Keynes’ theory (Mitchell 1998, 85). The etymology of the word 
economy, or oeconomy and its history of different appropriations shows this double meaning: it refers 
on the one hand to the order of the whole, its overarching organization and rationale, and on the other to 
the logic of strategic calculation, relating means to ends. See for different accounts  of the history of the 
word ‘economy’ (Stemmler 1985, esp. 32 and 57). 
207 Keynes’ critique of the principles of laissez-faire economics repeats the same point and maintains 
that “[e]xperience does not show that individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less 
clear-sighted than when they act separately” (CW ix, 288). 
208 Keynes did not advocate a turn towards unqualified public expenditure: he made a distinction 
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spends, wears out, and wastes his life” in evading the “pressure of his finitude”, 
recedes from the forefront of the attempt to think the body politic.
209 Keynes brackets 
the cornerstone of the wisdom of classical and neo-classical in his attempt to write a 
book that would “revolutionize the way the world thinks about economic problems” 
(CW xxviii, 42). Keynes approaches economy from the other end of things – from that 
economic fact, about which J.S. Mill said in the nineteenth century that there cannot 
be a more “intrinsically insignificant thing, in the economy of society”, that is: money 
(CW xiii, 254).
210  
This turn towards money should not be mistaken as one topic of choice, 
although it was this, too. Historical circumstance drew attention to the issue of money. 
Keynes himself notes that “[t]he fluctuations in the value of money since 1914 have 
been on a scale so great as to constitute, with all that they involve, one of the most 
significant events in the economic history of the modern world” (CW ix, 59). 
Inflationary pressures and deflationary reactions “made us lose all sense of numbers 
and magnitude” (ibid, 11).  They pointed to a missing foundation in the very medium 
in which economic facts are perceived, counted and constituted. On the whole, such 
monetary fluctuations certainly amplified the general perception of a crumbling and 
                                                                                                                                             
between ‘current’ and ‘capital’ spending and wanted the capital budget to fluctuate with employment.  
The investment programs were to be treated as ‘off-budget’, but still subjected to the sense of “what 
things cost”, to “sound accounting in order to measure efficiency and maintain economy” (Keynes cit. 
in Skidelsky 2003, 160). Keynes distinguished between economy, or “cheapness” which was due to 
skill and efficiency in production and cheapness “which means he ruin the producer” being a “greatest 
economic disaster” (CW ix, 136). Most importantly, scarcity and the issue of population were 
incorporated into his theory, forming the “tunnel of economic necessity” which it was necessary to pass 
and through which the economist had to lead the way. But this belongs already to the new ‘double 
constitution’, to which we will turn in the next chapter.  
209 Those quotes stem from Foucault’s rhetorically embellished account of the episteme of the 
nineteenth century, as it manifested itself in the science of political economy. (Foucault 1970, 259). 
210 (Keynes 1971h) hereafter abbreviated as (CW xiii).  
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ruinous basis for material civilization.
211 
But it is not just a restricted, albeit different perspective on the monetary side 
of economy - necessitated by the experience of unprecedented monetary upheaval – 
that is at stake in the writings of Keynes. For him, the new importance of money 
involves a concomitant change in the constitution of the economy as a whole, 
specifically its boundaries and its dynamics. To think about money is for Keynes to 
introduce temporality into the heart of economy and vice versa. The following 
discussion argues that temporality and money become the kernels around which a new 
account of economic objectivity emerges. The philosophical reading offered here 
stresses, how such perspective on temporality and money opens economy to questions 
of convention, power, and institutions. These shape the dominant measures, which 
determine the dominant economic temporalities. Viewed from this angle, economic 
temporality is not due to an internally functional and necessary dynamic, closing ‘the 
                                                 
211 Before writing the General Theory Keynes had written extensively on monetary theory. Money and 
probability were his first two theoretical and practical passions. He had started his early – but 
intermittent – administrative career as a young clerk at the India Office, where he was concerned with 
the managed gold standard in India. His return to scholarly life in Cambridge was financed by his 
lectures on monetary theory. Thus biographical and historical circumstances favored money as a choice 
of subject matter. The two books on money before the General Theory were The Tract on Monetary 
Reform (1923) and A Treatise on Money (Vol I: The Pure Theory of Money; Vol II: The Applied Theory 
of Money) (1930). The editors describe the difference between Keynes’ early and later writings as 
follows “In his Tract on Monetary Reform…Keynes stood well within the limits of the Cambridge 
orthodoxy of his day…although his policy goals of price stability, erring if necessary towards slight 
inflation, his preference for national management and changes in exchange rates, and his emphasis on 
the short run were all at odds with the tempers of Marshall and Pigou. It was in his movement from the 
position of the Tract that he was to break new ground” (CW xiii, 15). See (CW xiii, 20f. and GT vii) for 
Keynes’ account of his leading tenets in the Tract and the new conclusions. In general, one can say that 
Keynes always granted money and bank policies a paramount influence for either interrupting or 
smoothing the system. The gap in which money and finance assumed their determining role resulted 
from his assumption that the motivations to invest and the motivations to consume or not are two 
different sets; they are not aligned mechanically (CW xiii, 93). See also (Skidelsky 2003, 160, 25, 49, 
60). In these early writings, scarcity remains a primary focus, as his positions on the question of 
population show, thus saving is still a virtue, which a community could miss out on in the midst of 
violent fluctuations of the standard of value (CW iv, 27). See the last chapter for further discussion.  
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economy’ back upon itself. Instead it is exposed as being fashioned at different sites, 
all determining intimately and at its center what a specific ‘economic objectivity’ is 
about.
212 Those remarks might suffice to indicate initially what is at stake in this turn 
towards temporality and money, as it is impossible to deduce from the general notions 
announced. 
The prominence given to the question of time in economic matters marked for 
Keynes a decisive distance between him and the inherited orthodoxy. While the 
“classical theory” wondered about the distribution of the given and projected an 
“instantaneous picture” of the economy (GT vii), Keynes occupied himself with the 
effects of an inherently unknown future on the process of creating wealth. “[T]he fact 
that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a 
peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory”, since 
the creating of wealth is oriented toward future results (CW xiv, 112f). This uncertain 
view into the future and the relevance it assumes in Keynes’ theory resonates with the 
general demise of deterministic conceptions at the turn of the century and the intense 
preoccupation with the future surrounding it. The nineteenth-century world of Laplace, 
in which “an intellect knowing at a given instant all forces” would face no uncertainty, 
neither in the future nor in the present, no longer existed.
213 Keynes maintained that 
the essentially uncertain future undermined the Benthamite calculus, on which 
classical theory had built its case. This “mythical system of probable knowledge”, in 
                                                 
212 To strive for this closure and foundation is instead due to a “political-theoretical” decision, which is 
the subject of analysis of my last chapter. 
213 The cultural historian Kern has described these changes in the conceptions of time and space: “The 
philosophy of the future of the period was an emphatic repudiation of a body of determinist thought that 
had been building for a century from its foundation in the naturalistic determinism of Pierre Laplace”; 
“The new technology, the science fiction, Futurist art, and revolutionary politics looked at the future 
like a predator eyeing its prey” (Kern 1983, 100 and 104).   
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which every event has its comparative advantage and probability attached” (CW xiv, 
123f), falters under the influence of shifting hopes and fears. “All these pretty, polite 
techniques, made for a well-paneled board oak room and a nicely regulated market are 
liable to collapse” (CW xiv, 115).
214 Expectations, beliefs and convention necessarily 
replace what cannot be known and - given their missing foundation - they fall prey to 
desires and moods.
215  
All this implies for Keynes that the scientific rendering of this object 
“economy” falls outside of the “formally exact”, and has to deal with “discreteness 
and “discontinuity” (CW xiv, 300).
216 The sensitivity towards time also led Keynes to 
denounce the “haggling of the market” as a site of lesser importance: while there it 
might be figured what the given situation is, his interest was to account for the making 
of these facts that the market merely discovers
217. Expectations and fears about the 
                                                 
214 Keynes’ first theoretical work on probability had resolved around refuting such beliefs. For Keynes, 
stochastic probability would eternally be unable to counter epistemological insecurities, which 
necessarily surround any attempt to predict future events or the consequences of action. Keynes 
maintained in his dissertation on probability that one looks in vain for reliable answers in mathematical 
frequencies of past events in order to gain certainty concerning the future. “A statement of probability 
always has reference to the available evidence and cannot be refuted or confirmed by subsequent 
events” (UA 19/2, 10). The profound ignorance about the future is not mended and controlled with such 
neat equations and yet decisions have to be taken. Pearson, who said that “the man of science may 
proudly predict the results of tossing half-pence , but the Monte Carlo roulette confounds his theories 
and mocks at his laws…it is chaotic in its manifestations.” Ignorance can only be answered to with due 
respect to what is known so far and for the near future, but certainty and ‘long views’ elude man. 
215 Keynes introduces the notion of convention prominently in this respect: “conventional judgments” 
refer to the orientation towards social standards. Here it has the connotation of majority, of average and 
of mass society (CW xiv, 114). Convention can also refer to more institutionalized regimes of value, 
like the gold standard. It is the latter meaning which is to be preferred, as it is broader and not tainted 
with the ‘critique of mass society’ Keynes seems to entertain. 
216 “[T]he theory we devise in the study of how we behave in the market place should not itself submit 
to market-place idols. I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite 
techniques” (CW xiv, 115). 
217 “You are usually concerned with the haggling of the market,” Keynes answers a colleague, “the 
short-time lags lasting a few week during which everybody is discovering what the demand really is; 
whereas I am concerned with the forces determining the demand…and I am not much interested myself 
in the brief intermediate period during which the haggling of the market is discovering the facts (CW 
xiv, 27).  
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future, Keynes maintained, determine fundamentally the numbers of unemployment 
and output. Given that Keynes was not only statesman and philosopher, but also 
economist, the vision of “the whole” and its most pressing problems is aptly captured 
in these numbers (GT 292). Within the discipline of economics, the most radical 
appropriations of Keynes – called the “Keynesian fundamentalists” – accentuate this 
centrality of uncertainty and non-determination.
218  
But my interest is not to repeat the economist’s view and to rest content in his 
constituted world, however uncertain it is and however much state intervention it 
needs. The turn towards temporality implies not only the recognition of uncertainty 
and expectations. The reading that is developed here suggests that thinking ‘economy 
through time’ incites the question of the proper measure, which is given by ‘economy’ 
and given to ‘economy’. The making of this measure in conventions and relations of 
power reveals a much more intimate relation between economy and the political – 
understood in the broad meaning of the terms – than the poles of market and state 
might suggest. The theoretical hope is that such finer understanding allows for a 
notion of the political, which neither forgets nor is subsumed to economy. This 
reading claims to be extremely close to the text, yet it strains the author’s intention. 
The proof of its plausibility can only lie in its effects and in the efficacy of translating 
and transforming the technical language of economics into the concerns of political 
and social theory. The texts of Keynes turn into an interlocutor within a theoretical 
conversation about how to think ‘the economy’ beyond the foundations of the old and 
the new ‘double constitution’. This explication of temporality, measure and economy 
                                                 
218 For an account of these strands of interpretation, see (Hutton 2001; Sowdon 1994, 67f and 375f).The 
emphasis lies on the absence of any self-regulating, efficient mechanism going against the reversal 
towards the ‘realism of the market’ evident in the last decades.  
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begins at the same point Keynes chose for himself: money and time.  
Temporality and Measurement 
“Money in its significant attributes is”, Keynes states, “above all, a subtle device for 
linking the present to the future […]. We cannot get rid of money even by abolishing 
gold and silver and legal tender instruments. So long as there exists any durable asset, 
it is capable of possessing monetary attributes and, therefore of giving rise to the 
characteristic problems of a monetary economy” (GT 294). The impact of money on 
the relations of exchange and production properly commences therefore not with the 
existence of coins circulating as medium of exchange, but only when “with the 
development of contract” when obligations are expressed in a “money of account” and 
are thereby fixed through time (CW xxviii, 226): “The introduction of a money, in 
terms of which loans and contracts with a time element can be expressed, is what 
really changes the economic status of a primitive society; and money in this sense 
already existed in Babylonia in a highly developed form as any years before the time 
of Solon” (ibid, 255). Stamping pieces of metal with a “local trademark was just a 
piece of bold vanity, patriotism or advertisement with no far-reaching importance”. 
The invention of “sealed money”, Keynes does not hesitate to claim, is of “very 
trifling significance” (ibid. 254): coinage does not constitute the “veritable 
introduction of money” (ibid. 255). Only when money becomes linked to time, 
contract and obligation does it “make […] its entry into human institutions” (ibid, 
226).
219 
                                                 
219 “An article may be deemed to have some at least of the peculiar characteristics of money (1) if it is 
regularly used to express certain conventional estimates of value such as religious dues, penalties or 
prizes, or (2) if it is used as the term in which loans and contracts are expressed, or (3) if it is used as the 
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Contracts and obligations are of course of preeminent importance beyond 
relations of trade and work. But the quest for a standard of measure was equally 
paramount for political and religious obligations: guilt, penalties or sacrifices required 
measure. The first uses of money are therefore linked to these “conventional estimates 
of value”. But for these “semi-economic purposes” a vague and customary standard is 
“perfectly satisfactory” (ibid. 256). “On the other hand for trading proper in the strict 
economic sense, where each party is keen for a profit and a trading ‘turn’”, it is 
important to have a measure of value that “can be generalized and expressed without 
reference to the particular” and is “steady throughout the year”.
220 Such a stable and 
generalized measure is to Keynes the specific modern innovation of “representative 
money”. It fulfills exactly the function described above in the classical account of 
money. But its virtues of representation have to be seen against the background of the 
inevitable lapse of time, the particularity of embodiment and its subjection to change. 
A cow, the customary ‘currency’ for religious duties or political penalties could never 
be estimated in abstraction from the particular and from the moment of time: its value 
would fluctuate very much depending on the concrete circumstances of existence. 
Because of its inexorable bonds to the particularities of time and place, it could never 
function as a ‘standard of value in the full sense of the word” (ibid. 258).  
“Representative money” thus achieves its stability over and above the vagaries 
                                                                                                                                             
term in which prices are expressed, or (4) if it is used as an habitual medium of exchange. In the first 
three cases the article in question is the term in a money-of-account, in the fourth case it is used as 
actual money. Now for most important social and economic purposes what matters is the money of 
account; for it is the money of account, which is the subject of contract and of customary obligation. 
The currency reforms, which matter are those which change the money of account. (CW xxviii 253).  
220 These aspects are emphasized here, but there are of course others, such as, for example, divisibility. 
The element of steadiness through time is of course of highest relevance – not for all transactions, but 
for those, which required long-term investments. Wages, Keynes mentions, “could be paid in corn, as 
they are paid daily” (ibid., 258).  
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of time and embodiment.
221 In order for something to be accepted as money, it has to 
maintain its “inelasticity”: if it were to be produced attendant on greater demand or if 
it were easily substituted by other particular goods, its general validity and stability 
would be jeopardized. Moreover, if the medium – which assumes the role of money – 
were subjected to the decay and costs that befall the storage of many goods, it would 
likewise eschew its own function, as it would change and threaten to lose its value 
(GT, 225).
222 All these characteristics of money contribute to its versatility and its 
magical character:
223 it is liquid, in Keynes’ word, that is, it can be “re-embodied if 
desired in quite a different form” (GT 240). In a sense, “liquidity” might be translated 
as potentiality referring to the fact that money manifests sheer possibility (Simmel). 
These powers of money are due to its abstract nature: because it has shed the 
inexorable ties to the particularities of time and place, it acquires the ability to “re-
embody” itself in a host of different things.
224 “Money is only significant for what it 
                                                 
221 For this use of the meaning of “representative” money see also: “Thus the long age of commodity 
money has at last passed finally away before the age of representative money. Gold has ceased to be a 
coin, a hoard, a tangible claim to wealth, of which the value cannot slip away so long as the hand of the 
individual clutches the material stuff. It has become a more abstract thing – just a standard of value” 
(CW ix, 163).  
222 See Chapter 17 of the General Theory for these issues, especially p. 230f. 
223 Keynes did not think much of Marx, “dull”, most boring. Keynes did not share the revolutionary 
passion of Marx, nor his scientific commitment to Ricardian foundations in economics. But within the 
wealth of Marx’ theoretical observations, there are convergences – one out- doing the other in the 
rhetorical pleasures of poetic descriptions. So listen to Marx, the same abstract quality of money is 
rendered as following: “Nothing is immune from this alchemy, the bones of the saints cannot withstand 
it” (Marx 1990, 253f). 
224 Keynes mentions that “liquidity,” in contrast to “carrying-costs” (the technical term for the costs of 
storage, maintenance and possible decay befalling particular embodiments), is a “question of degree; 
and that it is only in having the former high relatively to the latter that the peculiarity of  ‘money’ 
consists” (GT, 239). The following definition of a non-monetary economy emphasizes the point made 
above: “Consider, for example, an economy in which there is no asset for which the liquidity-premium 
is always in excess of the carrying-costs; which is the best definition I can give of a so-called “non-
monetary” economy. There exists nothing, that is to say, but particular consumables and particular 
capital equipments more or less differentiated according to the character of the consumables which they 
can yield up….all of which, unlike cash, deteriorate or involve expense, if they are kept in stock, to a 
value in excess of any liquidity-premium which may attach to them” (ibid).  
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can procure” (CW ix 59)
225 – its abstraction only manifests its powers if it relates back 
to the world of things.  
This account of money draws time, representation and abstraction into a vexed 
relation to each other. Money is on the one hand defined by its very ability to form a 
link between past and future. On the other hand, it fashions this continuity through 
time by avoiding the exposure to time and the mishaps of existence. It suffers no waste 
and is not subject to decay; it neither costs to store it, nor loses its value by 
accumulation. It concentrates all powers of abstraction on its side. Money is a 
“bottomless sink” (GT 231). But this relation to time and the love for potentiality 
invites paradoxes. The pure storage of money for the sake of retaining an unspecified 
purchasing power is also folly, if one considers the matter of economy proper. If it 
were not for the “liquidity” money offers, only a “lunatic”, says Keynes, would use 
this medium as a store of value. For classical theory, which is blind toward this aspect, 
it would be “an insane use to which to put it!” This is because the course of time not 
only subjects things, bodies and machines to the threat of loss and decay, but also 
because it harbors the possibility of multiplication and surplus. “For it is a recognized 
characteristic of money as a store of wealth that it is barren; whereas practically every 
other form of storing wealth yields some interest or profit” (CW xiii, xiv, 116) Money, 
taken by itself, is in this regard not the wisest link through time – the miser as Marx 
already knew, is “merely capitalist gone mad”
226. The relation of money to time, as 
paradoxical as it already is, requires further refinement: it needs thus to be seen in light 
of forming a particular economic temporality – one among others while exerting 
                                                 
225 See also (Keynes 1971k). 
226(Marx 1990, 254). Liquidity-preference, Keynes says, is equivalent to the “propensity to hoard” (CW 
xiv, 117).  
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specific effects in regard to them.  
Money is not the only link through time. The separation between the “real” and 
the “monetary” economy, which the classical tradition so strictly maintains, starts to 
fade
227: both sides manifest commitments equally through time and thus exhibit a deep 
homology
228. Just like money, capital is defined by the link through time it 
instantiates: “By capital technique I mean the relative importance of long processes as 
an efficient method of producing what is currently consumed” (CW xiv, 126). It draws 
resources of the “whole community” to transform them in procurement for the future 
(CW ix, 355). Keynes concludes the chapter on the marginal efficiency of capital:“It is 
by reason of the existence of durable equipment that the economic future is linked to 
the present” (GT 146)
229 - just as “the importance of money essentially flows from its 
being a link between the present and the future” based on, if on nothing else, the 
“durability of an asset” (GT 293, emphasis in the text; and 294).
230 The more degree of 
liquidity this link acquires, the more monetarized it is, so to speak, until it reaches that 
stage of barrenness that the miser cherishes. But of course, neither the barren store of 
value, nor the simple durability and processes through time have yet sufficiently 
captured economic temporality proper. Temporality is not determined by some 
                                                 
227For Keynes, it is a “false division”: “We have all of us become used to finding ourselves sometimes 
on the one side of the moon and sometimes on the other, without knowing what route or journey 
connects them, related, apparently, after the fashion of our waking and our dreaming lives. One of the 
objects of the foregoing chapers has been to escape from this double life” (GT, 294). 
228 His theory of a monetary economy, Keynes finds important to state, is not a “separate theory of 
money”; it remains a “theory of value and distribution” (ibid). 
229 Therefore, expectations about the future enter essentially into its determination, Keynes maintains in 
respect to the effects of uncertainty. The ‘marginal efficiency of capital’ – the yield it gives – is always 
an expected yield. Regarding it as severed from the link with the future is to “import an element of 
unreality” into the theory (GT, 145f, 210). 
230 See the quote above: “So long as there exists any durable asset, it is capable of possessing monetary 
attributes and, therefore of giving rise to the characteristic problems of a monetary economy” (GT, 
239).  
  147
technical process of production, respective transportation or some natural process of 
growth, neither is it embodied in that “capitalist gone mad” although it has to take 
account of all of these.
231 Rather, it is the simple fact that it has “a yield over the 
course of its life in excess of its original cost” (GT 213). Economic temporality thus 
marks the point in time, where the promise of a yield is asked to materialize.
232  
Such a definition of economic temporality appears to be rather banal – it does 
not stray far from any common sense understanding of economic purpose.
233 “We 
should not be too ready to shrug off such remarks as truisms or naivites”, advises 
Braudel in respect to such seemingly “too simple” beginnings (Braudel 1992, 173 
ansd141). So far, one has done not much more than point toward the circular structure 
of economic temporality: at the marked point in time, the return is demanded, the 
                                                 
231 About the distinction between capital as a technical apparatus, or physical thing and the process of 
creation through time untouched by economy, see his discussion (GT 214f). Otherwise there would be 
an “optimum interval for any given article between the average date of input and the date of 
consumption”, since a “shorter process of production would be less efficient technically, whilst a longer 
process would be less efficient by reason of storage costs and deterioration” (GT, 216). 
232 To enliven this point apart from the more technical argument employed, Keynes uses the analogy of 
a cook making dinner and the desire to eat. Even though physical output might be increased by 
postponing delivery, the dinner is expected at a certain point in time. It is no use to defer this date – 
“except in so far as the prospect of a larger meal, so to speak, induces the consumer to anticipate or 
postpone the hour of dinner”. A date is marked, which might be much different if “time counted for 
nothing, one way or the other, and his [the cook’s] was to produce the absolutely best dinner” (GT, 
215f). 
233 A short note might here be necessary about such general definitions of economy, which seem to shed 
all relation to the concrete historical forms of  “economy” it emanates from. The argument tilts, the 
wary reader might suspect, towards such a general definition of economy. This is in one respect a well-
founded suspicion, but maybe the procedure is not as suspicious as it might seem. Marx, in his critique 
of the Gothaer Program, ridiculed the socialist dictum that each worker should be rewarded according 
to the share he contributed. They forgot to account for the surplus, which has necessarily to be retrieved 
for provision, for sickness and likewise expenditures. A circuit with return, one could say, will in any 
case be made, capitalist or not. Marx’ critique of both the lack of transparency of exchange and the 
utilitarian conception of “due share’ consequentially led him to portray an utopia, in which there is 
neither, but only abundance and no mediation between social relations and ‘economy’ as exchange or 
return. The circuit of return circumscribed by economic temporality is - to answer the suspicion in a 
second way – only the starting point for an inquiry into the shape and limits of this circuit, its length, its 
breaks, its returns and into the site of their making (Tucker 1978).    
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circle is to be closed and the calculation of loss and surplus is to be made. Several 
thinkers have dwelled on this circular structure; although they fit it to their own 
respective theoretical aims, they all point to the same rendering of economy and 
capital. Braudel puts the matter straightforwardly when he describes the economic 
logic of long-distance trade during the early modern period under the heading “no 
closure, no deal”: “Trade circuits are like electrical circuits: they only work when the 
connection is unbroken”(Braudel 1992, 144). Likewise, Marx took pains to distinguish 
the circular movement of capital, governed by the limitless drive to make ‘money 
beget money’, from more limited engagements for the sake of consumption.
234 In 
contrast with the final dissipation of funds through consumption, the logic of capital 
lives by the closure of the circle so that the funds travel back to their site of emanation 
- hopefully with the highest return possible. Most recently, and seemingly most distant 
from more narrowly defined economic thinkers, Derrida has pursued the same line of 
reasoning, when he says in Given Time that one needs to attend to the odysseic 
structure of economy (Derrida 1992, 246).  
Given this very general description of economic objectivity in terms of a 
circular temporal structure, different ways of theoretical engagement become possible. 
Marx, as is well-known, linked the circular structure to a “limitless” logic of capital, 
an “automatic subject” that “brings forth living offspring, or at least lays golden eggs” 
(Marx 1990, 255). The powers of this  ”subject” and internal – if catastrophic – 
consistency of the system it brings about were in Marx’ account so paramount that any 
                                                 
234 “Whilst in the simple circulation of commodities the twofold displacement of the same piece of 
money effects its definite transfer from one hand into another, here the twofold displacement of the 
same commodity causes the money to flow back to its initial point of departure” (Marx 1990, 249 and 
256). Marx also likens this circulation to the “metabolic process” (ibid., 228) and quotes Galiani saying: 
“Things possess an infinite quality when moving in a circle which they lack when advancing in a 
straight line” (ibid., 255).  
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further questions about the source of such   “limitlessness” and  “powers” eluded the 
theoretical horizon. It marched towards one decisive battle of  “life and death” – 
between the ever-growing machine-like and abstract rhythm of capital and the “pure 
humanity” of suffering on the other side. The economic and political stage was set in a 
single scene. Much less dramatic – rightly or wrongly so - and much more piecemeal 
is the picture emerging for Keynes. What sets Keynes apart from the classical 
tradition, including the liberal and the Marxian versions alike, is his willingness to 
consider the non-automatic and conventional ways in which these circuits are 
determined and become effective.
235  
Contained in the most technical discussions of interest rates, marginal 
efficiency or liquidity in the General Theory is the broader socio-theoretical question: 
What measure does economic temporality imply when it asks for a certain return 
within a circumscribed horizon of time? How and where is such measure determined? 
Keynes’ most prominent answers to these questions all turn around the paradoxes of 
money. The peculiarity of the monetary measure, says Keynes, assumes its 
significance against the multiple measures resulting from the particularities of time 
and place in which any project takes place. Keynes elaborates on this diversity of 
measures in a short but instructive chapter in the General Theory. It is a chapter on the 
rate of interest – a term that should not be left to hide in technical clothes the question 
of time and measurement it points to: the interest rate describes what is retrieved in the 
future for a given sum put down in the present.
236 It circumscribes, so to speak, 
                                                 
235 The term “convention” refers here, as Keynes does himself, to the human artifice, to the made 
character of the measure given.  
236 See (GT, 222) for a more technical version of this definition of the difference between “future” and 
“spot” prices. Or a less technical definition of the rate of interest of money: “Interest on money…is 
simply the premium obtainable on current cash over deferred cash” (CW xiv, 101).  
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economic temporality as it establishes the height of return and narrows the horizon of 
time
.. “For every durable commodity we have a rate of interest in terms of itself, - a 
wheat-rate of interest, a copper-rate of interest, a house-rate of interest, even a steel-
plant rate of interest”, Keynes asserts, adding “there is no reason why their rates of 
interest should be the same” (GT 223).
. They differ since the probability of yield, the 
danger of loss and the cost of storing differs from one to the next (ibid. 225). The 
measure of their return is inexorably linked to their particularity, their corporeal 
qualities, their rhythm of growth and the temporal specificity of the demands they 
answer to.  
The attention Keynes gives to the diversity of measures of temporality speaks 
to the wider theoretical import of his argument. If Keynes has been called the ‘Einstein 
of economics’, the analogy should find here its proper anchor.
237 For most people, 
Einstein’s theoretical innovation lay in his argument against the universal 
measurement of time. The cultural historian Kern quotes him as saying  “every 
reference body has its own particular time”. Kern elaborates: “[H]e contrasted the 
older mechanics, which used only one clock, with his theory which requires that we 
imagine  ‘as many clocks as we like’. The general theory of relativity had the effect, 
figuratively, of placing a clock in every gravitational field in the universe…each 
telling a different correct time” (Kern 1983, 19). In one of Keynes’ early papers, read 
to the Apostles, he rehearses much the same argument: “time’s arrow did no always 
fly straight and true.” It is the “interaction of time and matter” that is the basis for 
                                                 
237 There are other ways to relate these two thinkers on the basis of their “systematic” approaches or the 
role given to the point of perspective. See (Galbraight 1994; Togati 2001). Keynes himself offers a way 
to link the two figures, as he relates his own General theory to the classical tradition, to which it is a 
special case (GT, vii) – just like Einstein’s challenge to Newtonian physics: while for most 
circumstances on earth, Newton’s ideas or economic orthodoxy would hold good, they were still special 
cases in a more general game – hence the General Theory.   
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Keynes’ and Einstein’s concerns alike (ibid., 29 and 32). “There is no absolute 
measurement of time that is intrinsically more correct than any other measurement” 
(UA 17, 3), Keynes maintains in these early reflections, and one might add that neither 
physical time nor economic time followed a single clock. Just as it was untenable for 
Keynes to conceive of a measure irrespective of the position to which it fits, it was 
paradoxical to assume to have found a general standard in money. An attempt to create 
a universal measure thus always stands in a vexed relation to the particularity of time 
of each body.
238  
Within a monetary economy, Keynes writes, monetary ways of measuring time 
will always “rule the roost”. Money thus creates such universalizing measure, 
assuming the place of the single clock so to speak, but this measure of greater validity 
than others is still geared towards its own particularity: “Money is not peculiar in 
having a marginal efficiency measured in terms of itself” (CW xiv, 102).
239 The 
universal measure has its own particularities, which determine the economic 
temporality it manifests and secures its widespread effects. This claim, innocent as it 
may appear, points to the theoretical site where Keynes seeks to breach the functional 
coherence of the orthodox image of the ‘economy’. Keynes accounts for the monetary 
rate of interest in terms of conventions, which have the tendency to impose “too much 
economy” on  “the economy”. Both the question - how is the measure of economy 
                                                 
238 Keynes gave a significant amount of theoretical attention to the question of how the value of money 
in general would be ascertained, circling again around the same problem.  Here the particularity of the 
situation, in which the “purchasing power” of money acquires its specific meaning, and the attempt to 
define such power or “value of money as such” (CW v, 72, 76f). But there is no “unique centre, to be 
called the general price level…There are various prices indexes, appropriate of various purposes. There 
is nothing else” (ibid 76.).  
239 This rate of interest specific to money takes account of the peculiar advantages money offers – 
otherwise “no one would pay this premium unless the possession of cash served some purpose, i.e. had 
some efficiency”(CW xiv, 101).  
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constituted? - and the answer – it is found in the realm of conventions and institutions 
– point beyond the closed disciplinary space of economics proper. They open 
economic objectivity to the consideration of relations of power and visions of order. 
His account of these conventions contains the central tenets of his theory and 
can serve as an exemplary and instructive case for the conventionality of economic 
facts. But before turning to this case, it is important to note that Keynes did not only 
stray from disciplinary boundaries and orthodoxies, he also kept some parts 
unchallenged. As much as he considered himself to belong to an “isolated group of 
cranks” in the tradition of economic thought and as a descendant of a long line of 
heretics, “a large part of the established body of economic doctrine”, he says, “I 
cannot but accept as broadly correct. I do not doubt it” (CW xiii, 489).  To this large 
part belong concepts like marginal efficiency or the play among costs and demands in 
the determination of customary prices. The preservation of a large part of orthodox 
economic thought and its main concepts is only of concern here insofar as it delineates 
yet again the boundary that divides a realm open for questions of convention, 
contingency and power from a realm to be protected from further inquiry. But the 
account of economic objectivity in terms of a problematic of temporality, 
measurement and abstraction does not necessitate this line of demarcation by itself. It 
is thus worthwhile to take the time to imagine such extension into realms and 
questions not envisioned by Keynes, even if his own search for the visceral 
foundations of the body politic did not induce him to do so, as the next chapter argues. 
Remaining within this theoretical horizon, the determination of the “natural 
rate of interest” of wheat, copper or steelplants – to use the examples Keynes gives –  
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refers not necessarily only to the calculation of loss, storage and the play of demand.
240 
The return they are supposed to bring and the horizon of time given to them can also 
be taken to refer to hierarchies of valuation, struggles over returns and pace of life. 
The particularities of existence are comprised of natural conditions, technical 
possibilities, bodily and mental dispositions no less than desires, cultural distinctions 
and disciplinary regimes –in addition to the calculations Keynes had mentioned 
himself. This panoply of material and cultural disposition, including the power 
relations they exhibit, is drawn together by the economic temporality which it is 
supposed to serve - at the same time the condition of possibility of a certain 
hegemonic measure of economic temporality and its very effect. Without having to 
assume the materiality of the laboring body as a foundational measure, as Marx 
following Ricardo did, it is possible to draw attention to the struggles about the 
respective temporal regimes, into which bodily life is made to fit. To mention an 
example pertinent to Keynes’ own time, one might think of the turn to scientific 
calculations and rationalization of work in Taylorism. It was meant to fashion a bodily 
disposition, which could be the stronghold of an accelerated temporal regime. 
Rabinbach has shown that the wish for scientific standards was driven by the search 
for consensual measures in view of social peace. These standards took account of and 
came in the wake of fierce struggles about work-days and efficient use of time in the 
nineteenth century.
241.Viewed in this perspective, the measure of economic 
                                                 
240 The “natural rate of interest” is for Keynes the rate as determined by the normal “haggling of the 
market” and the account of usual business risks. 
241 “The claims of the Taylor system to provide a scientific solution of the “worker question” appealed 
to industrialists and engineers in Europe primarily because its modernizing and rationalizing thrust 
linked greater productivity with social peace.” (Rabinbach 1990, 240). See also (Sarasin 2003). About 
the dreams of rationalization and the political energies captured by it in the first years of the Soviet 
Union, see (Buck-Morss 2002, 241).  
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temporality has many sources – as it is not preempted anymore by the assumption of 
functional necessity, its contingent and conventional character becomes open to 
further inquiry.  
The Conventions of Money 
The money-rate of interest is a “measure of the unwillingness of those who possess 
money to part with their liquid control over it” (GT 167). It is the numerical 
expression of desire for the abstract potential of money’s power.
242 It is a “barometer 
of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the 
future...It takes charge at the moment when the higher, more precarious conventions 
have weakened…the premium which we require to make us part with money is the 
measure of the degree of our disquietude” (CW xiv, 116). The relation to money 
assumes thereby a self-reflexive character: it entails a judgment about the world. It 
happens such that all other judgments have to “fall in line” with the disquietude and 
unwillingness to part with money. The measure of economy given through money – 
that is, its interest rate determined by the “forces appropriate to itself”  - assumes 
greater efficacy: it tends to be higher, less willing to give up on its measure and less 
forced to do so (GT, 229). Keynes spins two different, albeit related stories, about this 
                                                 
242 Classical theory assumes that the rate of interest is the ‘price’, which brings into equilibrium the 
demand for resources to invest with the readiness to abstain from present consumption” (GT, 167). It 
channels the funds from saving into investment, rewarding those who do not consume. In this case, high 
interest rates indicate the need for more funds to be saved, as it promises a higher reward for those who 
do it. It falls neatly in lie with the requirement of the ‘real economy’. It becomes apparent, how 
differently Keynes approaches the question, as now the interest rates has nothing do to with saving 
anymore. It eschews the moral story about the economic virtues of saving. No longer a drama between 
immediate desire and the discipline of deferring it, but the desire to hold onto abstract potentials: “In 
this respect I consider that the difference between myself and the classicals lies in the fact that they 
regard the rate of interest as a non-monetary phenomenon” (CW xiv, 80). See also (CW xiv, 92) for a 
lucid account of the difference and (CW xiv, 103).  
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measure of economy given through money. Both need to be told – one is about power 
and the other about hysteria; one points towards politics, the other towards morality. 
The first story revolves around institutions, monetary regimes and their 
respective relation to the particular conditions of space and time. It takes places in the 
context of the gold standard, which had reigned unquestioned during the nineteenth 
century, but had been finally abandoned in 1931.
243 Tying the currency to the gold 
standard promises to its adherents the stability of monetary values on the international 
stage, facilitates trade, contracts and investments across political boundaries.
244 But 
this type of monetary stability comes at a price: maintaining the parity with gold 
requires a tight monetary policy and budget discipline – all in the service of ensuring a 
stable value of money in respect to the remote abstraction of gold.
245 The interest rate 
follows suit, fitting itself to the requirements of tight money and uniformity.
246 The 
                                                 
243 The gold standard had been abandoned in the wake of the First World War. Between the wars, the 
return to gold seemed to promise a return to normalcy and stability. Under Churchill the gold standard 
was restored in 1925 before being abandoned in 1931. See the relevant essays by Keynes on the gold 
standard in (CW ix, 161-252). 
244 For the whole classical tradition of the nineteenth century– Marx was no exception – money was an 
afterthought to the movements of the ‘real economy’. Those were modeled under the assumption of a 
barter-economy. However different the presumed economic laws were – either based on the labor 
theory of value or on the calculation of marginal utilities – they shaped the fundamental side of 
economy as if they took place in absence of money. Such laws regulated allocation and production, 
brought about equilibrium or crisis. In respects to these dynamics, within the classical perspective, the 
highest aim of monetary arrangements is hence currency stability. During the nineteenth century the 
gold standard embodied such stability. 
245 This discipline was intended: governments are often deemed to be the main culprits of such 
derailment between real and monetary economy: given their power to define legal tender, they are 
tempted to use their privilege to procure funds for themselves or to succumb to populist demands – 
accepting thereby an inflation of monetary signs and a loss of its value. Heightened instability results, 
since business calculation and distribution of purchasing power are challenged irrespective of the 
demands of equilibrium. In the long run all prices will merely reflect the larger quantity of money in the 
system, while it has unnecessarily suffered from that period of adaptation. 
246 Different interest rates in different countries invite flows of money to those places where it is 
highest, eschewing the aim to maintain these differences. The problematization of the ‘flight of capital’ 
is very vivid in Keynes piece on ‘National Self-Sufficiency’, in which he contemplated the problems of 
free trade (Keynes 1971d). Hereafter abbreviated as (CW xxi).   
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whole arrangement is surrounded by the air of objectivity, as it seems to have firm 
foundations in its metal base. But for Keynes the choice of gold as a standard of value 
is itself a convention - and for the purpose of exchange a quite recent one -, “almost a 
parvenu” (CW ix, 162).
247 It has some advantages, Keynes admits, but it also turns out 
to be a rather inappropriate convention if one considers it from the perspective of 
economic temporality. The uniformity of interest rates and the imposition of their tight 
measure is likely to be out of sync with the differences of economic temporalities. The 
prospects for yield are not always the highest. But instead of following this course of 
things, the measure remains high: “It is interesting to notice that the characteristic 
which has been traditionally supposed to render gold especially suitable for use as the 
standard of value…turns out to be precisely the characteristic which is at the bottom of 
the trouble” (GT 236). For someone looking at money solely in terms of 
representation, these limits remain unaccounted.
248 Instead, any deviation from the 
                                                 
247 By 1914, it had reigned in England “de jure over less than a hundred years” and “in other countries 
over less than sixty” (CW ix, 162). 
248 As shown above, Keynes locates money in a triangle of time, abstraction and representation. It is not 
the case that a stable “measuring rod” is not important. “Money has only meaning for what it can 
procure” (CW ix, 59) - for that reason the concern for the constancy of its purchasing power has its due 
place in monetary theory and policy, for the early as for the later Keynes. But the theoretical plane from 
which he later appreciates this concern is rather different from that of the classical discourse in political 
economy. The absolute commitment to the representational transparency of money will become “less 
heroic” (CW xiii, 90); deviations – if not too wide – are not any longer the direst sin of this medium. 
For a discussion of inflation in this ‘non-heroic’ light see (Kirshner 2001). Proper representation 
remains an issue, but the  “essence” of money is not exhausted by this logic anymore. It is as if, to use 
the analogy often drawn between language and money, language is no longer defined exclusively in 
terms of representation, but has other structuring effects and roles, which need to be taken into account. 
Likewise, money turns out to play a role that exceeds representation: it models a particular temporality 
of economy and has in this respect far-reaching effects. Keynes never denied the importance of the 
stability of money values. Especially in his early books on money – when the break with the tradition 
had not yet occurred – the emphasis on the problem of inflation was just more pronounced. He argued 
at length against the destabilizing effects of unsound money. The instability of money as a “measuring 
rod” creates perceptual confusion, has “made us lose all sense of number and magnitude”, results in the 
“violent and arbitrary disturbance of contract and of the established equilibrium of wealth” (CW ix, 58) 
and turns “wealth-getting into a gamble and a lottery”. Worst of all, it strikes at the fundamental relation 
between creditor and debtor, this stronghold of the current order. “Lenin was certainly right. There is no 
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proper representation of the “real economy” becomes the worst for theorists and 
untenable for speculators .
249 The belief in a “level established by convention”, which 
is “thought to be rooted in objective grounds much stronger than convention”, makes 
by this very reason every other level appear “experimental”, “unsafe” and thus fallible. 
The same level would work, if conviction of its reasonability is firmly entrenched and 
promoted by an “authority unlikely to be superseded” (GT 204). Thus, the uniformity 
of the measure for economy and its stability rest upon a convention mistaken about its 
own conventional nature.
250 It is maintained in institutions, surrounded by a discourse 
of representation and unfolding in relations of power. It imposes a certain economic 
temporality - an ever tighter circle of time and yield – which appears as part of 
economic necessities, while it belongs to a particular and contingent convention.  
The other story Keynes tells about the whereabouts of the measures of and for 
economy is a story about fetishism, hysteria and lack of conviction. With it, the 
character of economic man, degenerating in his fears, returns; with him the jam-saver, 
the frigid penguins and those who lack the “sanguine temperament” and the “animal 
spirits” necessary to “defeat the dark forces of time” (GT 162). In this story, 
uncertainty about the future looms large. The preference for money’s potential, instead 
of its transformation into proper objects of desire, is a fearful reaction to the 
uncertainty of the future. Money is loved for its own sake, not for the things it could 
                                                                                                                                             
subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The 
process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction” (CW ix, 57). What it 
involves is the connection of economy, money and temporality (CW xiii, 90f and 111f). 
249 “For example, in a country linked to an international gold standard, a rate of interest lower than 
prevails elsewhere will be viewed with a justifiable lack of confidence; yet a domestic rate of interest 
dragged up to a parity with the highest rate…may be much higher than is consistent with domestic full 
employment” (GT, 203).  
250 “For its actual value is largely governed by the prevailing view as to what its value is expected to be. 
Any level of interest which is accepted with sufficient conviction as likely to be durable will be 
durable…” (GT, 203).  
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procure and the technical term ‘liquidity preference’ is nothing but an expression of to 
this cultural flaw.
251 Keynes turns to psychoanalysis in order to account for this 
“delight in gold”, this “superstitious attitude” towards money, which mistakes means 
for ends.
252 The nineteenth century, according to Keynes, forgot the “fertility of the 
species in a contemplation of the dizzy virtues of compound interest (CW ii, 13). The 
borrowing of psychological categories and the allusions to reproduction concur in 
Keynes’ use of the concept of fetishism.
253 Sexual and economic matters mingle 
conspicuously in the diagnosis of interrupted reproduction of the whole through 
misled desires. With Malthus, proper reproduction was halted by unbound sexual 
desire and the lust for immediate gratification; with Keynes the circuit is interrupted 
through the opposite: the link between deferral and gratification is severed and 
economic man shows his perversion as he loves the substitute instead of the real 
object.
254 He is a sorry figure of civilization. This cultural and moral story is markedly 
different than the one Malthus tells, but it remains a story about similar faults.
255 
                                                 
251 Among the manuscripts of Keynes there are some outlines on a planned book called “An 
Examination of Capitalism”. He notes to himself: “Begin the problem is moral”. The first chapters 
would be devoted to this problem, called “The love of money” (A 2, 1). 
252 “The love of money as possession – as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the 
enjoyments and realities of life – will be recognized for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, 
one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the 
specialists in mental disease” (CW ix, 329). For the appeal of psychoanalytic accounts of money to 
Keynes see (Winslow 1986) 
253 “Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-social than the fetish of liquidity, the 
doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part of investment institutions to concentrate their resources” 
(GT, 155).  
254 “[T]hey fall back on the grant substitute motive, the perfect ersatz, the anodyne for those who, in 
fact, want nothing at all: money” (CW ix, 320). The concept of fetishism Keynes employs bears 
Freudian rather than Marxian traces. While in each case, fetishism is about a form of misrecognition 
and perversion of social order – taking means for ends or confounding social relations and objects – the 
latter is much more about the lack of transparency involved, whereas the latter points to an interrupted 
circulation. See Böhme for an instructive account of the colonial history of concept of fetishism 
(Boehme 2000). 
255 The distance Keynes entertains to the moral story about the threats to material civilization and order 
is no more visible than in the speculations in his General Theory, when he asserts that the reason  “the 
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Instead of defeating the dark forces of time, which needs skill and conviction, the 
economic man is part of an “ignorant mass” flickering in unfounded judgments and 
speculative passions (GT 169).
256 “It needs more intelligence to defeat the forces of 
time and our ignorance of the future than to beat the gun” (GT 157).  We have 
encountered these character-masks before.  
Theories of fetishism tend to project the problematic they diagnose onto a 
single element. Purging this element from society promises then to heal the rift it 
suffers from. Such imagined danger to society is then easily associated with a single 
group of people, who are demonized and stigmatized. The long history of the 
stigmatization of the Jew as the greedy moneylender and passive parasite of a vital 
society testifies to these dangers. Keynes’ anti-semitism is pronounced and he 
repeatedly conjures up the image of the “avaricious jew” (CW ix, 259f) who comes to 
embody the “moral problem of the age”.
257 There is a marked difference between the 
                                                                                                                                             
world after several millennia of steady individual saving, is so poor as it is in accumulated capital-
assets, is to be explained, in my opinion, neither be the improvident propensities of mankind, nor even 
by the destruction of war, but by the high liquidity-premiums formerly attached to the ownership of 
land and now attaching to money” (GT, 242). Whereas Malthus pondered the laborer, whose pleasures 
of gambling and drinking showed that he had no proper senses for the future, Keynes wonders how to 
make gambling less prone to ruin the gambler. Asked in the Royal Commission if gambling would not 
undermine the discipline to work, he answered: “It would be much fairer than the present system if 
fortunes were distributed by lot…I should not have thought it would have any effect” (CW xxviii, 402). 
Gambling is for Keynes only a problem insofar as indulgence in it causes the person great loss of 
money (ibid. 404). 
256 Speculation had a proper role to play, in Keynes view; even more so, since each investment had an 
element of gambling on the fortunes of the future. The problematic aspect of a rising amount of 
speculation resulted from its link to the desire for liquidity (GT, 195, 158).  
257 In his biographical sketch of Einstein, written in 1926, Keynes contrasts him – “He is that kind of 
Jew – the kind which rarely has its head above water, the sweet, tender imps who have not sublimated 
immortality into compound interest” – with “the other kind of Jews, the ones who are not imps but 
serving devils, with small horns, pitch forks, and oily tails. It is not agreeable to see civilization so 
under the ugly thumbs of its impure Jews who have all the money and the power and the brains. I vote 
rather for the plump hausfraus and thick fingered Wandering Birds. The result of which is that Left and 
Right in German politics do not quite mean what we think they mean. The Right is Nationalist, anti-
Semite, anti-Dawes Scheme. The Left is for twisting and turning and lying, and accommodations with 
International Finance and Red Russians and everything” (CW x, 383f). See also Toye on Keynes’ anti-
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two stories. The former one emphasizes conventions, institutions and is open for the 
consideration of power relations, the latter one is a narrative in which culturally flawed 
characters manifest the calamities of the social body. It is unfortunately the latter one, 
which better suited the  “double constitution” that Keynes envisioned and vice versa. 
But it is important to know that another story could be told as well. 
                                                                                                                                             
semitism (Toye 2000, 149f).  
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CHAPTER 6 
PLATO’S HEIRS 
 
The economic machine has broken down – this is how Keynes diagnoses the inter-war 
period (CW ix, 232). In the face of a stock market crash, depression and 
unprecedented unemployment, his contemporaries probably did not need much 
argument in order to concur.  In fact, Keynes admits, the economy had never been a 
properly functioning machine. He asserts that with respect to the nineteenth century 
the economy was more like a “juggernaut” crashing along all the way, while those 
who sat at the “top tier of the machine” could afford to ignore the mishaps of its 
mechanical alignment.
258 While the economy had produced, for the time being, and in 
spite of everything else, the desired material progress, it turned out to be more out of 
sync than ever before – with itself as well as with the prevalent mood of the time, 
which would no longer accept its jumps and leaps.
259 
Keynes’ play with the image of the broken and unyielding machine countered 
                                                 
258 “The idea of the old-world party, that you can, for example alter the value of money and then leave 
the consequential adjustments to be brought about by the forces of supply and demand, belongs to the 
days of fifty or a hundred years ago when trade unions were powerless, and when the economic 
juggernaut was allowed to crash along the highway of progress without obstruction and even with 
applause”. “[N]ot only the facts” he asserts, “but public opinion also have moved a long distance 
away”, in their wish to “control economic forces, so that they do not intolerably interfere with 
contemporary ideas as to what is fit and proper in the interests of social stability and social justice” (CW 
ix, 305f) 
259 “We have changed, by insensible degrees, our philosophy of economic life, or notions of what is 
reasonable and what is tolerable; and we have done this without changing our technique or our 
copybook maxims. Hence our tears and troubles” (CW ix, 306). “[T]he theory of the economic 
juggernaut” “is that wages should be settled by economic pressure, otherwise called ‘hard facts’, and 
that our vast machine should crash along, with regard only to its equilibrium as a whole, and without 
attention to the chance consequences of the journey to individual groups. The gold standard, with its 
dependence on pure change, its faith in ‘automatic adjustments’, and its general regardlessness of social 
detail, is an essential emblem and idol of those who sit in the opt tier of the machine”. It would be 
stupid, Keynes holds, “to apple the principles of an economics…to a society which is rapidly 
abandoning these hypotheses” (CW ix, 224)  
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the inherited image of the machine as the harbinger of rational order, mastery and 
progress – an image that dominated the nineteenth century.
260  The difference between 
Keynes’ position and the beliefs in determinism and laissez-faire is captured in this 
image of the “juggernaut”. Indeed, if one takes Keynes’ account of the nature of 
economic objectivity seriously, the economy could never hope to be a machine. The 
unruly assemblage of different temporalities, governed by hegemonic conventions, 
embodied in things, machines and money, cast by institutional traditions, and 
underwritten by the “haggling of the market” –hardly forms a smoothly arranged 
functional unit, closed upon itself. It resembles more a field of relations, interlaced 
within hegemonic regimes of measurement, and differing by the degree of economy, 
they are subjected to.
261  
Yet, the economy was to become a proper machine - even if it never had been 
one. “The machine” had been “jammed” (CW ix, 129) and needed some conscious 
arrangement:  “[T]oday we have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having 
blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not 
understand”. Economics was to help with that “muddle”, it was “even becoming a 
science”, Keynes announces (ibid. 126f). Since “individualistic capitalism in England 
has come to the point when it can no longer depend on the momentum of mere 
expansion, it must apply itself to the scientific task of improving the structure of its 
economic machine” (ibid. 200). He wishes that the economists would be like 
“dentists”, serving in the solution of the technical problem of economy – that “would 
                                                 
260 See Adas for the cultural role of technology in defining European superiority and the belief that 
mastery of technology manifested its civilizational merits (Adas, 137f). 
261 “[T]here is no machinery for effecting a simultaneous reactionto changes”, Keynes asserts – in this 
particular case he refers to the assumption that reduction of wages and prices would all happen at once, 
keeping the situation as before (CW ix, 211).  
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be splendid!” (ibid. 332).
262 
Such use of the image of the machine, which occurs quite frequently in 
Keynes’ writings, points to his vision of a new double constitution of economy and 
politics: a working machine and its wise governance in the name of the welfare of all. 
But the machine as a visual device to think social order had a different connotation 
this time than its nineteenth-century predecessor.  It did not emphasize automatic and 
uninterrupted working; rather, it pointed prominently to the technician’s hand and the 
necessity of willful control.
263  Keynes’ conception of the machine bears very much 
the signs of the time.  Considering the political movements in the first decades of the 
twentieth century - Lenin’s vanguard party organizing the mechanics of material and 
social progress, Jünger’s vision of organic relations of submission to the machine, 
Sombart’s call for technological efficiency and national strength; Schmitt’s emphasis 
on necessity of political leadership in view of the apparent neutrality of machinic 
organization
264 – the machine was a quite ubiquitous device to envision a political 
rationality and its attendant social body. Keynes use of the image of such “delicate 
                                                 
262 “Our pressing tasks is the elaboration of a new standard system which will justify economists in 
taking their seat beside other scientists” (CW xxviii, 32). 
263 See Blumenberg and Meyer on the different semantic and political implications of the image. 
Metaphors like the machine have a protean nature and it would be quite wrong to assume that there is a 
consistent juxtaposition between the image of the machine and the body throughout the history of its 
use. Blumenberg alludes to this when he asks if the dualism between organic and mechanic is itself a 
production of our historical period. The example he gives in order to point to the quite changing 
meaning of the machine is Lukrez’s machina mundi, which refers to an impressive and astounding 
effect, but not to the immanent perfection of a functional mechanism (Blumenberg 1999, 92f). Meyer 
traces the different uses and accounts of order associated with organisms, machines, organic-machines 
and mechanic organisms. (Meyer 1980) 
264 Russia was for Schmitt a case in point; it demonstrates how the ‘anti-religion’ of technique has been 
taken to task by a strong political leadership, creating a state that is more ‘statist’ than any absolutist 
state has ever been. The more radical brother, Schmitt says, shows what it implies to think technology 
to its conclusion (Schmitt 1996, 80). For an account of Jünger and Sombart see (Herf 1984, 86f and 
147). His discussion of Sombart contains a lucid description of how anti-semitism and the critique of 
capitalism were linked in these writings. Scott describes Lenin’s politics of the vanguard and the 
rationalizing dreams attendant to it (Scott 1998).  
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machine” as the economy entails one elaboration of a specifically liberal political 
rationality.  
That Keynes’ account of economic objectivity did not fall neatly into the cast 
of a smooth and neutral functioning ‘hydraulic Keynesianism’, which introduces the 
economic expert for the neutral and benevolent management of economic order, 
becomes itself an intriguing fact. What are the lines of thought that govern the 
transformation of the field of inquiry about measurement, temporality and convention 
into an economic mechanism on the one hand and expert politics on the other hand? 
What political vision sustains this new ‘double constitution’? What notion of the 
political is implied by it? The quest for order and the imagination of political 
rationalities – this has been the guiding premise of the current project – affects both 
realms at the same time: political vision and accounts of economic objectivity emerge 
in a single stroke. This last chapter on Keynes is thus dedicated to the analysis of the 
political vision that underwrites this particular double constitution. It aims to give an 
overview of the broader concerns that animated this vision,and the particular 
theoretical and rhetorical strategies that allow economy framed as a neutralized and 
technical question yet again. The main contention is that it is the political dream to 
find foundation in a visceral order comprised of affective ties and desires, which 
favors the closure of this field of temporality and measure into a machine under the 
guidance of the ‘economic prince’.
265 The fears of the conundrums of political 
                                                 
265 This is, of course, not only a liberal dream, but also characteristic of the conservative attempts to 
‘make order’ as well. Within liberalism, such a dream stands in relation to the emphasis given to the 
political sphere with its legal encoding of freedom in terms of individual and political rights and the 
pre-eminent role given to the protection of property. There is pretension or hope in the liberal tradition 
to have thereby sufficiently dealt with the question of freedom, power and material existence. But a 
plethora of power relations and disciplinary techniques have been implicitly or explicitly included in 
order to work underneath the political sphere of rights, creating a rather particular form of order in 
juxtaposition to the claims of a universally guaranteed and most extended actualization of freedom. 
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judgment about questions of power and freedom pertaining to the “order of things” are 
at once settled and sealed in such foundation.
266 While Keynes sought to break 
radically with the economic thought of the nineteenth century – at least its dominant 
and deterministic aspects – he not only remained close to the political horizon it 
carried with it but also was carried by. It was his encompassing political vision that 
made him prefer the economic machine. 
Keynes’ political vision was thoroughly steeped in the tradition of English 
liberalism; he saw himself as part of a long intellectual heritage, connecting Locke and 
Hume, Burke and Malthus.
267 Liberalism was for him, as for the dominant self-
understanding of political culture in Britain in general, a trait of English national 
character.
268 It was so encompassing that he grouped almost the whole political 
spectrum under its name; even the young communists whom he “liked” and 
                                                                                                                                             
They seem to be especially welcomed in the liberal political vision, for, they maintain its commitment 
to freedom and its fear of the political passions and insecure foundations of political judgment at the 
same time. 
266 Very rarely does Keynes put the matter in terms of power, as for example, when he refers to the 
“cumulative oppressive power” linked to the “scarcity value of capital”, meaning nothing else than the 
measure imposed by the money-rate of interest elaborated in the previous chapter (GT, 376). He does 
explicitly refers to relations of power in the context of international relation, which will be discussed 
later in the text, but these allusions do not lead to a substantial theoretical effort, to think the question of 
power in conjunction with the specificity of “economic temporalities” and their institutional 
manifestations. That this question is not only left open, but also is not properly posed, is due to Keynes’ 
political vision of Keynes, as will be shown in the following. 
267 As Keynes writes in his biographical account of Malthus, the intellectual tradition of “Locke, Hume, 
Adam Smith, Paley, Bentham, Darwin and Mill” – a company “to which Malthus belongs” contains “an 
extraordinary continuity of feeling” (CW x, 86).. The tradition combined, so enumerates at another 
point, “the conservative individualism of Locke, Hume, Johnson, and Burke with the socialism and 
democratic egalitarianism of Rousseau, Paley, Bentham and Godwin” (CW ix, 274f). It would not be 
wrong to locate Keynes’ sympathies with the first half of this combination. 
268 Colls gives a good overview of this assumption that it was “the good fortune of the English to have 
the idealist-historicist mix deep within themselves. Self-help and the freedom it engendered might 
indeed be a universal quality, but it also had to be quintessentially English. Freedom… has in all times 
been a marked feature in the English character, and furnishes the true measure of our power as a nation” 
(Colls 1986a, 35).  
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“respected”, were in some sense liberal descendents.
269  Liberalism in England was 
about tradition, paternalism, reform and civilization as much as it was about the praise 
of property, rights and individual judgment in personal matters. The strong emphasis 
on inheritance and cultural-political tradition gave English liberalism its specific 
conservative taste.  Edmund Burke’s writings are exemplary in this respect. His 
defense of a nationally tangible and culturally rooted freedom against the ‘abstraction’ 
of rights of the French revolution won out in the articulation of English liberal ethos 
for the nineteenth century, which coupled forthwith property rights with aristocratic 
difference, the valuation of eccentric individualism with admiration for custom and the 
utilitarian zeal for reform.
270  It was indeed Burke to whom Keynes resorted as the 
intellectual authority in political matters; he treasured him as “perhaps the only 
political writer, the direct bearing of whose works is wholly topical and 
contemporary” (UA 20/3/1, 4).  
Burke, Keynes explained to the Apostles – this secret society of Cambridge 
scholars, of which he was a member – “laid bear the fallacies of those philosophers 
who saw intrinsic merit in institutions and methods of government and forbade us to 
translate our doubtful means into the securer position of intrinsic goods.”
271  Burke 
                                                 
269 “I believe that the real convictions of at least three-quarters of the country to-day 
are…liberal….There is no one in politics to-day worth sixpence outside the ranks of liberals except the 
post-war generation of intellectual Communists under thirty-five. Them, too, I like and respect. Perhaps 
in their feelings and instincts they are the nearest thing we now have to the typical nervous 
nonconformist English gentleman who went to the Crusades, made the Reformation, fought the Great 
Rebellion, won us our civil and religious liberties and humanized the working classes last century” (A 
39, 2). 
270 Its counterpart would have been the radical democratic reading of liberalism, as presented by Paine. 
Arendt points out that “the concept of inheritance, applied to the very nature of liberty, has been the 
ideological basis from which English nationalism received its curious touch of race-feeling ever since 
the French Revolution…Without encroaching upon the rights of the privileged class within the English 
nation, Burke enlarged the principles of these privileges to include the whole English people, 
establishing them as a kind of nobility among nations” (Arendt 1994, 176).  
271 The quote continues as follows “In fact the various enthusiasms for man and for mankind which 
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“did not look to establish his ultimate goods by political considerations; those he 
sought for elsewhere; the science of politics is with him a doctrine of means, the 
theoretical part of a device intended to facilitate the attainment of various private 
goods by the individual members of the community. It is his antagonism to those who 
maintain that there are certain ends of a political nature, universally and intrinsically 
desirable” (UA 20/3/1, 9). Thus, “we cannot, in fact, set before ourselves anything 
more particular than general welfare” (UA 37, 3).  
Keynes aligns himself with this dislike of the political as being of “intrinsic 
excellence”. It is important to clarify the meaning given in this context to this notion 
of the political. On the one hand, it refers to “political ideals in the remote future”.
272 It 
is the utopian content of a politically envisioned scheme, against which Keynes levels 
– with Burke - his doubts. The organization of the social is so complex and the final 
aims of radical change so far ahead that epistemologically and ethically it is 
problematic to incur grave sacrifices for such insecure benefits
273. The cautious 
hesitation in respect to the effects of revolutionary overhaul colors his attitude towards 
the communist political program and the radical and violent change it announces.
274  
                                                                                                                                             
have animated thinkers in the past have usually had for their basis a belief in the efficacy of some 
doctrine which would go far towards achieving its object,  if only its value and its truth were widely or 
universally perceived” (UA 37, 2f). “It has been thought that some alteration in the recognized theory of 
politics leading to a change in political institutions, or in political method and organization would 
automatically lead to the millennium” (ibid). 
272 “It has been thought that some alteration in the recognized theory of politics leading to a change in 
political institutions, or in political method and organization would automatically lead to the 
millennium. There is, it is argued a certain intrinsic virtue in particular institutions that can make men 
good. And the true believer points to our halfheartedness to-day as largely due to our skepticisms 
regarding the existence of any such ultimate or paramount ends of a political nature (UA 37, 3). 
273 “Our power of prediction is so slight, our knowledge of remote consequences so uncertain that it is 
seldom wise to sacrifice a present benefit for a doubtful advantage in the future. Burke ever held, and 
held rightly, that it can seldom be right to sacrifice the well-being of a nation for a generation…for the 
sake of a supposed millennium in the comparatively remote future (UA 20/3/1, 18). 
274 “But what counsel of hope can revolution offer to sufferers from economic privation which does not 
arise out of the injustices of distribution but is general” asks Keynes (CW ix, 31) and certainly hopes 
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Reform was his preferred form of change, very much in concurrence with the liberal 
tradition he wanted to propel into the future. This was, he admitted, “somewhat dull 
and uninspiring” and very much oriented to “choosing means calculated to deal with 
the peculiar circumstances of the day” (UA 37, 4). But it was also approriate to the 
situation, where the grand recipes for change were not convincing and the matters 
seemed to be too complex to answer to violence.
275  But the cautious attitude was itself 
to be treated with caution, Keynes noted, and Burke was rather too timid.
276 Indeed, to 
                                                                                                                                             
that his General Theory could give the proper counsel. Keynes consistently posited intellectual 
erudition, thought and ideas against the danger of ‘war between the classes’, revolution and bitter strife. 
“The revolution is to be a supreme example of the means justify by the end. The soldier of the 
revolution must crucify his own human nature, becoming unscrupulous and ruthless, and suffering 
himself a life without security or joy – but as a means to his purpose and not its end” (CW ix, 259). 
Those calling for revolution and those calling for the “economic juggernaut” were both under the spell 
of a badly thought theory: “I ask Shaw and Stalin to allow the possibility that mere intellectual 
cogitation may have something to contribute to the solution, and also that their traditional interpretation 
does not fit the present facts…Shaw has forgotten that he and Stalin are just as completely under the 
intellectual dominance of that standard system [of economics] as Asquith and Inge. The system bred 
two families – those who thought it true and inevitable, and those who thought it true and intolerable. 
There was no third school of thought in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, there is a third possibility 
– that it is not true” (CW xxviii, 32). Against Trotsky he maintains most clearly that the lack of proper 
vision is the root of the political question, not force: “He [Trotsky] assumes that the moral and 
intellectual problems of the transformation of society have been already solved – that a plan exists, and 
that nothing remains except to put it into operation…Trotsky’s book must confirm us in our conviction 
of the uselessness, the empty-headedness of force at the present stage of human affairs. Force would 
settle nothing – no more in the class war than in the wars of nations or in the wars of religion. An 
understanding of the historical process, to which Trotsky is so fond of appealing, declares not for, but 
against, force at this juncture of things. We lack more than usual a coherent scheme of progress, a 
tangible ideal….The next move is with the head, and fists must wait (CW x, 66f). About the power of 
ideas, Keynes promises, “I am sure that the power of vested interests I vastly exaggerated compared 
with the gradual encroachment of ideas…soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are 
dangerous for good or evil” (GT, 383f).  
275 In a talk given to the Apostles under the title “Have we panacea?” Keynes summarizes the political 
state of mind as it presents itself to him: “We have probed political philosophy to its depth, but we have 
triumphed – we believe in nothing whatever…and find the world the colder for our lack of clothes…In 
fact the various enthusiasms for man and mankind which have animated thinkers in the past have 
usually had for their basis a belief in the efficacy of some doctrine which would go far towards 
achieving its object” (UA 37, 1f). 
276 “But Burke’s timidity was often extreme to the point of absurdity; it is true that human laws and 
customs are closely interdependent and form a whole of the utmost complexity. But Burke was often as 
anxious for the outworks as for the central structure itself…which the most innocent innovation might 
disturb” (UA 20/3/1, 42).  
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Keynes’ mind, allegiance to Burke’s unconditional commitment to the laws of 
property and scarcity could hardly offer inspiration for the beginning of the twentieth 
century.
277 According to Keynes, some change and some overhaul of outworn 
conventions and traditions had to happen.  Burke’s philosophical stance, his cautious 
and circumspect attitude towards the complexity of the social organism, required the 
political leader at his side to induce change and the passion for it.  Although Keynes 
exhibited reservation with respect to respect to the Russian revolutions, he also had a 
profound estimation for the political energy they mobilized and the qualities of 
leadership of Lenin or Stalin under which they were eventually concentrated.
278 When 
one sifts through his writings it becomes apparent that the skepticism of Keynes 
towards political schemes of change and experimentation was very much dependent 
on the question of whose auspices they unfolded under. Russia was thus at once 
cherished as a place of bold experimentation and inspiration, and feared as the country 
being “in the hands of the most incompetent and ignorant members of the population”, 
                                                 
277 Keynes approves in part of Burke’s plea against the “greater equalization of wealth”, [b]ut its 
validity is very much less when it is directed against any attempt whatever to influence the channels in 
which wealth flows or to regulate either its management or its distribution…All this is a matter of great 
complexity and difficulty…, but Burke’s treatment is wholly inadequate and he seems to convince 
himself in passages which certainly ought to convince nobody else” (UA 20/3/1, 28f). 
278 “The leaders, in Russia as elsewhere, were politicians not economists…The histories of revolution 
contain nothing more remarkable or more coldly and splendidly glittering than the carrier of Nicholas 
[sic] Lenin, now closing, not in capitulation or eclipse but in clouds of physical weakness…By 1921…it 
was safe for Lenin to embark his administration on the slope of compromise known as the new 
economic policy. The myths had done their work, and it was now clear that, whatever the future held, 
the old regime was permanently destroyed. The infamous was wiped out and its record rubbed away. In 
the evolutionary struggle one kind of beast had become extinct, and Lenin’s work was done” (CW xvii, 
437).  In a review of Webb’s book on Russia he comments approvingly: “There is little or nothing left 
which bears any special relation to Marx and Marxism as distinguished form other systems of socialism. 
They are engaged in the vast administrative task of making a completely new set of social institutions 
work smoothly and successfully…Methods are still changing rapidly in response to experience. The 
largest scale empiricism and experimentalism which has ever been attempted by disinterest 
administrators is in operation” (CW xxviii, 334). Here Burke’s view on government and politics and 
socialist Russia conjoin with respect to administrative experiment for the sake of welfare.  
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which just adds to the “incapacity of Russians in organization and administration” (FI 
4, 9). The “stupidity” of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” was to him a worse assault 
than the reference to autocratic control in itself – likewise, the fact that the “inner ring” 
of the conservative party in Britain “can almost dictate the details and the technique of 
policy” spoke in its favor (CW ix, 295). The worries about misleading political 
judgment and overambitious passions had thus a very circumscribed social location: 
the masses, erupting discontented from their lot and having nothing in mind but 
“jealousies” and demands to “gratify their passions” (ibid).  
These were old and persistent fears, known to Burke and Malthus as well as to 
Keynes and his contemporaries; we have already encountered them in the previous 
chapters. The skepticism towards the virtues of the political, which Burke pronounced 
and which Keynes adopted, are very much tied to these fears and relate not only to the 
disbelief in the possibilities of a radical overhaul in the face of the inscrutable 
complexity of human matters.
279 While those are certainly reminders of general import 
against the self-indulgence of transparent rationality or single-handed attempts to 
design the new, they remain here in the context of the suspicions about the exercise of 
political judgment by the many.
280 Against those suspicions, the liberal and 
conservative tradition tended towards the virtues of a visceral mode of order. It seems 
to be absurd to Keynes to hold that “no good which government can provide compares 
                                                 
279 Burke’s fault of “pushing matters too far”, and thereby falsifying the element of truth in his theory, 
retired to the background, so Keynes, where his “practical precepts of government and the place that the 
democratic elements ought to hold” are concerned (UA 20/3/1, 38). 
280 Keynes qualified his judgment of democracy as follows: “Democracy is still on its trial, but so far 
has not disgraced itself…The temper, which Burke feared, may be better restrained and modified by a 
means of expression, than by confinement under an authority however well-intentioned…it is an aspect 
that cannot be overlooked in weighing the advantages of the system (UA 20/3/1, 62). But he also 
maintained, that “there is not very general a priori probability of arriving at desirable results by 
submitting to the decision of a vast body of persons, who are individually wholly incompetent to deliver 
a rational judgment on the affair at issue” (UA 20/3/1, 60).  
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in intrinsic excellence with the mere possession of direct political power. Burke’s 
arguments fall to the ground if we admit that one of the best possible things in the 
world is the possession by the bulk of the people of the power of immediately carrying 
into effect whatever they will, and of directly supervising their own affairs, regardless 
of the nature of their desires or of their performances” (UA 20 3 1, 55). While the 
many, of course, must have “some general control over the end of government”, “the 
selection of particular means and policies must be wholly beyond their competence”, 
“their transient will and their uncertain judgment” (ibid. 57).  Good government is 
rather about governing the existing passions to a proper end – as, for example, the 
“money-making passion” Keynes talks about at the end of the General Theory.  Hume, 
with his emphasis on the passions as the ground for order, stands out as the common 
antecedent of Malthus and Keynes: All that “moralists or politicians” “can pretend to 
is to give a new direction to those natural passions” (Hume 1948, 86). Thus the “task 
of managing human nature” by “wise and prudent statesmanship” is to reckon with 
existing opinions and passions, allowing the game to be played, but limiting its worse 
effects (GT 372).
281  
Keynes describes Burke “politically” as a utilitarian.
282  This should have been 
ground for disapproval, if one considers how intense Keynes’ theoretical opposition to 
the utilitarian aspects of the liberal tradition was in other respects.
283  But Keynes finds 
                                                 
281 This view on ‘government’ finds confirmation in comments Keynes makes on various issues.  
282 “Politically he may without serious inadequacy, be described as a utilitarian; for, with the exceptions 
of an occasional lapse, he sets before him the happiness of the community as the sole and ultimate end 
of government. But ethically he can in no wise claim to have anticipated his distinguished 
contemporary” (UA 20/3/1, 10). He is one of the “earliest exponents of a modified political 
utilitarianism” (ibid. 21). 
283 (CW x, 445f). Utilitarianism, as mentioned before, designated for Keynes, on the one hand, the 
“mythical system” of complete knowledge and, on the other hand, the prevalence of economy and the 
“treasury view” with respect to the whole of civilization.  
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that the “doctrines of utilitarianism” “do not form an unsatisfactory basis to a political 
theory [emphasis added, ut]” (UA 20 3 1, 84)
284. Attention to the passions and opinion 
as existing with “mercy and moderation” would enlarge the “efficient power” and 
increase the “general happiness (ibid. 42).
285  “Traditions and prejudices” support 
society, and “duties” define those rules, which, though not immutable”, have such a 
general validity “that they ought to be obeyed as universally as if they were 
themselves universal. We may accept the experience of the race in certain matters – in 
fact we ought so to accept it – and not all cases of action ought to be decided by us 
individually” (UA 22 1, 2f). “In social life duty is our method”, Keynes asserts in a 
paper directed to the question of whether such duties are about to change together with 
the “social organism” and its “colossal mechanisms” to apply “human energy” (ibid. 
4).
286 It is a question posed from the beyond of this machine: “We are not in the grip 
of the machine, but we consume its products; we have hardly any duties” (ibid. 7). But 
it does not give reason “to ignore the outside world, real life – London, and New York 
and Paris and Vienna, whose fortunes are made and tragedies are enacted, …where 
some are hungry and others are cruel and rapacious…because they are in the grip of 
the machine” (ibid.). Caught within means and ends, duties and mechanisms, the 
“social organism” requires proper utilitarian government.  But “the first and greatest 
                                                 
284 “It was known before Burke’s time that government ought to aim at the happiness of the community, 
but there were innumerable minor aims and so-called rights that eternally stood in the way and occupied 
the minds and energies of men. It is by virtue of these ‘rights’ that tyranny slips in; and where tyranny 
has been kept out, legality in administration has usurped the place of morality” (ibid. 84).  
285 About the appropriate form of judgment in respect to political issues, Keynes maintains: “The only 
practicable course is to form a judgment of probability based on our view of the temper of the country, 
its motives and ideals, its public opinion in the broadest sense, and the sort of people likely to be in 
power from time  to time in the near future. It is on such a judgment, and on such a judgment alone, that 
we can arrive at a reasonable conclusion whether we wish this country to be strong or weak” (CW 
xxviii, 52).  
286 “It may be possible, a hundred years hence, to investigate for …the influence of railways on 
morality” (ibid. 7).  
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prophet of ends, Plato, will remain the prophet of those who live apart of the machine” 
(ibid. 9f). The Plato of the Dialogues did not teach the art of “statecraft” for the 
machine and its ascendancy to the world of ends.
287 The “political and social dreamer” 
of the “school of Plato” needs the economists to give him a “platform from which his 
imagination can leap” (CW xxviii, 32): an ‘economic prince’, so to speak, to assists 
the philosopher king, in order to steer the whole. He is to announce what is 
“economically sound” in order to lead the way for affording what is “economically 
unsound” – enjoyed by a few at first but promised for the many
288 - in order to reach 
the “Ideal Republic” (PS 5, 114).
289  
The field of what is “economically sound” provides the economic prince with 
his role and circumscribes his elaboration of modes of governing. It remains a 
question, however, what hides behind this phrase. The orthodox theory has been found 
wanting. “Laissez-faire” appeared like a belief-system, more fitting a political utopia 
than a depiction of ‘economic reality’, which certainly could not claim the status of 
science: “Economists no longer have any link with the theological or political 
philosophies out of which the dogma of social harmony was born, and their scientific 
analysis leads them to no such conclusions (CW ix, 281).
290  What formerly belonged 
                                                 
287 Keynes’ had mentioned in his “Early Beliefs”, that he and his friends lived in the world of Plato’s 
Dialogues, but had not reached the Republic, let alone the Laws. (CW x, 445). 
288 This is Keynes’ definition of socialism: “For my part I would define the Socialist Program thus: To 
obtain political power with a view to doing what is economically sound in order that the community 
may become rich enough to afford what is economically unsound”.  He considers economically sound 
“improvements in organization” desirable because they increase wealth; economically unsound ones 
may have the opposite effect (PS 5, 109f). 
289 Also Malthus and Marshall referred to Plato – is it that many economists have a special liking for 
Plato, who sought to find the device for the good, the true and the beautiful residing above the well-
ordered social body. Keynes’ reports about Marshall that he had planned to write a book on Plato’s 
republic, trying to imagine what kind of Republic that Plato would wish for had he lived in Marshall’s 
time (CW x, 231). 
290 Again, the “Utilitarians” bore the main guilt, as it was they “who admitted Hume’s egoism and 
Bentham’s egalitarianism” at the same time. The “popularity of the doctrine” of laissez-faire “must be 
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to the absolutely un-affordable turns out to be ‘economically sound’ – in contrast to 
the “penny-wisdom of Gladstonian finance” (GT 362).  The epistemology of scarcity, 
deemed to regulate the social body into material civilization, could not be relied on 
any further as the sole means to fashion the “social duties” and the progress of the 
“machine”.  The body politic was required to “have the welfare of the giraffes at 
heart” and not to overlook “the sufferings of the shorter necks” or the “evil look of 
anxiety or struggling greediness which overcasts the mild faces of the herd” (CW ix, 
285), while, at the same time, not making the “possibility of rising…too easy (UA 6 
15, 44).  Even the conventions of finance and the treasury – so criticized from the 
point of view of new “ideas and methods of government” – had to be recognized as 
“essential bulwark against overwhelming wickedness” to be retained so that there “is 
no positive waste; that money is drawn away upon useless activities” (PS 2, 81f).
291  
The firmness of the ground of what is ‘economically sound’ and the technical 
expertise attending to it seem to be much more uncertain than the metaphors of 
“dentists” or “electricians” suggest (CW xxviii, 32). The epistemology proper to the 
guidance of the social body is thus not translatable into a formalized system. The more 
delicate the ‘machine’, the more delicate its knowledge: “The object of our analysis is 
not to provide a machine, or method of blind manipulation, which will furnish an 
                                                                                                                                             
laid at the door of the political philosophers of the day…rather than of the political economists” (CW x, 
278) In Keynes’ manuscript an instructive set of notes can be found about the politicians’ desire for 
rules as simple as the ones laissez-faire presents. Keynes quotes Dugald Stewart with the following 
words (the topic is the administration of Colbert): “…under the shelter of a few general principles, a 
systematical politician enjoys a perpetual calm. By the help of one alone, that of a perfect liberty of 
trade, he would govern the world…he insists that the result cannot be judged of till after a century or 
two shall have elapsed. If his contemporaries, in consequence of the disorder into which he has thrown 
public affairs are scrupulous about submitting quietly to the experiment, he accuses them of 
impatience” (A 2, 58).  
291 Behind all of the conventions of finance lay, after all, so Keynes, “a large measure of wisdom” and 
“protection against ill-regulated enthusiasms” (ibid.).  
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infallible answer, but to provide ourselves with an organized and orderly method of 
thinking out particular problems” (GT 297).
292  The ‘economic prince’ had indeed to 
be all at once – the statesman, the philosopher and the economist – in order to be 
properly concerned with the “economic system as a whole”, that is, with the proper 
order of the body politic (GT 340).  
The vision of order that Keynes procured against the failed epistemology of 
economy molded itself into the prevalent political currency of the time: the nationally 
framed body politic. The cohesion of the national body politic was to be fashioned in 
terms of culture, civilization and affection – while the ‘logic of economy’ had to be 
complemented with a political perspective geared towards stitching the breaks within 
it. For Keynes, the questions of measure, convention and institution did not invite a 
general elaboration of political reason that would be able to put the questions of 
freedom and power towards the ‘order of things’; instead it required the good 
judgment of the ‘economic prince’ for the right measure, all things already considered 
and all institutional wit already applied. For those comprising the body politic what 
mattered was “bread and circus” – something, which the ancients knew, but which was 
unfortunately forgotten over the course of the nineteenth century (CW xxviii, 341). 
The “duty and purpose, the honour and glory of the state” was even taken to be 
uneconomic to finance.  Keynes complains about the “dreadful heresy” of the 
“utilitarian, economic and financial ideal”, which “has ever gained the ear of a 
civilized people”. In addition to providing monuments of “dignity and beauty”, and to 
                                                 
292 The appropriate knowledge of economy was made in between “the caterpillar of a moral scientist” 
and a “chrysalis of an historian”, Keynes’ praise of Malthus seems to suggest (CW x, 107). In his 
biographical sketch of Newton, Keynes emphasizes his “muscles of intuition, being the strongest and 
most enduring with which a man has ever been gifted”, while his formal proofs had just been “dressed 
up afterwards”, without being “instruments of discovery”. Newton was rather a “magician”, looking at 
the universe as a riddle, than he was a sober, rationally proceeding scientist (CW x, 365, 366).   
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transforming “the south banks of London” into the “most magnificent, the most 
commodious and healthy working-class quarters in the world”, it was vitally important 
to finance “ephemeral ceremonies, shows and entertainments, in which the common 
man can take his delight and recreation after his work is done, and which can make 
him feel, as nothing else can, that he is one with, and part of, a community, finer, more 
gifted, more spending, more care-free than he can be by himself” (ibid. 343f). These 
“mass emotions” could be “exceedingly dangerous”, but capitalist democracies were 
weakened by their lack and the “solidity of our institutions”, Keynes worried, might be 
thus undermined.
293  
But the “false gods” of hostile nationalism were not what Keynes had in mind 
after the end of the First World War. The reference to the nation-state belongs rather to 
a changed “geo-political” imagination, directed at once towards re-figuring internal 
and external relations.  Esty aptly suggests understanding the General Theory as one 
among other “self-conscious attempts of modernist writers in the 1930s” to “recover a 
usable core of English national culture from the derelict body of British imperialism”: 
“Keynesian economics, then, can be seen as both a representative case and a cause 
agent within a larger intellectual transformation that brought the concept of social 
totality from the imperial periphery back to the national center” (Esty 2000).  This new 
“social totality” emerged vis-à-vis the changed international context: the waning 
strength of empire and the rising dominance of the United States.  It is not that Keynes 
envisioned Britain without its networks of empire or the commonwealth, but that the 
European nations would have to cease nourishing the imperialist strife between them, 
                                                 
293 This piece, titled ‘The arts and the State’, was written in 1936.  The success of the “authoritarian 
states” in garnering the emotional support of their citizens was the background of Keynes’ argument 
and figured as a negative template (ibid. 347).  
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which, if unchecked, would reproduce the danger of a new war carried overseas (W 6 
1, 53).  In a secret proposal from 1941 for an international currency unit, Keynes 
writes that the idea that the British Commonwealth could “stand safely” on its own 
feet with enough “economic solidarity within” harbored the danger of “isolating us 
from the United States” without “real security that we had constructed a reliable 
economic unit within the Empire” (W 6 1, 78). The debtor-position Britain was facing 
after the two World Wars and the necessities and difficulties of procuring the financial 
resources from the United States in its wake framed much of Keynes’ thinking about a 
new international order.
294  The Empire and the dominant British position therein 
could not obtain much support, financial or otherwise, from the United States.
295 
Schumpeter once said that Keynes’ advice was in the first instance “always English 
advice, born of English problems” (Schumpeter 1952, 274). But he also knew that “it 
is not with our problems of ways and means that idealistic and internationally-minded 
Americans will be particularly concerned”, and he thought that it is strategically and 
substantially most wise to “collaborate with them to larger ends”: “The assistance for 
which we can hope must be indirect and a consequence of setting the world as a whole 
on its feet and of laying the foundations of a sounder political economy between all 
nations” (W 6 1, 76f). This did not challenge the special relation of Britain to its 
                                                 
294 “Only since the German War has the United States disputed with Asia the right to wear the ass’s ears 
of Midas” (CW xxviii, 227f). Against the hostility of the Bank of England to the compromise worked 
out with the United States about the financial help after the war, Keynes states the structures of 
dependencies he perceived: “They do not allow for the fact that our post-war domestic policies are 
impossible without further American assistance. They do not allow for the fact that the Americans are 
strong enough to offer inducements to many or most of our friends to walk out on us, if we 
ostentatiously set out to start up an independent shop” (cit. in Skidelsky 2003, 751). 
295 Much of the needed finance for World War II “went into defining the Empire against Germany and 
Italy in the Middle East and against Japan in the far East…Britain would start the peace not just with an 
export trade 30 per cent of  pre-war, but with approximately …$14bn of external debt – the largest in its 
history” (Skidelsky 2003, 634). About Keynes’ role in negotiating the financial support from the States 
see (ibid., 669f.).   
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Empire or newly baptized commonwealth for Keynes.
296 Rather, it shows that the 
quest for a “sounder political economy between all nations” was foremost in 
answering the problem of financial dependence newly experienced by Britain itself. 
This was the site where he most explicitly and most publicly reflected about the 
question of power and the desire for freedom to experiment with modes of life with 
respect to economic matters. Already after the First World War, he warned that a 
“huge scale of indebtedness between governments has special dangers”, creating 
“paper shackles” and binding the interests of creditor nations to a “particular type of 
government or economic organization” in the debtor countries: “entangling alliances 
or entangling leagues are nothing to the entanglements of cash owing” (CW ix, 26). 
The gold standard had been another financial entanglement that dictated a certain 
measure of ‘economy’ in a nation that might require another (Treatise, 255; 276f); it 
limited unduly the “powers of the central bank to deal with its own domestic situation” 
(ibid.). Much of Keynes’ energies during the last years went into designing an 
international monetary regime that would mitigate the immediate dependencies and 
uniformity commanded by an ‘automatic standard’ that linked “rigidly the City and 
Wall Street” (CW ix, 198).
297  
But within the body of the nation the question of power relations or freedom to 
experiment, however limited they have already been framed in terms of two already 
                                                 
296 One instance might serve to illustrate how Keynes assumed Empire as an unquestioned frame: in 
1938 he produced a note on the “policy of government storage of food stuff and raw materials”, 
suggesting that the British government should “offer storage to  all Empire producers” free of charge, 
hoping to produce a steady input and price of these materials. In addition it would be a “gain to our 
prestige…and security…an accumulation which others could not afford to imitate” (PS 6, 244).   
297 “If gold and short credits and foreign bonds can flow without restriction or risk of loss backwards 
and forwards across the Atlantic, fluctuations of given magnitude will produce on us effects altogether 
disproportionate…it would be a mistake to believe that in the long run they will, or ought to, manage 
their affairs to suit our convenience” (ibid. 199).  
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constituted national bodies encountering each other on the international scene, was not 
asked, but subsumed in the right measure given by the ‘economic prince’.  It was, as 
elucidated before, a comprehensive moral-political measure as it had in view the 
making of a visceral, affective order. The question of freedom pertaining to modes of 
life – and not exclusively to individual rights as the liberal framework suggests - lay 
beyond it, but apparently it was not out of reach. In the speech “Prospects for our 
Grandchildren”, given in 1930 in the midst of the slump, Keynes announced that 
“mankind is solving its economic problem” “within a hundred years”, which means 
“that the economic problem is not – if we look into the future – the permanent 
problem of the human race” (CW ix, 325f).  Free from “pressing economic cares” and 
the “delicate machine”, it seems as if the “Ideal Republic” would now dawn for 
everybody; for now only a few as the “advance guard” are “spying out the promised 
land” (ibid. 328).  Living in such promised land, Keynes warns, will force man to face 
“his real, his permanent problem: how to use his freedom, how to occupy his leisure, 
how to enjoy his abundance and how to “cultivate” the “art of life” (ibid.).  This is a 
problem that Keynes assumes to cause a “nervous breakdown”, already experienced 
by the “wives of the well-to-do classes”, who prove unable to live without “the spur of 
economic necessity” (ibid. 327).  Mankind, “deprived of its traditional purpose” when 
the economic problem is solved, might present a “depressive picture” (ibid. 328).  
As depressing, one might wonder, as Kojeve‘s depiction of the dangers of 
post-historical life in which “Americans appear as rich Chinese Soviets”, representing 
the arrival in the “eternal present” after the march through history has been fulfilled, 
and the return of man to animality appears a pending prospect.  The ‘philosophy of 
history’ of the nineteenth century asserts itself yet again and economic and 
philosophical elaborations of the status of man and his orders conjoin. Foucault’s 
dictum that man has a history because he is finite can here be asserted with its full  
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argumentative weight: between the original scarcity and the promised land, history – 
or rather the philosophy of history - unfolds itself.  Malthus, Ricardo, Marx, Mill and 
Keynes – to name only a few – are in entire agreement in this respect. Keynes might 
have wanted to knock the Ricardian foundations of Marxism away, and Marx might 
have wanted to put as much distance as possible between him and Malthus.  For all of 
them history was made between lack and abundance. True freedom was to be had, if at 
all, only in the end; it was something still to come, while the fear of halting the march 
towards civilization, the necessity to succumb to its course, or the dread of its boredom 
run as an undercurrent to these prospects. This historical line of material progress had 
different shades, and it would be wrong to align Marx and Keynes too closely under 
its heading. But is it too bold to see in Keynes’ depiction of the ‘promised land’ and its 
question of freedom the unwitting and inverse exposition of the attempts to devise a 
political rationality that projects scarcity as its innermost kernel and most imaginary 
point of cohesion?  Does not the anonymous writer to Keynes point in satirical and 
witty ways to this project of making order through economy and scarcity when he 
addresses him in the following words: “Dear Malthus…It was you and your school 
who from 1789 onwards exalted work and childbearing into virtues and so disturbed 
nature’s balance. If men work, women labour. If men are idle, women are too. Paris 
lives up to it” (CW xix, 142).
298  
A politics of time then abstracts the promise from the “tunnel of economic 
necessity”--from “daylight” (CW ix, 331). It cordons off the sphere where questions of 
power and freedom can effectively be asked from the sphere governed by interlacing 
desires, visceral ties, and necessity, all of which answer to the kernel of ever-present 
                                                 
298 (Keynes 1971b) here abbreviated as (CW xix).  
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and ever-evanescent scarcity. “The time for all this is not yet. For at least another 
hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and to everyone that fair is foul and foul is 
fair; for foul is useful and fair is not”. Only then, “we shall be free” to discard “all 
kinds of social customs and economic practices…which we now maintain at all costs, 
however distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves” (ibid. 331; 329).  
The neutrality and technical expertise of the “economic prince” hinge on this 
maintenance of ‘necessity’ and ‘scarcity’ as the points of flight for order.  He is 
leading the last steps through the “tunnel”. The critique of scarcity, as the regulatory 
epistemology of the social body, the questions of convention and power that Keynes 
posed, were not maintained in their theoretical potential but were subsumed in a 
historical narrative of development.
299 Scarcity was its point of commencement and 
economic men had been well-placed for the time being. They had a historical duty to 
fulfill: to “carry us all along with them into the lap of economic abundance” (CW ix, 
328). It only turned out that their virtues had become insufficient: the social body was 
more “sclerotic” and less apt to be propelled further by the striving for only but the 
highest gains and, worst of all, the descendants of the powerful makers of the world 
were anything but impressive – the ‘economic prince’ enters onto the historical stage.  
The Theoretical Temptation of Money and the Levers of Economy 
The limits to the ontology of scarcity are thus historical and developmental, which 
means the search for the levers of a visceral mode of ordering the social body must be 
redirected. But they were geared neither towards the exploration of the intimate links 
                                                 
299 Keynes adopts the categorization of an “eminent American economist, Professor Commons” in order 
to distinguish the era of scarcity from the era of abundance and its subsequent stabilization (CW ix, 
303f).   
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between economic objectivity and political rationality, nor to the play of power and 
freedom within it. Therefore, Keynes’ announcement, that his General Theory was to 
encompass the orthodox tradition as its special case (GT vii) exposes here its full 
political meaning. The more general perspective had to be able, Keynes emphasizes 
again and again, to think ‘the economy as a whole’ (GT 340). It is a perspective of 
“statecraft”, but it is not about opening the economy towards the concerns of the 
political, here understood to include the potential for contention. The whole that 
Keynes delineates is about “output” and “employment”, nothing more or less.
300 The 
aim of the general theory is to get a hold on those levers that would be able to 
integrate the “waste” (CW ix, 93) of unemployment and the “fetish of liquidity” into a 
well-tempered social body, to mitigate its excesses and to give each individual its 
place.  The measure of economy appropriate to the social body depended on the 
judgment of the prince: more “distribution” or more “capital”, more immediacy or 
more deferral, more dissipating consumption or more accumulation – these were the 
options contained in such a vision of the whole (GT 368f). The simultaneous task and 
threat of scarcity was its horizon. “As Hayek put it to Keynes: ‘It is reassuring to know 
that we agree so completely on the economics of scarcity, even if we differ on when it 
applies’” (cit. Skidelsky, 2003, 589). 
To achieve all this, the ‘economic prince’ had one main lever: money. It has its 
flaws as a lever, Keynes admits, it might not have the desired effects.
301  Yet, it is a 
tempting device: “[T]here is no part of our economic system which works so badly as 
                                                 
300 Portraying these concerns in terms of a limit is not meant to discount the issues of work and wealth; 
after all, both refer to means of making a life. The limits result from the exclusive rendering of the 
question of “the whole” in these terms, their separation from a broader perspective and thus the 
constriction they effect with respect to the question of what the political entails. 
301 At several instances, Keynes reflects upon the limits of monetary policy. See (CW ix, 357).   
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our monetary and credit arrangements; none where the results of bad working are so 
disastrous socially; and none, where it is easier to find a scientific solution” (PS 2, 
237).  It is a cause as general as the theory itself – so general, that it transcends the 
aims of political struggles and revolutionary impetus (CW ix, 225).  Money is a 
temptation for the ‘economic prince’ as well as the political philosopher, who searches 
the working foundation of the body politic. His task is to counter the excesses of fear 
and fetishism, excessive claims of debt and excessive counter fetishism, excessive fear 
and excessive hope, undue rights of inherited wealth and undue claims of the many. 
Cheap money promised to do all of it: it lured the investor with higher prices and it 
cast a veil of plenty over the reward of labor so that all would seemingly benefit from 
the increase of such produced wealth, giving labor its retroactive rewards and filling 
the funds, which had been used before the fact. The performative power of money - 
due to the credit it garners for the supposed stability of value - allows leaping into the 
future and smoothing the muddled machine. Herein lies the main theoretical 
intervention of the General Theory that such a ‘leap’ will and “has” to bring about 
material effects, however indirect and vague they might be. The monetary step into the 
future, once it is not caught in the fearful fetishism but thrown into the world as 
capital, will drag the rest behind it.  The savings used beforehand will retroactively be 
materialized; the equation knows no exception. Meanwhile, cheap money eases the 
“dead hand of the past”, that is, former credits whose value falls with cheaper money, 
and it appeases social strife: “unconscious economists”. Step by step all claims to 
income from money alone would fade, offering no advantage, but rather disadvantage 
in respect to the productive circles of the body politic. Above all, it would close the 
gap between the measures of economic temporality pertaining to a particular time and 
place and the measures imposed by money: as money becomes cheaper and the 
interest rate is steadily and authoritatively brought down, the gap closes. The ‘money- 
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wizard’ had but one precondition: a system closed upon itself, whose boundaries 
would ensure that the performative effects of money come full circle. The equation of 
leaps into the future and lags behind the productive actualization of rising incomes and 
rising margins knows no exception. The oikos of the nation is secured in the nomos of 
such assumed closure. 
This portrayed assumption of closure should not be misunderstood in terms of 
a “self-sufficient” national body tout court. Keynes did consider its merits during the 
thirties, but he did not mean to call Britain to “grow its own vine.”
302 Towards the end 
of the war his institutional imagination and theoretical endeavor was to design an 
international monetary regime that would facilitate trade without restricting the 
“making of measure” fitted to the respective circumstances of each national body. In 
fact, he applied the same kind of argument – pointing towards the possibility of 
expenditure and its leap into the future without forcing restrictions somewhere else - 
towards the international provision of funds. The ordered exchange between these 
well-kept national bodies was not to be undermined by the liquidity and abstract 
measure of money, forcing all to adhere to a single ‘clock’ and penalizing those who 
do not by withdrawal and flight into abstraction.  Thus, the national body envisioned is 
not a hermetically closed and isolated monad. It is rather a member in wider networks 
but geared towards its own internal dynamic and demands of livelihood. The paradigm 
of national developments, which became so dominant in the post-war years and 
                                                 
302 “I sympathize, therefore, with those who would minimize rather than with those who would 
maximize economic entanglement among nations. Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel--these 
are the things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is 
reasonably and conveniently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national. Yet, at the same 
time, those who seek to disembarrass a country of its entanglements should be very slow and wary. It 
should not be a matter of tearing up roots but of slowly training a plant to grow in a different direction” 
(CW xxi, 233f).  
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underwrote the discourses of Third World development, emulate this political vision 
as much as “hydraulic Keynesianism” bespeaks this political hope for closure.  
The significance of this nationally minded political vision with its monetary 
levers emerges when viewed in light of the problematique to which it answers. The 
conventional and hegemonic nature of economic facts and the limits of “scarcity” as a 
regulatory epistemology of the social body are here met with an equally visceral order 
involving a fear of political judgment and experiment beyond the wisdom of the 
“economic prince”.  Contained within this vision is certainly a theoretical sensibility 
towards the dangers of abstract measure, its making, its performative powers and its 
relation to the particularities of time and place. But this framework is not likely to 
open this problématique to the analysis of relations of power working within it. The 
internal drama of this social body evolves around misguided fears and fetishized 
desires, which need to be mended into a properly producing and reproducing social 
body. Keynes knew that the lever of monetary policies on which he pinned his liberal 
hopes could prove to be of limited efficacy. In this case, the public body of the state 
had to undertake the investments not forthcoming from those for whom the promises 
for return were not sufficient, regardless of the fact that the interest rate did not 
diverge from what could be expected. Returns too low and circuits too long seem to 
soften the boundaries between public and private, between economy and an-economy. 
But at stake for Keynes were not the boundaries of economy and hegemonic measures 
but the social body integrated and reproducing, circumscribing the horizon for 
thinking the role of the political: the state, which mended the productive body, both 
together forming a viable body politic. In so far as the desire for foundation and 
closure worked within this account of monetary policies and promised effects, it is not 
so surprising that the neat equations of ‘hydraulic Keynesianism’ did not provide 
solutions – as if indeed the whole problem was to cure fetishism and uncertainty.  
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As the above analysis has attempted to suggest, framing the question of 
economy as a technical matter had its roots in the “politics of time”, which revolved 
around the kernel of scarcity. Scarcity remained a part of economic objectivity via this 
historical narrative and served thereby as a foundation for Keynes’ ‘double 
constitution’. As the genealogy of scarcity presented in the first chapters was meant to 
elucidate, scarcity has always been about establishing the question of economy in 
terms of functional and necessary cohesion and an internally regulated social body, apt 
to make the foundation of the body politic. As much as scarcity ceased to provide the 
sufficient regulatory epistemology of the social body, so much did the outlines of the 
social body need to be delineated in different terms. The strong references towards 
national culture and its affective grounding take upon this role. The question of 
population is like a prism that it shows how these modes of imagining the visceral 
foundation of the body politic shift, changing from the internal regulation of scarcity 
to the more explicit concerns with unified culture and civilization, “innate quality” and 
degeneration. In each case, there is a ubiquitous orientation towards civilization and 
the making of it. Keynes remains deeply embroiled in the hegemonic distinctions 
between those who are not yet civilized and those who are, those who need to be 
governed by scarcity and fear and those who do not, those who are able to live in 
freedom and those who are not, those, who need the morality and necessity and those 
who do not. It is thus instructive to consider how Keynes dealt with the question of 
population, and it might provide evidence as to how the social body was kept in the 
role of founding and displacing considerations of power relations and political 
judgments within their desirable limits.
303  
                                                 
303 Population was a continuous topic in Keynes’ writings beginning early on with the manuscript on 
population in 1912 and concluding with the Galton Lecture in 1937, including a lecture on population in 
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Keynes’ writings on the question of population have gained less attention than 
his economic theories or even his political writings.
304 It is, as Toye writes, 
“something not altogether familiar” and something less conducive to “his glory” (Toye 
2000, 4); they bring to the fore the racial prejudices of Keynes and his consideration of 
eugenics as a proper object of state policy.
305 As the chairman of the Malthusian 
                                                                                                                                             
1914, remarks in parts of Economic Consequences of Peace and the paper on Malthus, published in 
Essays in Biography (CW x). The lecture of 1914 is not published in the Collected Works. In his book 
on Keynes Toye offers a transcript of this lecture, otherwise found in the King’s College Archive. The 
Galton Lecture given to the Eugenics Society in 1937, is printed in (CW xiv).  
304 In his comprehensive study Toye quotes only two predecessors, Rostow (1960) and Peterson, whose 
books did not yet take into account the unpublished lectures on population by Keynes, which only 
became available much later (7). It is interesting that Toye felt the need to preface his book on Keynes 
and population with a defense that “there is not intention, even if it were possible, to deny what already 
stands to his eternal credit, or to snatch away the laurels long since won”. “Keynes’s high 
achievements”, Toye assures, “should never be forgotten” (4). He presents the reaction to his first 
article in 1997 as “causing a passing storm. The article received extensive national newspaper 
coverage…On the one hand, there was outrage that I dared to say such a thing about a cultural icon like 
Keynes…One the other hand, there were elaborate expressions of indifference…since in those days 
everybody who was anybody was racially prejudiced” (4f). It seems in general that Keynes either elicits 
unconditional praise or accusations. Toye himself is quick to assure the reader that “it was not clear to 
me how Keynesian policies could be applied to development strategies except as austerity policies to 
permit capital accumulation” and that he had “provided an excellent early critique of Soviet economic 
policies” (5). But the question of publication and public reaction has much wider bearings than the story 
about Toye himself. It remains a curious circumstance that the lecture on population has not been 
published in the Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. “Keynes manuscript on ‘Population’, the 
basis of a lecture he delivered on 2 May 1914, was not finally published in any form until 1993, and 
then only as one small part of the archive of Keynes’ papers that was made available by King’s college. 
See Toye (p. 44f) for an account of the editorial policy. The lecture notes were not published in the 
omissions, while others, the much less substantial preface to the 1922 Cambridge economic handbook 
on population, was. Given that the lecture of 1914 has no parallel in other writings of Keynes, Toye 
finds the omission unintelligible (48). He refrains from any imputation of editorial intent, concluding 
only that “there is still work to do for the editors” (47). 
305 “[K]eynes revealed himself as much more of a neo-Malthusian and a Social Darwinist than Marshall 
ever was, even in his later years” (Toye 2000, 29). Marshall himself exhibited the strong link between 
population, civilization and racial distinction: “Since the whole English people, except the residuum, is 
a long way above the average of the world, it is scarcely possible to suppose any curtailment of English 
population which would not lower the average quality of the inhabitants of the world, their average 
wealth and average well-being” (Marshall, 1975/ 1867-90: 390-393, cit. In Toye 2000, 26). “There can 
be no doubt that his extension of the English race has been a benefit to the world. A check to the growth 
of population would do great harm if it affected only the more intelligent races, and particularly the 
more intelligent classes of those races…if Englishmen multiply less rapidly than the Chinese, this 
spiritless race will overrun portions of the earth that otherwise would have been peopled by English 
vigour” (ibid., 387).  
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League - a society for the propagation of birth control – Keynes had announced in a 
speech to its fiftieth anniversary: “I believe that for the future the problem of 
population will merge in the much greater problem of Heredity and Eugenics”. The 
manuscript continues with the crossed out sentences: “Quality must become the 
preoccupation” (PS 3, 113f). The social body, regulated internally and implicitly 
through scarcity, became the conscious project of the state, but in both cases it was 
cast as the cohesive foundation of the body politic. 
In his early writings, in which he was still thinking on the basis of the inherited 
economic orthodoxy of scarcity, the population issue retained its original Malthusian 
outlines and it stood at the center of economic objectivity:
306 “While it might be rash 
to argue from overpopulation to unemployment”, he concedes, “unemployment might 
be a symptom of a maladjustment very closely connected with population, namely that 
which results from an attempt on the part of organized labour or of the community as a 
whole to maintain real wages at a higher level than the underlying economic 
conditions are able to support” (CW xix, 121). Within the context of industrialized 
Britain the fact of overpopulation took on the air of a counterfactual, a “deep cause” 
for the economist to ascertain: “Is not a country over-populated when its standards are 
lower than they would be if its numbers were less? In that case the question of what 
numbers are desirable arises long before starvation sets in, and even before the level of 
life begins to fall. Perhaps we have already sacrificed too much to population. The 
average conditions are not good enough relatively to material progress” (ibid, 124). 
                                                 
306 This is apparent not only in the writings on Russia (Keynes 1971c), but also in the lecture given to 
the “Political Philosophy and Science Club” in 1914, in which he maintains that Malthus’ thesis is 
“simple, clear, and irrefutable... and that the question of population is the first and perhaps the most 
urgent and important of the problems facing those who seek to improve the material condition of 
mankind” (SS 1/215, 15f).  
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All the Malthusian fears of uncontrolled masses and disorder in these early writings, 
point towards the eternal ontology of scarcity: “That man are not better off than they 
are is because there are too many of them…(CW xvii, 270)
307” but they “might cease 
to trample on another to the wall” if they succeed to control the birth rate.” “Can we 
check the unborn hosts in time?” (ibid. 449) he asks and contends, just as Malthus did 
over hundred years earlier, that all schemes of improvement have to attend to the 
question of population, “for, in population, lying behind all other economic influences, 
is the deepest origin of the instability of our society” (CW xvii, 267).
308  
Keynes wrote this in the wake of the First World War, with the horrors of it in 
mind. As for Malthus, the “pressure of population” looms as the cause of war (CW 
xvii, 451). Remember that the search for self-inducing limitation of numbers was in 
Malthus’ writings the recipe for material progress, civilization and peace at the same 
time; only the barbarians, with their unbridled fecundity, furnished the material for 
ever-recurring war. But at the beginning of the twentieth century, after the colonial 
and imperial regimes of the nineteenth century, the double constitution of Malthus had 
been subjected to some changes, and the unconditional love for peace was replaced 
                                                 
307 (Keynes 1971a). 
308 “Since the days of Malthus and his followers, enthusiasts for new social schemes have always been 
disposed to regard the theory of population as an intellectualist device for pouring cold water on 
generous ideas. Yet the solution of this problem is fundamental to any social scheme, which aims at 
guaranteeing a certain minimum standard of life to everybody. The conception of the ‘minimum’ leads 
immediately to the proportion between aggregate numbers and aggregate resources – which is simply 
another way of stating the problem of population. To treat the question as primarily one of the 
redistribution of existing resources, without regard to the long-period effect of the new social order on 
the proportion between numbers and resources is a far-reaching error. In the light of present knowledge 
I am unable to see any possible method of materially improving the average human lot, which does not 
include a plan for restricting the increase in numbers (CW, xvii, 452f). Commenting on the Russian 
situation in 1922, he maintains, in the guise of scientific objectivity: “But it is clear that many deaths 
from special causes of persons in the prime of life are necessary year by year even to maintain an 
equilibrium. The diminished birth rate and the death from hard circumstances of children and of the 
aged afford some immediate relief to the pressure on the supply of food, but does not much affect the 
labour market for many years to come” (ibid., 435).  
  190
with a conditional acceptance of the necessity of war. The uninterrupted line of 
progressive civilization linking the savage abroad to the race of the labourer at home 
had become more divided than ever before into distinct races and firm cultural traits. 
In his early lecture on population from 1914 and the manuscript of 1912 Keynes 
argued that the problem of population now staged a different, international drama: 
“[I]n civilized countries the automatic increase in population does not put a perpetual 
barrier against the permanent improvement of the working class. But we are now 
aware of a new problem, hardly less serious…In a given country it is the poorest and 
least intelligent part of the population which reproduces itself most rapidly; and it is in 
the most civilized countries that the birth rate is falling off fastest” (Toye 2000, 
40f).
309 “If we look to the East, I believe that the Malthusian doctrine has never ceased 
to be applicable there to its fullest extent” (SS 1/215, 21).
310  The drama consists now 
of the struggle between the races and against the degeneration of one’s own race. “[I]f 
Darwin had learned from Malthus before, it is now the turn for Malthus to be qualified 
by Darwin”. The struggles become inescapable from the economists’ point of view, 
since the differences in the degrees of civilization will continue to impinge on 
mankind. While they might be couched in the worst prejudices, the deeper reality of 
them matches the patriots’ cause: “The patriot has something on his side. What is the 
use of weakening intentionally the stock which we think is the best, by a course of 
                                                 
309 The cultural and racial hierarchies are ubiquitous in Keynes. In one of his early papers on Egoism to 
the Apostles (1906), he frames the problem as follows: “I wonder if in our heart of hearts we would 
blame a man who would chose the most splendid flights of passionate and mutual affection…rather 
than linger through eternity…with the lowest feeling…although…the sacrifice were to lead to the 
enlightenment of two Negroid negroes from Central Africa and to their participation in the paradisaic 
supper party” (UA 26, 5).  
310 He goes on to explain in this lecture, how the material improvements due to “the advantages of 
settled, humane and intelligent government” have been eaten up by the growth of population. “It is a 
point of honour with the government of India to keep skeletons just alive”.  Toye points out that Keynes 
took a harsh view on the in any case very small helps granted.  
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action which, if it is isolated action, will have but negligible effect on the material 
prosperity of the world” (ibid, 27).  
These early perspectives on the unyielding problem of scarcity for two-thirds 
of mankind, the worry about hidden overpopulation, its racist inflection and the 
prospects of inevitable political strife seem to cease somewhat with the thirties – that 
is, with the experience of the First World War and Keynes’ re-articulation of the 
economic orthodoxy. By 1937 Keynes left the Malthusian League opposing the 
policies of positive selection (Toye 2000). In the end it was not the Malthus, theorist 
of scarcity and population, who received Keynes’ praise, but the Malthus who had 
theoretical sensibilities as to the temporal nature of economic matters, knew about the 
role of demand and opposed the system-building of Ricardo (CW x, and SS 1, 215)
311: 
“Malthus himself was overwhelmed by the “sophisms of the economists”. “A hundred 
years were to pass before there would be anyone to read with a shadow of sympathy 
and understanding this powerful and unanswerable attack on the great Ricardo. So 
Malthus’ name has been immortalized by his Principle of Population, and the brilliant 
intuitions of his more far reaching Principle of Effective Demand have been forgotten” 
(ibid). What remained of the issue of population was the field of intervention for the 
“economic prince”: the decision about levels of consumption and investment between 
the extremes of dissipating funds for the many and the accumulation of more things as 
well as the integration of all and each into productive circulation. Population still 
circumscribed the objectivity of what is “economically sound” and provided the 
ground for the ‘technical decision’ of the economic prince. In all his envisioning of the 
future, governed more or less by the rod of “economic necessity”, population belonged 
                                                 
311 (Keynes 1971f)  
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to the few items of the state’s agenda, beside peace.  
The political perspective, which was invoked in the limitation of economy to a 
foundation of the body politic, does not, therefore, stray from the horizon that 
economy has delineated for political reason all along in creating a social body that 
could be a foundation and a visceral displacement of political judgments about the 
powers inherent in the “order of things”. 
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CONCLUSION 
ECONOMY AND THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL 
 
At the beginning of this dissertation stood the suggestion that scientific accounts of 
modern economic reality are themselves a form of ‘doing political philosophy’. This 
suggestion clandestinely assumes that the notion of the political can be fruitfully 
extended to a much more general realm than the liberal sphere of rights or the 
republican agora. Taking distance from a discussion of the political in abstraction from 
the subject matter at the beginning, only some intimations were given about what 
‘doing philosophy’ would entail. It relied more implicitly than explicitly on Sheldon 
Wolin’s rendering of political philosophy as imagining the conditions and foundations 
of a desirable and viable order. He explicitly refers to the element of an “imaginative 
vision” pertaining to it in its aims to conjure the well-ordered whole (Wolin 2004, 10, 
17-20).  
Modern Economic thought - this is the most general claim of the thesis – fully 
partook in this  “architectonic impulse” (Wolin) for building and founding order. The 
political genealogy of modern economic objectivity attempted to show how the 
reflection on economic matters is inflected by this foundationalist desire. The work of 
historian Emma Rothschild, who was not too shy to assert that “we still live, at the 
onset of the twenty-first century, in a world which is defined, in important respects, by 
the French Revolution and of the Post-Revolutionary restoration,” encouraged me to 
state the thesis in this bold form (Rothschild 2001, 6). Against the “inner shuddering” 
upon the high running political passions and the new breadth of political claims in the 
context of the French Revolution and British Radicalism, the “circumscription and 
circumspection of political economy” (ibid.) belong to the making of a new foundation 
of the modern body politic. The first chapter corroborated this claim by showing that  
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Malthus was not only an economist, but also a political philosopher, who was troubled 
by a political problématique, which stood at the onset of his scientific account of 
economy and population. The threats resulting from the uncertain foundations of 
political judgment and the fears attached to its democratic extension were heightened, 
as questions of life and subsistence even introduced more complexities onto the 
political stage. The effects of this impending intermeshing of politics and issues of 
life, could result according to Malthus only in a “monstrous” mob, “clamouring for 
want of food”, which subjected political order to unceasing “carnage”.  The social 
body, governed by laws of its own and severed from the political stage, was posited by 
Malthus against the “inner shuddering” about the vagaries of judgment. The 
“architectonic impulse” of political philosophy leads at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century to a ‘double constitution’, which ordains an ‘order of bodies’ at a distance 
from political follies.  
In the wake of the making of this ‘double constitution’, the reflections on 
economic matters become inflected by this foundationalist impulse in prominent ways 
– which is the thesis expounded by the subsequent two chapters on Malthus. The 
second chapter offers a close reading of the concept of scarcity, which stands at the 
core of the definition of the subject matter of modern economics. The concept of 
scarcity refers not to a natural predicament of life. It belongs instead to a particular 
envisioning of a general condition of order, involving as its inner kernel a similar 
figure, which Malthus, the political philosopher, feared most: akin to the passionate 
and senseless mob, a raw force of life, which is governed by blindness about its own 
conditions of existence, follows its own immediate desires and turns any natural gift of 
abundance into misery. Against this blindness of life and its catastrophic disorder, 
Malthus posits the making of a proper order of the social body through a regulatory 
epistemology of scarcity. It belongs to the lasting effects of Malthus’ envisioning of  
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order, that he ties the recognition of the condition of existence to the experience of fear 
and scarcity, whereas the experience of abundance is akin to impending 
misrecognition. A close reading of Malthus’ principle of population has revealed the 
constitution of ‘economic objectivity’ as a constitution of a social epistemology - 
working internally in the social body – which guarantees the making of a viable and 
progressive body politic. Going back to the initially uttered astonishment regarding the 
epistemological privilege granted to economy to expose the fundamental reality of 
socio-political order, we might now place the very anchor of this privilege: it resides 
in the fact that economy established itself as an epistemology, without which blinding 
catastrophe is awaiting.  
The last chapter on Malthus then elaborates the issue as to how this general 
account of order, epistemology and scarcity is translated into the more recognizable 
categories of economy. The chapter traces the mechanisms through which economy is 
consistently established in terms of such regulatory epistemology, which links the 
experience of scarcity, deferral of desire, civilization, material wealth and a viable 
political order into an uninterrupted chain. While modern economy promises to lead 
away from scarcity to material plenty, this promise is always tainted by design: the 
‘body in pain’, the experience of scarcity remains and is supposed to remain an ever 
present threat and reality, since without it blinding abundance would ensue and the 
forces of savage life would remain unregulated. Reflections on economic matters thus 
remain caught in ensuring self-producing and reproducing order, satisfying the 
“architectonic impulse” of building foundations against the monstrous mingling of life 
and political reason. 
How inextricably the notion of economy has been tied to the making of 
civilization, of proper subjects of order, and to the foundational figure of scarcity is 
revealed at the close of the nineteenth century. Answering to the crumbling  
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foundations of the Victorian order in the imperial rivalries, revolutionary upheavals, 
colonial uprisings and social strife at home, Keynes announced the figure of economic 
man to be not only the most sorry figure that civilization has ever produced, but also 
charged it with the faults of utter misrecognition. Economy entered into an 
epistemological vertigo as bankers turned out to be blind, stock markets were on the 
verge of a nervous breakdown and the gold standard was more akin to the old-worn 
morality of bishops than to a proper measure of economic exchange. Keynes was, like 
Malthus, faced with a catastrophic historical situation, which he took as a result from 
the folly of political reason; neither imperial aspirations nor the politicization of the 
masses at home seemed to exhibit the proper exercise of political reason. But unlike 
Malthus, Keynes was also faced with the epistemological vertigo of economy.  
From this double de-stabilization, traced in the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter 
exposes Keynes’ envisioning of economic objectivity, which goes beyond the morality 
of scarcity and the epistemological foundation of economy. Starting with the notion of 
temporality and money, the question of economy is developed as a question of giving 
measure. This measure is not determined in a closed space of functional necessity. It 
opens economic objectivity to conventions of measurements and  - extrapolating this 
vision somewhat beyond Keynes – to relations of power. Upon a close reading of 
Keynes’ reflections on money and time and of his critique of the notion of economy 
inherited from the nineteenth century, it seems to be possible to retrieve an account of 
economic objectivity which remains cognizant of the specificity of economic relations, 
while it is not yet subjected to the demands of giving foundation. His reflections on 
money in terms of the vexed relations between abstraction, representation, materiality 
and temporality suggests an understanding of economic matters, which opens the field 
of economic thought to social and political theory and economy to political reason. 
But Keynes did neither eschew the foundationalist desires of political philosophy, nor  
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the desires for scientific authority (one is thereby fuelling and shaping the other). Like 
Malthus, he envisioned a proper body politic upon the foundation of economy. This 
foundation did not reside any more in an unqualified epistemology of scarcity. 
Economy would only function as a foundation, if its measure was adjusted, tinkered to 
appease the regulatory needs, but also to undo the excesses of the ‘economy of 
scarcity’. The economy was to become a machine in the hands of the ‘economic 
prince’, serving the higher ends of the “ideal republic.” Keynes’ envisioning of the 
body politic stands in the tradition of British liberalism: his economic machine was not 
modeled upon the planned control, but put all its hope on the indirect machinations of 
money, wisely used to lure capital, cast a veil labor’s rewards until plenty turns around 
to it and to undo the “dead head of the past”. Like the corn laws of Malthus, which had 
to bear the weight of ensuring the viable order of the body politic, the Keynesian 
hopes on money belonged to the political vision of the proper ways to found a body 
politic. 
Aside from the political hopes Keynes put on money – of whose limits he was 
also aware –, the political vision of a machine in the hands of the economic prince 
relied on grounds which were much more problematic. Keynes’ account of the social 
body unified in culture and measured reproduction, would have confirmed all of what 
Hannah Arendt thought to be most problematic about modern political reason. To her, 
modern political reason reduces its horizon to the maintenance and administration of 
biological life, thereby transforming the polis into a huge household to be efficiently 
run (Arendt 1974, 33, 218).  The fact that Keynes asserted the limits of economy and 
took utilitarianism to be the most “dreadful heresy” which has ever “captured the ear 
of civilized people” would have given her only a slight moment of theoretical 
concurrence. Keynes surrounded the newly found limits of economy and utilitarianism 
with the Platonic search for the good, undertaken by those individuals, who were  
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civilized and strong enough to live outside of economic necessity. But for Arendt, the 
Platonic search for the good and the polis belong merely to an older variation of the 
same subjugation of the political space of plurality and freedom to a philosophical 
foundation of good order. Viewed from her perspective, it is quite unsurprising that 
economists have a liking for Plato’s philosophy, given how they both tend to search 
for the proper installment of the good order by a principle beyond doubt. 
To disclose the economists as political philosophers and ask for the recognition 
of this element in their rendering of economic objectivity does therefore not provide 
the opening of other possibilities of thinking about economic and political matters by 
itself. The foundationalist desires pertain not only to political philosophy in the clothes 
of economic reasoning. As the few remarks on Arendt’s critique of Plato have 
indicated, the hope to find unquestioned grounds and the worries about the uncertain 
basis of political judgment belong prominently to the tradition of political philosophy. 
Ranciere has also used Plato as his touchstone to exemplify the problematic hopes 
political philosophy put into the well-ordered whole. Ranciere thus takes Plato’s 
republic as a “masterpiece of economy”, in which individual needs and the means to 
satisfy them are already distributed into useful positions and assembled into a working 
whole serving higher ends (Ranciere 2004, 3, 10f). Political theorists, like Arendt and 
Ranciere are thus problematizing the notion of the political, which remains caught in 
attempt to undo the uncertainties of political judgment by conjuring up foundations for 
it. Bonnie Honig described this tendency, which concerns the political philosophy and 
economic thought alike, “to confine politics (conceptually and territorially) to the 
juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, 
building consensus, maintaining agreements or consolidation communities and 
identities” (1993, 2). Against this hope to undo uncertainty and contingency, the 
theorists mentioned here have sought to develop an understanding of the political,  
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which includes the virtues of the contestation of these “partitioning of the sensible” 
(Ranciere). They, and others, have all done so in different ways, concluding with 
different definitions of the political, which would include these modes of contestation. 
An in-depth discussion of these notions and how they relate to the findings of the 
present project would already point beyond the argument of this work, and can only be 
intimated here.  
Hannah Arendt’s account of the political realm insisted on recognition of the 
fundamental plurality of different voices and the ability to begin anew. Both aspects 
were eschewed by a regime of necessity, be it by the rule of an ‘invisible hand’ or 
through the social organization of the life processes. While for her the reign necessity 
belonged to the universal condition of life itself, the necessities pertaining to social 
organization belonged to the predicament of modern societies. Both always threatened 
to impose themselves onto the precarious reality of the political sphere, which belongs 
to human artifice and as to be maintained by continual actualization of addressing the 
others as equals with plural voices. The necessity of life could thus not be addressed in 
this sphere, and especially in her account of the French Revolution, such views on 
issues of life and economy were prominently articulated. 
“The most power necessity of which we are aware in self-introspection,” 
Arendt says, “is the life-process which permeates our bodies”. These natural and 
biological necessities gained political import during the French Revolution “when the 
poor, driven by the needs of their bodies, burst onto the scene of the French 
Revolution…”. “[N]ecessity appeared with them and the result was…that the new 
republic was stillborn”. The new revolutionary government was subjected to the law 
of welfare of the people and to the reproduction of their species.” Happiness, not 
freedom, was their aim – this is how Arendt bemoans the course of this political 
beginning (Arendt 1963, 53). Apart from the fact that there is always also an  
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imputation that the appearance of the “downtrodden multitude” on the political stage is 
governed by nothing but immediate bodily desires, as they do not have the taste for 
freedom, Arendt here reproduces the tight bond between economy, life and necessity. 
This is a bond that is itself knit in the search for foundation, created in a political 
vision and preserved under the heading of “economic facts”. But as the genealogy of 
scarcity might have shown, and as its surpassing in the account of economic 
objectivity in Keynes might have made visible, it is a self-inflicted restriction of the 
“space of freedom and plurality” that political philosophers lament. Arendt’s strategy 
to shield the political sphere from the questions of life thus accepts the very effects of 
the foundational reasoning she is opposed to.  
Ranciere has always been adamant of the problematic division of the political 
from the socio-economic sphere and has criticized the attempts to strife for a pure 
republican account of the political world of speech and deed, which remains oblivious 
to the socio-economic realm. Without addressing in sufficient ways his way of 
envisioning how the political horizon can address the question of the “partitioning of 
the sensible,” it might be sufficient to point out that a different account of economic 
objectivity, as it became apparent with Keynes, can underwrite and support his 
attempts to undo the strict division between these two realms in sensible ways. 
Likewise, contributions to the burgeoining debates around biopolitics and 
governmentality become possible on the basis of the work done here. The figure of 
‘naked life’ in the epistemology of scarcity envisioned by Malthus at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century adds towards a careful historical genealogy of the question of 
life, which is so generally and pervasively discussed now. 
The present work has engaged economic thought with a political 
problematique of foundationalist political reasoning. Within the accounts of economic 
objectivity and facts itself, it has searched for the traces of both, the yearning to find  
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foundation in economy and the contingencies and “fissures” it is wrought with (Honig 
1993, 5). It presented the economists Malthus and Keynes as interlocutors for political 
theory, and showed their reliance on political categories and the much broader 
philosophical, cultural and social-theoretical strands in which they partake.  
By explicating these strands and by opening the functional and foundationalist 
account of economy to the discussion of its implicit political theory, this dissertation 
hopes to contribute, in however modest ways, to a re-thinking of the economy and its 
relation to the political. The traveling experts of modern times, the “dentists”, 
“electricians”, “doctors” or ‘economic princes’ assume a technicality of economic 
questions which hides the political-philosophical foundations, on which these 
assumptions rest. But the theoretical conversation within the realms of political and 
social theory about the questions of power, the notion of the political and the making 
of forms of life pertain intimately to them and their field of expertise, thereby 
disrupting the purely functional, technical or scientific authority, which is claimed 
when questions of economy are at stake. 
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